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Abstract 
Prehistoric art, like the Venus of Willendorf sculpture, shows that we have 
always looked for ways to distil fundamental human characteristics and capture 
them in physically embodied representations of the self. Recently, this 
undertaking has gained new momentum through the introduction of robots that 
resemble humans in their shape and their behaviour. These social robots are 
envisioned to take on important roles: alleviate loneliness, support vulnerable 
children and serve as helpful companions for the elderly. However, to date, few 
commercially available social robots are living up to these expectations. Given 
their importance for an ever older and more socially isolated society, rigorous 
research at the intersection of psychology, social neuroscience and human-robot 
interaction is needed to determine to which extent mechanisms active during 
human-human interaction can be co-opted when we encounter social robots.  
This thesis takes an anthropocentric approach to answering the question how 
socially motivated we are to interact with humanoid robots. Across three 
empirical and one theoretical chapter, I use self-report, behavioural and neural 
measures relevant to the study of interactions with robots to address this 
question. With the Social Motivation Theory of Autism as a point of departure, 
the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) investigates the relevance of 
interpersonal synchrony for human-robot interaction. This chapter reports a null 
effect: participants did not find a robot that synchronised its movement with 
them on a drawing task more likeable, nor were they more motivated to ask it 
more questions in a semi-structured interaction scenario. As this chapter heavily 
relies on self-report as a main outcome measure, Chapter 4 addresses this 
limitation by adapting an established behavioural paradigm for the study of 
human-robot interaction. This chapter shows that a failure to conceptually 
extend an effect in the field of social attentional capture calls for a different 
approach when seeking to adapt paradigms for HRI.  
Chapter 5 serves as a moment of reflection on the current state-of-the-art 
research at the intersection of neuroscience and human-robot interaction. Here, 
I argue that the future of HRI research will rely on interaction studies with 
mobile brain imaging systems (like functional near-infrared spectroscopy) that 
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allow data collection during embodied encounters with social robots. However, 
going forward, the field should slowly and carefully move outside of the lab and 
into real situations with robots. As the previous chapters have established, well-
known effects have to be replicated before they are implemented for robots, 
and before they are taken out of the lab, into real life. The final empirical 
chapter (Chapter 6), takes the first step of this proposed slow approach: in 
addition to establishing the detection rate of a mobile fNIRS system in 
comparison to fMRI, this chapter contributes a novel way to digitising optode 
positions by means of photogrammetry.  
In the final chapter of this thesis, I highlight the main lessons learned conducting 
studies with social robots. I propose an updated roadmap which takes into 
account the problems raised in this thesis and emphasise the importance of 
incorporating more open science practices going forward. Various tools that 
emerged out of the open science movement will be invaluable for researchers 
working on this exciting, interdisciplinary endeavour.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
In the beloved children’s classic ‘The Adventures of Pinocchio’, a wooden 
marionette comes to life through the hands of master puppeteer Geppetto 
(Collodi, 1883). Pinocchio ventures out into the world and after a long series of 
misfortunes eventually learns to show empathy and kindness towards Geppetto 
and others. The puppet’s understanding of fundamental human virtues finally 
culminates in its metamorphosis into a real boy. The story of this 
transformation, from a lifeless object to a fully functioning human, has been re-
told in various forms in the science fiction literature, and echoes a principal 
desire in robotics today: to create a machine that perfectly embodies the traits 
that make us fundamentally human and fundamentally social - a robot that is 
independent and can learn.  
Since its inception, the scientific field of robotics has been closely intertwined 
with science fiction literature, with the first mention of the word robot made by 
Karel Čapek in his 1920 play ‘Rossum’s Universal Robots’ (Hockstein et al., 
2007). In this play, robots who look almost indistinguishable from humans are 
exploited as factory slaves and later rebel against their human makers, another 
popular trope in science fiction. A bit later, the term ‘robotics’ was coined by 
Isaac Asimov, in his short story ‘Liar!’, which features a robot that is compelled 
to lie so as not to upset its human creators (1941). While these terms were 
introduced historically quite late, visions of automata have existed for almost as 
long as humans have lived together in societies. From ancient Egypt, Greece and 
China, to the 18th century ‘Turk’ (a fake chess playing machine, which in fact 
was controlled by a human hiding inside the device) and the friendly Japanese 
‘Gakutensoku’ - mechatronic puppets and automatons have fuelled the public 
imagination of what might be possible in terms of human-fabricated autonomous 
agents that interact with us - almost as equals (Frumer, 2020; Schwartz, 2019). 
Goodrich and Schultz (2007) remark in their survey on human-robot interaction 
(HRI) that the impact of science fiction literature on robotics cannot be denied: 
the inventors of the very first industrial robot – ‘Unimate’, a mechanical arm 
deployed at the General Motors car factory in the spring of 1961, were initially 
inspired by Asimov’s stories. The authors reflect on the relatively young field of 
19 
human-robot interaction, which they define as “the field of study dedicated to 
understanding, designing and evaluating robotic systems for use by or with 
humans” (p. 204). In the late 1960s a big leap forward was accomplished when 
Nilsson published his work on the first autonomous robot (‘Shakey’), which was 
able to navigate around a block obstacle course (Kuipers et al., 2017; Nilsson, 
1969). 
These breakthroughs in autonomous robotics, as Broadbent (2017) and others 
have argued, were facilitated by developments in the nascent field of artificial 
intelligence and the foundations laid by Alan Turing in his work on digital 
computing (1950). Goodrich and Schultz (2007) cite the first meeting of the IEEE 
Symposium on Robot & Human Interactive Communication (RoMan) in 1992 and 
the first explicitly multidisciplinary meeting of the ACM International Conference 
on Human-Robot Interaction (ACM-HRI) in 2006 as defining moments in the 
emergence of HRI as a scientific field of study. In addition to these initial 
scientific meetings, the authors mention engineering and technical challenges as 
another important catalyst, such as the RoboCup Search and Rescue competition 
(Goodrich & Schultz, 2007). Further, the authors note that the field of human-
robot interaction has been driven by its applications, and they reflect that major 
developments have been facilitated in part due to interest in domains such as 
search and rescue, and space exploration. This is also evident in the ‘three Ds of 
robotization’: robots for dangerous, dull and dirty work (Takayama et al., 2008).  
Early enthusiasm for the potential of robotics is perhaps best illustrated with Bill 
Gates’ essay in the Scientific American (2008) ‘A robot in every home’, which 
envisioned that in the near future, robots would become part of our everyday 
lives – much like the personal computer. These robots, he wrote, would help 
with various tasks in the household, and in addition to providing assistance, 
would also provide companionship. While his vision of ubiquity has not quite 
come true yet, it is the case that many modern households employ robotic 
vacuum cleaners, like the Roomba robot, or speech-based personal assistants, 
like the Alexa system (Šabanović, 2010; Vallverdú & Trovato, 2016), suggesting 
his vision might be slowly but surely moving toward reality. 
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1.1. Defining social robots 
Within the field of human-robot interaction, social robots take on a special role, 
and fall under the category of ‘proximate interaction’, in which “humans and 
robots interact as peers or companions” (Goodrich & Schultz, 2007, p. 205). In a 
bibliometric analysis by Mejia and Kajikawa (2017), it becomes apparent that the 
social robotics literature comprises only a small part of the larger robotics 
knowledgebase: 2.3%, to be exact. According to their search in the Web of 
Science database, the authors identified discussions on social robotics appearing 
as early as 1970, but, as the authors illustrated, it was not until the late 1990s 
that the field started growing rapidly. Based on reference information of the 
extracted articles, the authors were also able to identify relevant clusters that 
represent the social robotics knowledgebase. The largest clusters in social 
robotics research can be summarized as ‘robots as social partners’ and ‘human 
factors in human-robot interaction’. Interestingly, Mejia and Kajikawa (2017) 
also point out that research trends emphasize the various fields of application 
for social robots: robots as companions, robots as educators for children, and 
robots as assistants for the elderly. This is consistent with a trend identified by 
Šabanović, who in interviews with robotics researchers in the US and Japan 
identified that social robots “often represent technological fixes”, i.e. using a 
technological approach to solve a pressing societal problem (2010, p. 349). 
Furthermore, when investigating what constitutes the majority of the 
knowledgebase in social robotics, Mejia and Kajikawa (2017) find that even 
though they play a central role, the social sciences are hardly represented 
(Figure 1). The authors write aptly: “Social robotics is social in its intention, but 
its knowledgebase is concentrated in the engineering and technology domains” 
(p.11). 
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Figure 1 - Subject areas in the ACM-HRI conference proceedings 
The subject areas are presented as a tree map with the size of the area representing the 
number of conference proceedings in each category. Robotics being one of the most 
prominent categories (947 results), there are some nods to the afore-mentioned social 
sciences: psychology (143 search results) and user studies (175 results). Data taken from: 
https://dl.acm.org/conference/hri  
 
Indeed, while the interdisciplinary nature of social robotics is emphasized 
throughout the literature, this observation by Mejia and Kajikawa reveals an 
interesting tension that has also been voiced by Broadbent (2017) and Eyssel 
(2017) – the literature could benefit from knowledge about the mechanisms of 
human social behaviour gained in psychology, the cognitive science and 
neuroscience (which are here referred to as ‘social sciences’, but depending on 
the country and higher education conventions are occasionally considered as 
part of science, technology, engineering, or mathematics). This issue is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.   
When reviewing the social robotics literature, it becomes apparent that there is 
not a generally agreed upon understanding of what social robots are, and what 
effectively constitutes a robot as being ‘social’ continues to be negotiated and 
debated by various authors. Sarrica and colleagues (2019) investigated the 
question of how social robots are understood by analysing definitions in articles 
published by the International Journal of Social Robotics between 2009 and 
2015. An overview of the most popular definitions they identified is presented in 
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Table 1. By investigating the most often cited definitions, it becomes apparent 
how heterogenous the understanding of social robots is. 
Despite this lack of homogeneity, Sarrica and colleagues (2019) were able to 
identify a few shared traits of the definitions: social robots are physically 
embodied agents that have some (or full) autonomy and engage in social 
interactions with humans, by communicating, cooperating and making decisions. 
These behaviours are then interpreted by human onlookers as ‘social’, according 
to current norms and conventions. It is of note that in discussions of what 
constitutes a social robot, many authors listed in Table 1 acknowledge that a 
truly social robot, as described in their definition, remains a vision of the future. 
Lee and colleagues (2006) emphasize that we are still far away from 
sophisticated social robots depicted in popular movies like Stephen Spielberg’s 
A.I. Artificial Intelligence and Dautenhahn (2007) remarks that she remains 
sceptical: “It is unclear whether the ‘social-emotional’ dimension in human-
human interaction can be fulfilled by robots, whether the inherently mechanical 
nature of HRIs can be replaced by truly meaningful social exchanges” (p. 701). 
Interestingly, this point is somewhat at odds with her argumentation that 
exploring social competencies for robots might actually be the missing piece in 
building stronger artificial intelligence. 
Table 1 - Popular definitions of social robots in the literature, identified by Sarrica and 
colleagues (2019). 
Authors Year Key term(s) Definition 
Breazeal 2003 sociable “Denoting robots that pro-actively 
engage with humans, having their 
own internal goals and needs in order 
to satisfy internal social aims (drives, 
emotions, etc.). These robots require 
deep models of social cognition not 
only in terms of perception but also 
of human modelling.”  
(p. 169) 
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Fong 2003 socially 
interactive 
“We describe robots that exhibit the 
following ‘human social’ 
characteristics:  
express and/or perceive emotions; 
communicate with high-level 
dialogue; learn models of or 
recognize other agents; establish 
and/or maintain social relationships; 
use natural cues (gaze, gestures, 
etc.); exhibit distinctive personality 
and character; and may learn and/or 
develop social competencies.”  
(p. 145) 
 
Duffy 2003  “A physical entity embodied in a 
complex, dynamic, and social 
environment sufficiently empowered 
to behave in a manner conducive to 
its own goals and those of its 
community.”  
(p. 177) 
 
Bartneck & 
Forlizzi 
2004  “A social robot is an autonomous or 
semi-autonomous robot that 
interacts and communicates with 
humans by following the behavioural 
norms expected by the people with 
whom the robot is intended to 
interact.” 
(p.592)  
 
Lee 2006  “Social robots are a new type of 
robot whose major purpose is to 
interact with humans in socially 
meaningful ways.” 
(p.962)  
 
Dautenhahn 2007 socially 
intelligent 
“A robot companion is a robot that 
(i) makes itself ‘useful’, i.e. is able 
to carry out a variety of tasks in 
order to assist humans, e.g. in a 
domestic home environment, and (ii) 
behaves socially, i.e. possesses social 
skills in order to be able to interact 
with people in a socially acceptable 
manner.” 
(p. 685) 
 
Hegel 2009 social 
interface 
(form, 
“A social robot is a robot plus a 
social interface. A social interface is 
a metaphor which includes all social 
attributes by which an observer 
24 
function, 
context) 
judges the robot as a social 
interaction partner.”  
(p. 174) 
 
A few authors go further and present comprehensive frameworks. For example, 
Kahn and colleagues (2006) argue that social robots should be evaluated against 
‘psychological benchmarks’, which capture fundamental aspects of human life. 
Using illustrative scenarios of what our future lives with social robots could look 
like, the authors raise important questions about whether it is in the best 
interest of companies and stakeholders to produce fully autonomous robots. 
Giving a benign example, the authors ask: would users want a robot to disagree 
with them about which card game to play? Might it be problematic to think of 
social agents as ‘useable’ objects? Who should be held accountable, and do 
these robots possess intrinsic moral value? In total nine possible benchmarks are 
described, which illustrate the central problem Kahn and colleagues, as well as 
many other social robotics researchers, characterize: “to understand ourselves 
as a species is one of the profound undertakings of a lifetime” (p. 384). This 
point is further elaborated in Chapter 2, where I illustrate the importance of 
social robots for gaining more understanding about the human brain and social 
behaviour. 
Finally, Baraka and colleagues (2019), in the face of the growing diverse 
landscape of social robots, propose their extended framework, by illustrating 
seven relevant dimensions of social robots: their appearance, the social 
capabilities, autonomy and intelligence of the robot, the proximity and temporal 
profile of the interaction and the context of the interaction (i.e., its purpose 
and application area). In their appearance classification system, they distinguish 
between bio-inspired robots (these can be human- or animal-inspired), artifact 
shaped (for example robots resembling man-made objects or those that are 
imaginary) and functional robots (for example drones).  
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Figure 2 - Robots introduced in this chapter (and mentioned throughout this thesis) 
First row, from left to right: Kismet (1997), Paro (2003), iCub (2004) and the Kaspar (2006) 
robot. Second row, from left to right: Pepper (2014), MiRo (2015), Cozmo (2016) and Nao 
(2008). The ABOT database (http://www.abotdatabase.info/) and the IEEE “ROBOTS” 
website (https://robots.ieee.org/) provide more comprehensive overviews of available 
platforms. Image sources: Kismet by Rama on Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 3.0 fr); Paro Therapy 
Robot by Theron Trowbridge on Flickr (CC BY-NC 2.0); iCub by Jiuguang Wang on Flickr 
(CC BY-SA 2.0), Kaspar by Loz Pycock on flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0); ); https://www.so-
bots.com/robots; MiRo by UK in Japan- FCO on Flickr (CC BY 2.0). Nao artwork by Julia 
Fechner. 
 
After this initial ontological exploration, I will now briefly consider social 
robotics through the lens of popular platforms for research and their application 
areas outside of experimental research. 
1.2. Overview of popular social robots in scientific 
research  
In the following, robotic platforms are introduced which have fundamentally 
shaped the field of social robotics (Figure 2). This list is not intended to be 
representative of all commercially or custom designed robots that are currently 
available. Instead, it is intended to highlight some of the main social robots that 
are currently in use, the different applications that are being envisioned for 
social robots, and the various avenues of research that are currently being 
pursued. 
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1.2.1. Kismet  
Many consider Kismet to be the first ‘intelligent’ social robot (Breazeal & 
Scassellati, 1999). Kismet was designed following the principle of building a 
sociable robot (Table 1), which, as the authors reason, relies on in-depth models 
of social cognition (Breazeal, 2003). Kismet has rudimentary facial features that 
resemble those of a human and can convey positive and negative facial 
emotional expressions by dynamically moving its eyelids, eyebrows, mouth, and 
ears. Breazeal and Scassellati (1999) modelled Kismet’s behaviour on that of 
young infants, whose mothers, despite limited means of explicit communication, 
interpret infant behaviour as intentional and infant proto-typical speech as 
meaningful. Kismet is programmed to look for perceptual cues in the 
environment that satisfy its internal drives for socialness, stimulation or rest. By 
means of implementing this software architecture, the authors argue that they 
have implemented proto-social responses that will convey intentionality of the 
robot towards its human partners. Following an initial proof-of-concept 
evaluation (Breazeal & Scassellati, 1999), human-robot interaction experiments 
with Kismet have laid the foundation for the design of social robots that are able 
to detect and mirror human emotions (Breazeal, 2003). 
1.2.2. Paro  
This social robot, designed to look and behave like a baby harp seal, was 
developed by Shibata and colleagues at the National Institute of Advanced 
Industrial Science and Technology in Japan (Shibata et al., 2003). The Paro robot 
can move its eyelids, head, front and back flippers, listens via microphone and 
produces harp seal sounds via speakers. It responds to tactile stimulation by 
means of sensors located at various points across its body and thus interactively 
responds to the user’s touch. After initial favourable evaluations in science 
museums in Japan and the UK pertaining to the robots perceived likeability, Paro 
has been deployed and evaluated in the context of elderly care homes as a 
therapeutic companion for patients with dementia (Shibata et al., 2003). As one 
of the most successful and most-widely sold social robots, several studies have 
shown that though its behavioural repertoire is very limited, its interactive 
capabilities and appearance have had positive effects on elderly participants and 
patients suffering from dementia (Broadbent, 2017; Kidd et al., 2006; Robinson 
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et al., 2013; Selma et al., 2013). Data from a randomized controlled trial and a 
long-term observational study indicated that interactions with the seal robot 
reduced loneliness and increased opportunities for interactions among the care 
home residents (Kidd et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2013). 
1.2.3. iCub  
Much like Kismet, iCub, the ‘robot child’, is based on theories of developmental 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience (L. Natale et al., 2017; Sandini et al., 
2004). Formerly known as RobotCub, this robot was developed as a testbed for 
the theory of embodied cognition. This theory describes the phenomenon of 
learning and development via physical interaction with the world through a 
human(oid) body (Sandini et al., 2004). Like a child exploring its environment, 
iCub was designed to manipulate its surroundings, imitate its human partners 
and communicate with them. iCub has been used in cognitive neuroscience 
studies to investigate whether humans perceive it as intentional and as an agent 
with a mind (Ghiglino et al., 2020; J. Perez-Osorio et al., 2018). Across several 
studies, it has been shown that especially knowledge cues about the behaviour 
of the robot influence the degree to which participants perceived the robot’s 
intentionality (Wiese et al., 2017; Wykowska et al., 2016).  
1.2.4. Kaspar  
Another field of application for social robots that is currently being explored is 
the context of social skills training for children with an autism spectrum 
condition (ASC). Kose-Bagci and colleagues (2009) argue that the reduced 
behavioural repertoire of the Kaspar robot might offer an opportunity to interact 
with children who lack social interaction skills typical for their age and their 
level of development, hallmark indicators of an ASC. Here, the humanoid form 
of the robot is preferred, as the authors speculate that the social skills learning 
may translate to human-human interactions outside the lab. However, the 
evidence base for this line of research is considered weak, and additional studies 
have repeatedly been invited to investigate these questions with larger sample 
sizes (Broadbent, 2017; Pennisi et al., 2016). 
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1.2.5. Pepper 
The commercially produced humanoid Pepper robot (SoftBank Robotics) has 
been used in a multitude of human-robot interaction studies to investigate its 
social acceptance, its role in educational contexts and general attitudes towards 
the robot (Jacobs, 2018; Kennedy et al., 2013; Thunberg et al., 2017). The robot 
was originally built as a business-to-business product for SoftBank Robotics stores 
in Japan, however, it eventually transformed into a popular platform to attract 
customers into stores worldwide (see Figure 3), and became a tool in academic 
research (Pandey & Gelin, 2018). Its design was informed by evaluations of the 
previous model, the Nao robot (Figure 2). Users expected robots to be taller 
than the 58cm-tall Nao, so Pepper’s height was targeted at the height of a 
person sitting in a chair (Pandey & Gelin, 2018). Pepper’s design also references 
themes from Japanese culture, including its manga-inspired eyes and the hip 
joint, which allows the robot to bow (Pandey & Gelin, 2018). This robotic 
platform was used in Chapter 3 of this thesis, and more details on its degrees-of-
freedom and inbuilt features are given there. While Pepper is the next 
generation of SoftBank’s robots, a study by Thunberg, Thellman and Ziemke 
(2017) found that participants were more likely to comply with the request of a 
Nao robot, compared to the Pepper robot’s requests to return a book to the 
experimenters. Mubin and colleagues (2018) investigated its use in public spaces 
and found that it was less popular than the Nao robot (maybe owing to the 
robots’ respective price points), with more papers designing and evaluating 
interaction scenarios for the Nao robot in public spaces. The authors identified 
papers that evaluated Pepper’s social acceptability in a shopping mall, an 
elderly care home, in a remote classroom and as a customer service employee in 
a hotel lobby scenario (Aaltonen et al., 2017; Stock & Merkle, 2018; Tanaka et 
al., 2015; Yang et al., 2017).  
1.2.6. MiRo 
Taking a different approach, the MiRo robot is a biomimetic system, whose 
design does not aim to imitate human social cognition, but rather the brain and 
behaviour of a simpler mammalian animal (Collins et al., 2015). The developers 
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explicitly justify their design choice of animal morphology as a strategy to 
mitigate potential disappointment of users and their expectations towards the 
social capabilities of the robot. The design of the robot features light patterns 
under the translucent shell of the back, which satisfies two goals: the simple 
communication of affect and increasing the salience of the interaction with an 
artificial, rather than a real, social agent (Collins et al., 2015). The robot, which 
evokes a pet-like impression, includes characteristics taken from “puppies, 
kittens and rabbits” (Collins et al., 2015, p. 2). The robot is described as an 
edutainment product, which alludes to its intended purpose as an educational 
tool for children. However, the robot has also been explored as a fall alert 
system, relevant especially to the population of over 80-year-olds, who are 
expected to fall in their home environments at least twice a year (Georgiou et 
al., 2020). In their proof-of-principle study, the authors demonstrate that MiRo 
could be used as a mobile and smart tool to locate a person on the ground, and 
send a help signal if no movement of the person is detected. 
1.2.7. Cozmo  
This commercial robot was initially developed by Anki (USA) as a children’s toy. 
However, the research community has embraced the palm-sized Cozmo (Figure 
2), especially for its engaging behavioural animations and expressive, emotional 
facial expressions, which were informed by an animator who worked on ‘Wall-E’, 
the Disney Pixar movie (Chaudhury et al., 2020; Skågeby, 2018). Initial studies 
show that long-term interactions in a socializing intervention with this social 
robot do not enhance human-like empathic responses towards it when it is 
shown in simulated pain, and another recent study implies that while 
participants behave reciprocally towards the robot in an economic game, there 
is no evidence for pro-social behaviour towards it (Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019; 
Hsieh et al., 2020). As a platform for researchers, especially when it comes to 
long-term human-robot interaction, it could prove useful, as it collects a wide 
range of information about the user, similar to the behavioural sampling method 
(Chaudhury et al., 2020; Henschel, Hortensius, et al., 2020b). However, it should 
be noted that like many social robots, future research efforts might be limited 
by the demise of the company, which ultimately leads to ceased support for the 
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robot (Hoffman, 2019). This common problem will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
1.3. The social robot paradox  
Duffy coined the ‘social robot paradox’, which has remained a critical point in 
social robotics over the years (2005, p. 1): 
“In fact, humanoid robots outside of science fiction, have thus far only 
been toys or research platforms with nebulous applications. It is 
intriguing that one of the most powerful paradigms for adaptivity and 
flexibility, the human, has so far, when modelled in the form of a 
machine, resulted in little more than a toy. Its usefulness is very 
limited.”  
16 years later, this observation still rings true, with new, commercial- or 
bespoke social robots (like Cozmo and MiRo) moving away from referencing the 
human form. Humanoid robots, like Pepper, are designed to be reminiscent of 
human characteristics, and at the same time avoid imitating every aspect of 
appearance to pre-empt an Uncanny Valley effect (Pandey & Gelin, 2018). This 
effect references the phenomenon that almost fully humanlike androids elicit 
eery or uncanny feelings in the user (Mori et al., 2012). While the humanoid 
shape as a design feature is a powerful signal to users that the agent affords 
social interactions, it also makes the robot more prone to failing to deliver on 
high expectations regarding the nature of the interaction (Dereshev et al., 2019; 
Kahn et al., 2006).  
To investigate this phenomenon more closely, Dereshev and colleagues (2019) 
interviewed long-term, expert users of the Pepper robot. Their participants had 
lived and interacted with the robot on timescales ranging between 8 months and 
more than 3 years. The researchers report that one specific expectation 
regarding the humanoid Pepper robot was its ability to engage in a reciprocal 
conversation. The participants’ expectations were disappointed when the robot 
was not able to go beyond the smart-speaker like single-turn structure of 
conversation. One of the participants also pointed out that people who 
interacted with Pepper quickly lost interest, a finding which is echoed in a 
usability study by Aldebaran (later purchased by SoftBank Robotics), where 
Pepper was deployed to the homes of users over several weeks (Rivoire & Lim, 
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2016). The novelty effect is a common problem in social robotics, and long-term 
studies have often found a reduced engagement with various robotic platforms 
over time (Leite et al., 2013; Tanaka et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 3 - Examples of the Pepper robot ‘in the wild’ 
Left: The social robot was placed at the customer checkout in a German supermarket and 
reminded shoppers of the new hygiene regulations in April of 2020, during the global 
coronavirus pandemic.  Right: Another Pepper robot in a Dutch souvenir shop at Schiphol 
airport. Pictures taken by the author. 
 
Thus, the robots we are familiar with through science fiction films like ‘Ex 
Machina’ or ‘Robot & Frank’ remain a futuristic dream, whether they are 
depicted as helpers and companions, or villains (Broadbent, 2017; Garland, 
2014; Schreier, 2012; Wiese et al., 2017). When we encounter robots ‘in the 
wild’ (Figure 3), this discrepancy between the reality of social robots and our 
expectations towards them becomes even more salient. The Pepper robot, when 
used in supermarkets or airports, becomes little more than a puppet repeating 
the same script over and over, as the autonomous capacities of the robot are not 
advanced enough to sustain natural interactions in unconstrained, changing 
environments, especially when groups of people are present. Social interactions 
are a complex problem, to humans and robots alike. Designing and programming 
robots to successfully and seamlessly integrate into the human social world 
remains an especially “wicked problem” (Hannibal & Weiss, 2020, p. 1). 
Duffy wrote about these issues in the early 2000s, observing that machines are 
simply not to be equated with humans, and thus every attempt to design socially 
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accepted machines may only result in a colourless impression of key human 
social characteristics and traits (Duffy, 2004). Since then, researchers have 
echoed this sentiment when they reflect on the commercial failures of many 
social robotics start-up companies and the fact that as of 2019, there are still 
few fully-autonomous commercial robots available to consumers (Dereshev et 
al., 2019; Goodrich & Schultz, 2007; Hoffman, 2019; Tulli et al., 2019; Wiese et 
al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018). 
1.4. Towards truly sociable robots?  
Currently available social robots remain puppets in the hands of private 
consumers or research teams, not yet having realised their potential to 
becoming fully autonomous and transforming into sophisticated social agents. 
When encountered outside of the lab, these social robots often execute scripts 
(with puppet masters/programmers pulling the strings) and have little 
interactive capacities.  
In the late 1990s, Breazeal and Scassellati entitled their work on Kismet “robots 
that make friends and influence people” – however, to this day, this appears still 
utopic, with serious implications for the many fields of applications in which 
social robots are expected to prompt innovation right now.  
When thinking about the future with truly sociable robots, one can perhaps turn 
to an unexpected avenue for inspiration: animal models of social collaboration 
(Collins, 2019; Kahn et al., 2006). In a seminal study by Halloy and colleagues 
(2007), the researchers took advantage of self-organising behaviour of social 
animal societies, like the cockroach. The authors developed behavioural models 
for robotic cockroaches (that looked nothing like their biological counterparts), 
placing emphasis on appropriate behavioural responses and the correct chemical 
signal, which they determined were the key factors to the acceptance of robots 
in a cockroach group. Indeed, these robots autonomously interacted with the 
animals, and drove collective decision making, demonstrating social acceptance 
in the group and collaboration. Circling back to human-robot interaction, one 
key factor in designing successful interactions with humanoid robots will 
therefore be to “maximise […] both its mechanical advantages and [find] the 
33 
minimum humanlike aspects required for their social acceptance” (Duffy, 2006, 
p. 33). 
1.5. Summary 
In this chapter, I have briefly introduced the field of social robotics, by 
reflecting on its early developments in the 1990s, as well as crucial advances in 
autonomous robotics that have led to an increased interest and research and 
development investment into the field. Social robotics is a small subdiscipline of 
human-robot interaction that envisions robots as assistants and companions. As 
this introduction highlights, it is a heterogenous and multidisciplinary field. 
Important questions raised by researchers early on concern the ethical 
implications of developing fully autonomous, truly social robots. However, in the 
field’s relatively short history, many scientists acknowledge the limitations of 
currently available social robots. Indeed, by reviewing the most successful 
robotic applications, it becomes apparent that despite their potential to be used 
as companions for the elderly, as educators, or teachers for children with ASC, 
many questions remain regarding the capabilities of robots to take on more 
social roles, especially if they are to be working alongside human users 
autonomously. Studies by Dautenhahn and colleagues show that participants in 
their studies still do not see robots as companions or friends, but rather as useful 
household servants (2007). Despite this, the research reviewed in the context of 
these robotic platforms hints at their usefulness as a testbed for human social 
cognition, in terms of probing its flexibility and dimensions (Hortensius & Cross, 
2018a). 
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Chapter 2 An interdisciplinary approach to 
investigating questions in social cognition 
2. The role of the humanoid robot in experimental 
research – implications for experimental rigor and 
reproducibility  
The African Ubuntu philosophy states that personhood emerges through 
interactions with others (Birhane, 2017; Bolis & Schilbach, 2018). In their recent 
philosophical perspective on social cognition, Bolis and Schilbach (2018) 
emphasize that this dynamic perspective on personhood puts the construction of 
the self through social interaction front and centre. Importantly, this process is 
not only initiated by other humans, but also when we change our environment 
ourselves. From this viewpoint, tools become a part of the exchange, and here 
the authors explicitly include artificial intelligence and robots. According to 
them, a dialectical view would likely yield more advanced artificially intelligent 
and social systems, as well as facilitate the search for answers to fundamental 
questions of social cognition. To that effect, this chapter presents an update to 
the philosophical tenets of Vygotsky (Bolis & Schilbach, 2018; Vygotsky, 1987): 
“We become ourselves through others – including robotic others”  
By studying human-robot interaction and developing more advanced social 
robots, we are forced to reverse-engineer what it means to be human, what 
constitutes social interaction and what makes interpersonal relationships 
successful. On the other hand, experimental psychological might positively 
influence the future development of social robots (Wiese et al., 2017). As 
alluded to at the beginning of Chapter 1, the longstanding human fascination for 
trying to understand the human psyche better by means of creation is also a 
recurring theme in science fiction, inspiring gothic writers like Mary Shelley and 
Jewish folklore, where the golem is created from clay (Kieval, 1997).  
While contemporary robotics still suffers from the social robot paradox, we now 
have a tool at our fingertips that constitutes a (near-)perfect stimulus and allows 
us to answer fascinating questions about the dynamic changes in the social fabric 
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of our society. Humanoid robots are an ideal control group for studying 
interactions with other people, as they allow us to probe the limits and the 
flexibility of social cognition (Henschel, 2019; Hortensius & Cross, 2018a).  
Bolis and Schilbach’s (2018) perspective matches the tenets of those researching 
at the intersection of social robotics, experimental psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. In her seminal review, Broadbent (2017) writes (p. 629): 
“The further we go down the path toward making and interacting with 
artificial humans, the more truths we learn about ourselves.” 
Indeed, integrating humanoid robots into empirical research is now an 
established and rich tradition in the multidisciplinary fields congregating around 
the social robot, including robotics, experimental and social psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience (Chaminade & Cheng, 2009; Chevalier et al., 2020; E. S. 
Cross, Hortensius, et al., 2018a; Kompatsiari et al., 2018; J. Perez-Osorio et al., 
2018; Wiese et al., 2017; Wykowska et al., 2016). The most prevalent recurring 
theme is that robots afford researchers interested in studying social interactions 
the benefit of ecological validity. While traditional research in social 
neuroscience used screen-based images and videos of socially relevant cues, 
humanoid robots allow scientists to retain experimental control while studying 
how people engage with a physically present agent.  
When including humanoid robots in embodied interaction experiments, the 
experimenter has control over the verbal and non-verbal cues of this agent and 
can take advantage of the social presence the robot exerts (Henschel, 2019; 
Kompatsiari et al., 2018; Wykowska et al., 2016). While some have argued that 
deploying humanoid social robots in the wild may lead to exaggerated 
expectations of the robot’s abilities, the subtle cues to humanness of the 
humanoids in their design and behaviour are ideally suited to experimental 
research, where they are steered by experimenters (Kahn et al., 2006). In the 
HRI literature, this is also referred to as ‘wizarding’ the robot, making a nod to 
the beloved American children’s classic novel ‘The wonderful wizard of Oz’ 
(Baum, 1900). In the story, a young girl is transported to a magical land, where 
she encounters the powerful wizard of Oz. However, the girl and her companions 
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finally realise that the magic is all smoke and mirrors: the great and powerful 
wizard turns out to be a fraud hiding behind a screen.  
Controlling the movements and the speech outputs of the robot in the lab allows 
experimenters to take on the role of the wizard, operating with a more socially 
advanced humanoid robot, presenting a form of illusory social ability that has 
sparked some concerns about deception (Broadbent, 2017; Prescott, 2017). 
Thus, the robots presented in the lab do not accurately reflect those met ‘in the 
wild’, however, even those robots that are wizarded by a human experimenter 
may not reach a level of socialness embodied by humans. Chevalier and 
colleagues (2020) acknowledge this limitation when they write that the 
humanoid robot might not elicit the same mechanisms that are at play when 
interacting with other humans, though these studies might nonetheless yield 
important insights in controlled lab environments.  
A popular approach researchers use is to take effects or theoretical concepts 
from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience and adapt them for 
human-robot interaction experiments (Kahn et al., 2006; J. Perez-Osorio et al., 
2018). Previous lines of research have especially focused on motor resonance 
(Chaminade & Cheng, 2009), empathy (Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019; Rosenthal-
Von Der Pütten et al., 2014), joint attention (Chevalier et al., 2020; Willemse & 
Wykowska, 2019) and adopting the intentional stance towards robots (Wiese et 
al., 2017). For example, Chaminade and Cheng (2009) argue that motor 
resonance plays a fundamental role in human-human interaction and conducted 
a series of studies to test how strongly the actions of a humanoid robot arm 
would interfere with the motions of participants in a classic motor interference 
paradigm. The authors found that compared to an industrial robot arm, the 
humanoid robot (whose motions were informed by human motion capture) 
elicited a change in the movement of human participants, depending on whether 
the robot was moving its arm congruently or incongruently (Chaminade & Cheng, 
2009). These experiments show the success of adapting well-understood 
concepts for HRI and demonstrate on a behaviour and brain level that our 
responses towards humanoid robots may be akin to fellow humans (Wykowska et 
al., 2016).  
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On the other hand, some researchers have argued repeatedly that HRI as a 
discipline lacks the systematicity characteristic of experimental research and 
have stressed that psychological and neuroscientific methods add rigor to the 
investigation of interactions with robots (Kompatsiari et al., 2018; Wiese et al., 
2017, p. 1). According to Wiese and colleagues, motion-tracking and brain 
imaging measures are needed to “make robots appear more social” – an effort 
directed towards making the wizard hiding behind the screen redundant. These 
more sophisticated social robots, as I argue in Chapter 3, may be advantageous 
in many social contexts where they are framed as companions, carers and 
coaches. For example, Wiese and colleagues (2017) highlight that the perceived 
intentionality of social robots will play a major role in successfully orchestrated 
feelings of connection towards it, as well as better collaboration in shared 
environments. The perceived intentionality of the robot can only be achieved, 
the authors explain, if they are able to elicit activity in the hub regions of 
human social cognition. Thus, using neurophysiological measurements in HRI will 
contribute to a future with more sophisticated social robots (Wiese et al., 2017). 
However, this argument does not remain uncontested by other researchers, who 
see relying on only neurophysiological methods as one-sided, especially in 
investigations into the mind perception of robots (Kewenig, 2018). Kewenig and 
colleagues (2018) argue that the study of social robotics cannot only depend on 
these electrophysiological measures alone, but must take a more holistic 
approach, considering for example self-report and qualitative data observed in 
interactions with robots.  
2.1. Integrating perspectives from social robotics, 
neuroscience & psychology  
Here some tensions between the different fields involved become apparent: 
while social robotics relies on insights from psychology and neuroscience, the 
lines of communication appear broken, and insights generated at the 
intersections of these disciplines are often not fed back to the engineers and 
developers of social robots. Baxter and colleagues examine these tensions more 
closely in their review of three years of proceedings of the ACM-HRI conference 
(2016). The authors note that there is a strong need for establishing a shared 
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language between different disciplines and that the field should move towards a 
common ground, such as a community ‘FAQ’ to help establish a stronger 
collaborative infrastructure. The main difference between HRI and what has 
been classed the social sciences, is their research output (papers versus the 
more fast-paced conference proceedings), different specialist terminology, 
fundamental theories and methodological approaches. Thus, the communication 
gap between fields which has been described here is perhaps not surprising.  
Interestingly, while researchers in experimental psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience mainly lament a missing objectivity in social robotics, HRI 
researchers observe a need for a more formalised structure of psychology and 
neuroscience knowledge, which might in the future contribute to lowering the 
barriers of engaging with other fields (Baxter et al., 2016). The dialogue 
between disciplines is fraught, as Hannibal and Weiss (2020, p. 1) write in their 
introduction to a special issue on current challenges and new methodologies in 
social robotics. As introduced in the previous chapter, these authors note that 
deploying sophisticated autonomous social robots remains a multifaceted 
challenge. Before robots can successfully integrate into a human-centric social 
environment, these complex challenges have to be addressed, which can only be 
achieved if all disciplines engage in a mutually respectful dialogue, 
acknowledging their own strengths and limitations. Hannibal and Weiss (2020) 
also observe a lack of consensus when it comes to methods and theory, a notion 
which is again echoed by Irfan and colleagues (2018a, p. 13), who adopt a more 
negative tone by characterising interdisciplinary ties between social psychology 
and HRI as an “uneasy marriage”. These authors reference and criticise the 
standard approach described by Kahn and colleagues (2006), by acknowledging 
that the fields of psychology and neuroscience have recently undergone a crisis 
leading to some unreliable findings and negatively impacting the trust HRI 
researcher subsequently express towards these adjacent fields. When non-
replicable concepts are carried over from social psychology to social robotics, 
studies are built on shaky grounds, they argue. Here the researchers call for a 
change in perspective, including raising awareness about the file-drawer 
problem, and admonishing questionable research practices. This point will be 
discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis, building on the 
recommendations of Irfan and colleagues (2018). 
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In a similarly critical perspective on the interdisciplinary ties in HRI, Eyssel 
(2017) places a strong emphasis on the need for taking a theory-driven approach 
when conducting studies with humanoid robots. This renewed interest in building 
upon strong theoretical foundations is in line with a recently published 
perspective that sees the replication crisis as not solely exacerbated by 
questionable research practices, but also by a lack of overarching theoretical 
frameworks (Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019). Eyssel (2017) draws on examples 
from her own work on adapting insights gained from intergroup relations 
research for a social robotics context. Here, dehumanising tendencies of 
outgroups become the starting point of investigation with humanoid social robots 
(Eyssel, 2017). 
While many researchers have raised critical concerns about the current state of 
the field, they also acknowledge the benefits of collaborating with multiple 
disciplines. Irfan and colleagues (2018) do not suggest researchers abandon 
established foundations in psychological research, but instead propose that 
researchers working in this field take advantage of a renewed emphasis placed 
on rigor in all those engaging in HRI research. This could also be beneficial when 
it comes to the problem of “putting the cart before the horse”, in terms of 
developing social robots first and then operating with the constraints of their 
emotional and behavioural capabilities (Vallverdú & Trovato, 2016, p. 325). 
Broadbent (2017) observes that more and more psychologists are getting 
involved in HRI research and Baxter and colleagues (2016) commend the richness 
that the multi-disciplinarity affords the research questions. They also argue that 
this diversity should be protected and nurtured. Finally, the pioneers of using 
humanoid robots in experimental research perhaps summarise this positive 
development best when they close with the notion that each field can mutually 
benefit and learn from each other (Chaminade & Cheng, 2009).  
2.2. Examining social behaviour toward robots: Social 
Motivation Theory 
Situating the empirical work of this thesis according to the taxonomy proposed 
by Baxter and colleagues (2016) and following the recommendation of Eyssel 
(2017), my dissertation work has taken a theory-driven and distinctly human-
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centric perspective to HRI research. Indeed, the improvement of a social robot 
per se is not a central goal of this work, rather, as Baxter and colleagues (2016) 
have expressed it, improvements to social robots could be a practical, future 
outcome. There are a multitude of theoretical models one can adopt as a point 
of departure when thinking about social robots. Two popular early theories are 
the Media Equation by Nass and colleagues (1996), originating from 
communication theory, and the “like me” framework embedded in 
developmental psychology (Meltzoff, 2007). Nass and Reeves (1996) established 
in their studies that people would apply the same social rules to computers used 
in their experiments as they did towards other humans. The researchers 
observed that participants used more positive adjectives when the subsequent 
evaluation was presented by a computer they had worked on, compared to a 
computer unrelated to the previous task. This, for example, has resulted in 
studies investigating the effects of social robots openly rejecting participants, 
finding that their self-esteem was lowered when a humanoid robot stated after a 
game of Connect-4 that it would not like to see them again (Nash et al., 2017). 
Another popular theory by Meltzoff represents the idea that fundamentally all 
social cognition originates in the recognition of other agents that are “like me” 
(2007). Empirical results from studies with very young children show that self-
other distinction takes place at a young age (Meltzoff, 2007). For example, when 
adults mimic babies, they are preferentially fixated when they act like the child. 
This finding was extended by the same authors in the field of HRI, where the 
gaze behaviour of 18-month old infants was recorded during the interaction with 
a small humanoid robot (Meltzoff et al., 2010). Those infants were more likely to 
follow the gaze of the humanoid robot if they had previously observed the 
experimenter engage socially with the robot, than those infants who had not 
observed this exchange. 
Overall, these theories seem to converge on the idea that humans tend to 
mindlessly apply social rules and conventions, even when confronted with 
inanimate agents, like computers or humanoid robots (Broadbent, 2017). This 
resonates with one of the most fundamental studies conducted in this area, 
which found participants applying social scripts and conventions to abstract 
moving shapes (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Moving circles and triangles were 
described as “lovers in the two-dimensional world” and framed in a social chase 
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situation that suggested participants engaged in anthropomorphizing behaviour, 
despite minimal cues to animacy being present (Heider & Simmel, 1944, p. 247). 
Anthropomorphising describes the tendency to ascribe human characteristics and 
traits to non-human entities (Epley et al., 2008). 
With this background, one of the questions I ask in this dissertation is whether 
and how interactions with humanoid robots are situated in terms of motivation. I 
used Chevallier and colleagues’ (2012) theory as a springboard: this framework 
considers social motivation as a fundamental human drive, affecting behaviour, 
biology and evolutionary selection. The authors propose the Social Motivation 
Theory of Autism, in which they argue that individuals with ASC show diminished 
social motivation, which may have far-reaching downstream consequences. On a 
conceptual level, typically developing individuals are thought to show a special 
attentional bias toward social stimuli, which has been honed over the course of 
human evolution, due to associated evolutionary fitness of being quickly able to 
differentiate between friends or foes. Chevallier and colleagues (2012) 
emphasize that across several cognitive science experiments, it has been 
repeatedly shown that human faces and bodies are attended to rapidly and 
consistently. A second pillar of the theoretical framework relates to the reward 
value of social interaction: here the authors propose that we are inherently 
motivated to engage in social interaction, and that we seek it out where 
possible. The final pillar relates to social maintaining, i.e. people’s drive to be 
seen in a favourable light and to (unconsciously) engage in behaviours that are 
conducive to sustaining interactions. For example, spontaneous movement 
imitation of others is referenced as a type of ‘social glue’ that fosters rapport 
and facilitates human social collaboration. 
This theory has sparked much research in HRI with obvious links to the 
prioritized field of research of engaging children with ASC in playful learning 
environments with social robots. However, this theory has also led to 
researchers asking fundamental questions on the motivational value of humanoid 
agents (Chaminade & Okka, 2013; Simut et al., 2016). This thesis takes a 
similarly fundamental approach, and asks across social orienting and reward, 
how humanoid robots rank in terms of their motivational value.  
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2.3. Summary and overview of the thesis 
This thesis is split in three parts. The first part (Chapters 1 and 2) has introduced 
core concepts and theories relevant to the thesis. This is followed by the main 
body, which includes published and submitted empirical and theoretical work on 
the subject. The third and final part of the thesis is a general discussion of the 
work as a whole. Author contributions are signposted in the section of the same 
name (see the Table of Contents).  
To summarise, the first two chapters have aimed to give a short introduction to 
the field of social robotics by examining what ‘socialness’ means in the context 
of robotics and by considering applications and research through the lens of 
popular robotic platforms. Chapter 1 also reflected on the current challenges 
and limitations associated with social robots, while Chapter 2 explored how 
social robots are currently used in experimental research, the resulting 
interdisciplinary tensions, and, finally, introduced the theoretical frame of 
reference for the present thesis, situating the research in terms of the social 
motivational value of humanoid robots.  
Chapter 3, the first empirical study, applied a phenomenon previously 
established in psychology and neuroscience, replacing a human interaction 
partner with a robot. Here we investigated whether the beneficial effects of 
interpersonal synchrony on rapport hold in this new context. In this between-
subjects study, we identified a gap in the availability of reliable behavioural 
measures of social motivation, which led to the empirical study described in 
Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 4, again, we adapted and conceptually extended a measure from 
cognitive neuropsychology. It was our aim to build on the eye-contact effect, 
which describes the phenomenon of human social cues claiming our attentional 
resources even when we are explicitly told to ignore them. It was our goal to 
extend this task by adding new stimulus material in the form of robot faces and 
pareidolic (object) faces, to adequately control for facial features in non-
interactive situations and compare how the demand on attention would be 
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shaped by these humanoid robot faces, in comparison to the socially more 
salient human faces.  
In Chapter 5, we reflect on the importance of applying cognitive neuroscience 
methods to social robotics, however, taking a graded and stepwise approach. In 
this opinion piece, my co-authors and I reflect on the replication crisis and its 
implications for conducting studies at the intersection of social robotics, 
psychology and neuroscience. It becomes clear that these interdisciplinary 
studies should aim to carefully replicate well-known effects in psychology and 
neuroscience, before extending and adapting them for HRI, using humanoid 
social robots.  
In the final empirical chapter (Chapter 6), I follow this proposed graded 
approach by identifying a brain region that plays a crucial role in governing 
human social interaction. In this study, I aimed to validate a new brain imaging 
system that allows mobile brain imaging in human-robot encounters, by 
identifying how brain activity recorded with functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) compared to functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). I used 
a robust localiser task, designed to elicit activity in the temporo-parietal 
junction. The motivation for testing the fNIRS system is its promise to further 
contribute to the ecological validity of experiments with humanoid robots by 
recording brain activity in natural interaction scenarios.  
In the final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 7), I reflect on the results of the 
empirical and theoretical work (chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6), and place an emphasis 
on methodological considerations going forward. I provide a road map for future 
studies, highlighting the need for direct replication studies, new theoretical 
developments following up on Social Motivation Theory and suggestions for more 
transparent data visualisation.  
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Chapter 3 No evidence for enhanced likeability 
and social motivation towards robots after 
synchrony experience  
 
 
 
This chapter is an exact copy of the author accepted manuscript of:  
Henschel, A., & Cross, E. S. (2020). No evidence for enhanced likeability and 
social motivation towards robots after synchrony experience. Interaction 
Studies, 21(1), 7-23. 
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3. Abstract 
A wealth of social psychology studies suggests that moving in synchrony with 
another person can positively influence their likeability and prosocial behavior 
towards them. Recently, human-robot interaction (HRI) researchers have started 
to develop real-time, adaptive synchronous movement algorithms for social 
robots. However, little is known how socially beneficial synchronous movements 
with a robot actually are. We predicted that moving in synchrony with a robot 
would improve its likeability and participants’ social motivation towards the 
robot, as measured by the number of questions asked during a free interaction 
period. Using a between-subjects design, we implemented the synchrony 
manipulation via a drawing task. Contrary to predictions, we found no evidence 
that participants who moved in synchrony with the robot rated it as more 
likeable or asked it more questions. By including validated behavioral and neural 
measures, future studies can generate a better and more objective estimation of 
synchrony’s effects on rapport with social robots.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
3.1. Introduction 
In his book Deep Thinking, former chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov (2017) 
recounts the story of his failure against the IBM super-computer Deep Blue in 
1997. Contrary to what one might expect, he emphasizes that the triumph of the 
machine is ultimately the triumph of its human makers, and in order to thrive, 
humans must learn to live together with intelligent machines. Beyond chess 
playing devices, disembodied algorithms, and fully automatized factory lines, 
the present time is very much shaped by the rise of the social robots. These 
robots have the potential to provide society with economical care, company and 
therapy (Eriksson et al., 2005; Prescott et al., 2012; Robins et al., 2005). While 
robots are now deployed in various social contexts where they are framed as 
companions rather than tools (Darling, 2015; Duffy, 2000), roboticists and 
stakeholders are faced with the seemingly impossible challenge of making robots 
“truly social” (Duffy et al., 1999). Researchers describe this as a grand challenge 
with a vast problem space (Riek, 2014; Sandini et al., 2018). However, by 
endowing an artificial agent with socialness, patients as well as healthy 
individuals might benefit greatly from improved learning, companionship and 
therapeutic outcomes (Fasola & Matarić, 2012; Feil-Seifer & Matarić, 2011). 
Wiese and colleagues (2017) suggest that the best way to make robots appear 
more social is to use the toolbox provided by neurocognitive research methods 
to implement empirically supported behaviors that give “socially awkward” 
robots better “people skills”. Hence, psychological research methods will be 
crucial in engineering engaging, long-term and motivating interactions between 
humans and artificial agents (Broadbent, 2017). But how can we solve the 
problem of designing truly social robots (Duffy & Joue, 2005)? One approach may 
be to examine a kind of “lowest common social denominator” that helps 
establish common ground in human-human interaction: namely, interpersonal 
synchrony. Defined as movements matched in time (Hove & Risen, 2009), 
interpersonal synchrony has been established as an indicator of social closeness 
between two individuals, and also a causal factor in enhancing rapport between 
people (Berniere et al., 1988; Hove & Risen, 2009).  
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Researchers in human-robot interaction have started taking advantage of the 
fact that synchrony with another agent may foster rapport (Hove & Risen, 2009). 
In their proof of concept study, Mörtl, Lorenz and Hirche (2014) equipped a 
robot with the ability to synchronize its movements to those of human 
participants during a joint-action pick-and-place task. The authors report that 11 
out of 12 participants recognized the adaptability of the robot and 10 
participants liked this about the robot. Relatedly, Shen and colleagues (2015) 
used an information distance algorithm to generate real-time, adaptive motor 
coordination with the KASPAR2 robot. While the main goal of the experiment 
was to test the success of the synchrony-promoting algorithm, they also 
distributed a questionnaire to their 23 participants, inquiring about which of the 
games (adaptive condition versus non-adaptive baseline condition) they 
preferred. While most participants preferred the adaptive robot, there was no 
significant pre- to post- rating difference for their single-item measure of the 
robots’ social capabilities. However, results by Lehmann and colleagues (2015) 
suggest that movement synchrony of a non-anthropomorphic robot significantly 
improved participants ratings of the robot’s likeability and perceived 
intelligence.  
As Irfan and colleagues (2018) emphasized, when implementing concepts from 
social psychology to human-robot interaction studies, it is important to establish 
how reliable and robust these effects are in humans. A recent meta-analysis by 
Mogan and colleagues (2017) investigated the effect size of interpersonal 
synchrony on pro-social attitude and behavior. The authors included 42 
independent studies that experimentally manipulated synchrony. The 
researchers found that moving in synchrony had a medium effect on increasing 
prosocial behaviors (MES = 0.28), small to medium effects on perceived social 
bonding and cognition (MES =0.17) and a small effect on increasing positive 
emotions (MES =0.11). However, Mogan et al. (2017) did not take into account a 
potentially problematic methodological artefact: experimenter bias. In fact, a 
meta-analysis conducted by Rennung and Göritz (2016) reports that the effect of 
interpersonal synchrony (here they define synchrony both as “synchronous motor 
movement and sensory stimulation”, p. 169) on prosocial behaviors can be 
entirely explained by a lack of experimenter blinding. They found that the 
effect of interpersonal synchrony on prosocial attitudes and perceived social 
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bonding was greatly reduced when controlling for experimenter blinding but 
remained significant. 
Similar to the abundance of synchrony manipulations used in the field (L. Cross 
et al., 2016), no underlying mechanism is generally agreed upon (Mogan et al., 
2017). However, Rennung and Göritz (2016) remark that all potential 
explanations share a common trait: “[interpersonal synchrony] is a rewarding 
experience” (p. 169). Wheatley and colleagues (2012) hypothesize that moving 
in sync with another individual may engage the brain’s reward system, which in 
turn may incentivize further social interactions. This idea is closely related to 
the theory of social motivation, as proposed by Chevallier and colleagues (2012). 
These scientists highlight two main components of social reward: liking and 
seeking of social cues. Empirical support for the theory that interpersonal 
synchrony may be connected to reward comes from Kokal and colleagues’ (2011) 
study on synchronized drumming. For participants who acquired the drumming 
rhythm easily before the scanning session, activity in the caudate nucleus was 
enhanced during synchronous drumming, which furthermore predicted later 
prosocial behavior towards the experimenter (who was blind to the 
manipulation). All in all, a possible underlying social reward mechanism may be 
what promotes the positive interpersonal effects of synchrony, thus highlighting 
the need to investigate interpersonal synchrony in conjunction with social 
motivation. 
The goal of the present double-blind study was to investigate whether 
interpersonal synchrony with a robot improves social motivation towards the 
robot. We hypothesized that moving in sync with the robot would improve its 
likeability, analogous to the findings of Lehmann and colleagues (2015), and, 
based on Chevallier’s Social Motivation Theory (2012), would increase the 
motivation to interact with the robot, as measured by the number of questions 
participants chose to ask the robot during a free interaction.  
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3.2. Methods 
Data statement. We report all measures in the study, all manipulations, any 
data exclusions, and the sample size determination rule. The data and the R 
analysis script are publicly available via the OSF [link]. 
Participants. We aimed to recruit the highest number of participants within the 
testing period (February to April 2018). Initially, the sample consisted of 71 
participants. Four participants were excluded from further analysis due to large 
error rates (losing the metronome more than 30 times, see experimental 
procedure below) on the task, and four more had to be excluded due to missing 
data on the Godspeed questionnaires. Two participants were excluded because 
they reported studying computer science, and one participant was excluded due 
to reporting a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder. 11 participants were 
excluded, as they failed the manipulation check of correctly perceiving 
synchrony or asynchrony. Four additional participants were removed after 
completing statistical checks before analyses (see data analysis, below). The 
final sample consisted of 45 participants. The subjects’ ages ranged between 18 
and 31, with an average of 20.51 years (SD=2.69). Of the 45, 30 were female. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Bangor University ethics review board 
(2018-16221). All subjects provided written informed consent prior to taking part 
and were reimbursed for their participation either by payment or course credit. 
Participants were naïve to the goal of the experiment. 
Robotic Platform. For the experiment, a Pepper robot was used. Pepper is a 
1.2m tall, commercially available humanoid robot from SoftBank Robotics 
(Tokyo, Japan). Pepper features 20 degrees of freedom and runs a Linux 
operating system programmable using NAOqi libraries with Python or C++. The 
robot can run in an automatic animation mode and a controlled animation mode. 
For the experiment, the controlled mode was used (sometimes referred to as the 
‘Wizard of Oz’ mode). The controlled mode allows full command over movement 
and speech, where it only acts as instructed by the experiment program, rather 
than by its inbuilt AI.   
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Dependent Measures. Participants were asked to assess likeability, 
anthropomorphism and perceived intelligence of the robot via the three 
Godspeed subscales of the same name (Bartneck et al., 2009). The items were 
presented in a scrambled order, as recommended by the authors. All subscales 
consist of 5 items, which are structured as a 5-point semantic differential scale 
(for example: “like-dislike”, “machinelike-humanlike”, “unintelligent-
intelligent”). The behavioral measure of social motivation was a list of questions 
provided to the participants, including such questions as “How are you?”, “Are 
you a boy or a girl?” and “Are you intelligent?” (Appendix A). The number of 
questions asked was used as a proxy for social motivation. 
 
Figure 4 - The set-up for the drawing task. 
 
Experimental Procedure. Upon arrival, participants received information about 
the experimental task and provided informed consent. Next, they filled out 
questionnaires relating to their demographic information and trait attitudes 
towards robots (Nomura, Kanda, & Suzuki, 2006; Syrdal, Dautenhahn, Koay et 
al., 2009). The Negative Attitude towards Robots Scale (Nomura et al., 2006) for 
example asks participants to rate statements such as “I would feel uneasy, if 
robots really had emotions” on a five-point scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to 
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“strongly agree” (5). Then they met Pepper, the robot, who introduced itself as 
a member of the University research department and invited participants to take 
a seat next to it. Importantly, the experimenter was blind to which condition the 
participant was randomly assigned to. The blinding was ensured via a room 
divider, hence, at no point during the synchrony manipulation could the 
experimenter see the movements of the robot or the participant.  
The two between-subjects experimental conditions involved drawing either in 
sync or out of sync with Pepper. We modelled our task after Hove and Risen 
(2009). In their study, participants were following a visual metronome (a rising 
and dropping bar), which resulted in them tapping either in synchrony or out of 
synchrony with a confederate (Hove & Risen, 2009). Similarly, we used a visual 
metronome (a small circle moving along a larger circular trajectory) and 
instructed participants to follow its movement with a pen. The practical reason 
for choosing this task was that it gave us a high degree of control of the 
participants’ movement, without explicitly asking them to synchronize with the 
robot, a potential confound. In the synchrony condition the metronome was 
linked to the movement of the robot, whereas in the asynchrony condition the 
robot was moving approximately 2.5 times as fast along the circle shape as the 
participant. Participants received the instruction from the experimenter that 
the goal of the task was to follow the moving target as closely as possible and 
deviate from it as little as possible. While participants followed the moving 
target with the drawing pen on the tablet, the robot (due to the technical 
constraints of it not being able to hold a pen), performed the drawing motion 
with some distance to the screen (Figure 4). The tablet in front of the robot was 
always turned off- participants were told that a film on the screen was used to 
prevent them from getting distracted from their task. When using the drawing 
pen, participants could see that the pen has indeed a wireless function, but they 
were always encouraged to keep the pen on the tablet, to minimize the chance 
of losing the visual metronome. To give a plausible justification for the task, 
participants were told that the experimenters were looking to investigate the 
effect of robotic presence on task performance.  
After an initial practice round was completed, participants received the 
additional instruction of monitoring an LED strip on Pepper’s right arm, similar, 
but not identical, to the one seen in Figure 4. They were told that the LED lights 
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would change colors randomly and they would be probed to report the color 
changes. However, due to technical difficulties with controlling the LED lights 
via a remote control, we only report a descriptive graph (Appendix A). Each 
experimental block consisted of four repetitions around the circle shape, 
resulting in four circular arm movements per block. After three experimental 
blocks of the drawing task, the participants filled out the three Godspeed 
subscales (Bartneck et al., 2009), which were presented to them via the drawing 
tablet screen. They proceeded with three more experimental drawing blocks.  
Finally, they received the instruction via their tablet that the main part of the 
experiment was over, and they now had the chance to get to know the robot 
better. They were also informed that this part of the study was optional and 
that they would not be compensated by research credits or money for the time 
spent talking to the robot. Then they picked up the piece of paper containing 
the questions, took a seat opposite to the robot and asked the robot questions, 
whose answers were Wizard-of-Oz controlled by the experimenter behind the 
room partition. Then, participants filled out a manipulation check probing them 
for suspicion and asking about perceived synchrony. Overall, the task took 12 
minutes to complete (2 minutes per experimental drawing block) and completing 
the entire study took roughly 45 minutes. 
Data analysis. We conducted a MANOVA on the Godspeed subscales, as this 
analysis accounts for the relationship between the outcome variables. Before 
the analysis, multivariate assumption checks were conducted. The Mardia 
skewness and kurtosis tests confirmed multivariate normality. Via Malanobis 
distance, four multivariate outliers were identified and removed. Moderate 
correlation between dependent measures was confirmed after running pairwise 
correlations. Bartlett’s test was not significant, indicating homogeneity of 
variances. Furthermore, a non-significant Box’s M test suggested homogeneity of 
the covariance matrices. A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
was conducted to investigate the effect of synchrony on the robot’s likeability, 
anthropomorphism and perceived intelligence. Furthermore, Welch’s Two 
Sample t-test was used to examine how the synchrony manipulation affected the 
participants’ social motivation. However, the manipulation check showed that a 
rather large proportion of the participants in the asynchrony condition had 
perceived to be in sync with the robot (n=10) and one participant in the 
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synchrony condition had failed to perceive this (n=1). Based on this insight, 
participants who had failed to correctly perceive the manipulation were 
excluded, resulting in N=45 participants (henceforth ‘original group split’). A 
second group split based on perceived synchrony was performed (henceforth 
‘perceived groups’), and within the context of exploration, the above analyses 
were repeated (N=56). This second group split on the basis of participants’ 
synchrony beliefs was investigated, since previous literature showed that top-
down beliefs about a robot’s behavior play an important role in agent 
perception, over and above bottom-up cues (Klapper et al., 2014; Cross et al., 
2016). 
3.3. Results 
Original group split. The one way MANOVA showed no significant differences 
between groups on the dependent measures: Pillai’s V=.07, F(3, 41)=.96, p=.42. 
There was no significant difference between the groups on the measure of social 
motivation: t(41.49)=-.45, p=. 67, d=-.13. These results are visualized in Figure 
5. Synchrony did not lead to increased liking or social motivation towards the 
robot.  
 
Figure 5 - Experimental groups. 
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The plot on the left-hand side depicts the groups’ ratings on likeability of the robot. The 
graph on the right depicts the distribution of number of questions participants asked the 
robot (N=45, n= 19 in the asynchrony group, n=26 in the synchrony group). The plots depict 
the raw data, the central tendencies and densities, and the 95% highest density intervals. 
 
Perceived groups. The second one way MANOVA showed also no differences, 
when the groups were split on perceived synchrony: Pillai’s V=.11, F(3, 52)=2.05, 
p=.12. In addition, there was no significant difference between the perceived 
groups in social motivation towards the robot: t(39.24)=-. 26, p=.60, d=-.15.  
 
Figure 6 - Perceived groups. 
On the left, the likeability ratings are shown for subjectively perceived synchrony with the 
robot. Individuals, who were in the asynchrony condition, but reported to have been in sync 
with Pepper were combined with those, who were objectively in sync with the robot. On the 
right, again the number of questions asked are shown, this time for perceived groups (N=56, 
n=20 in the asynchrony group, n=36 in the synchrony group). The plots depict the raw data, 
the central tendencies and densities, and the 95% highest density intervals.  
 
Likeability ratings and social motivation of the perceived groups are depicted in 
Figure 6. Perceived synchrony did not lead to an improved perception of Pepper 
or towards an increased motivation to ask the robot questions.  
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3.4. Discussion 
In this study, we investigated the effect of experiencing interpersonal synchrony 
with a humanoid robot on its likeability and participants’ social motivation 
towards the robot. Contradictory to our hypotheses, participants who moved in 
sync with Pepper did not rate the robot as more likeable, intelligent or 
humanlike than participants who performed the task out of sync with it. 
Participants in the synchrony condition did not show stronger social motivation 
towards the robot, as indexed by the amount of questions they asked the robot 
in a voluntary interaction after completion of the main task.  
One critical but interesting observation were the differences in experimentally 
manipulated and subjectively experienced synchrony. One third of the 
participants who were assigned to the asynchrony group reported that they 
believed they were moving in sync with Pepper. Given this finding, it may be 
that the experimental manipulation of synchrony was either too subtle or too 
short to fully immerse participants in the experience and to produce the 
hypothesized beneficial effect on rapport between synchronizing agents. Indeed, 
findings reported by Lehmann and colleagues’ (2015) suggest that movement 
synchrony should positively impact self-reported likeability of a synchronous 
robot. However, an important difference between the study reported here and 
their experiment was that in their videos, the robot was making goal-direct 
movements towards a person. They defined “positive synchrony” as the robot 
shifting its “gaze” towards the movement of a human agent, who was arranging 
flowers in a vase. In contrast, in our experiment, Pepper was making goal-
directed, synchronous movements reacting to the task, and not the participant. 
Hence, this was a markedly less social context, than reacting to the movements 
of the other interaction partner.  
In addition to the potential necessity of adaptivity in synchronous interpersonal 
movement, Lorenz, Weiss and Hirche (2016) argue that in order to reap the 
benefits of synchrony in social interactions with robots, the human interaction 
partner needs to attribute a mind to the robot. This idea is consistent with 
research by (Wiese et al., 2012), which shows that top-down beliefs about an 
agent’s intentional stance can influence basic attentional mechanisms. Even 
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though we assessed trait negative attitudes towards robots, we did not include a 
self-report or behavioral measure of mind attribution. While Pepper introduced 
itself before starting the drawing task, it remains unclear how much mind and 
intention the participants attributed to the robot. In addition to these factors 
that could have adversely affected the hypothesized positive influence of 
interpersonal synchrony, we saw a ceiling effect of likeability of the robot – in 
both groups, Pepper was rated as very likeable.  
More questions remain regarding why the synchrony manipulation did not impact 
participants’ social motivation towards Pepper. One possible explanation for this 
result could be that counting the amount of questions the participants chose to 
ask the robot may have been too crude a measure to pick up any small to 
medium sized effect we expected from a synchrony manipulation. Stronger 
motivational factors, such as the desire to finish an already long experiment, 
may have interfered with subjects’ desire to spend time with the robot. In 
addition, previous experiences with the robot might have influenced their 
behavior, with participants lacking any experience perhaps showing stronger 
curiosity to interact with Pepper or a lack of familiarity affecting the mind 
perception of the robot (Müller et al., 2011). This lack of sensitivity of the 
behavioral measure highlights an important gap in readily available, objective, 
dependent measures in social robotics. Behavioral and neuronal measures offer 
objectivity, which self-report measures are not able to provide, due to inherent 
reporting bias and social desirability effects. Drawing on established and 
validated measures from cognitive (neuro)science might help us to bridge this 
gap (Wiese et al., 2017). Future research in interpersonal synchrony with robots 
should invest in the implementation of these behavioral and neuroscientific 
dependent measures, to complement the limitations of self-report and enable 
more precise triangulation of the mechanisms and consequences of social 
affiliation via synchrony. Future experiments should further include a positive 
control to ensure the synchrony manipulation works as expected in human-
human interaction and additional loops of control to ensure that the synchrony 
manipulation is sufficiently immersive and salient. A final limitation we would 
like to highlight is the fact that given the rather high number of participants we 
had to exclude, the sample size may have been too small to show the expected 
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small to medium effect size of a synchrony manipulation on perception of and 
behavior towards the robot.  
Following the tenets of the recent HRI’18 workshop “What Could Go Wrong: 
Lessons Learned When Doing HRI User Studies with Off-the-Shelf Social Robots?”, 
below we summarize the insights gained as psychologists conducting experiments 
with commercially available robots, such as Pepper.  
The Pepper robot as an experimental confederate: lessons learned.  
Our initial motivation was to use the most natural, and most autonomous robotic 
behavior available. However, we quickly noticed in preceding pilot experiments 
that even little robotic movements away from the participant (due to it 
orienting to the experimenter’s voice behind the room partition), were 
interpreted as rejection, and especially the faulty behavior of the robot during 
the free interaction period (due to volume or accent issues), would obstruct the 
question asking scenario significantly. As such, we used an experimenter-
controlled, Wizard-of-Oz setting with gaze lock implemented, to ensure it would 
always face the participant during the introduction and free interaction period. 
Furthermore, we found it useful to use Pepper’s “alive and breathing” mode 
between experimental drawing blocks, as the change from complete stillness to 
the drawing motions might have been perceived as too uncanny. Further, when 
employing a humanoid robot in a psychology-informed synchrony experiment, we 
recommend facilitating a salient experience of synchronizing with the robot, to 
ensure that experimental results are driven by the manipulation and not the lack 
of synchrony immersion.  
In conclusion, we did not find that orchestrated synchrony, here induced via a 
drawing task with a physically present embodied robot, improved the rapport 
between participants and the robot. Future experiments will help to further 
elucidate the relationship between synchronous behavior and social affiliation 
toward robots by including both behavioral and neural measures of social 
motivation.  
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Chapter 4 Faces do not attract more attention 
than non-social distractors in the Stroop task 
 
 
 
This chapter is an exact copy of the following manuscript under review: 
Chapter 4 - Henschel, A., Bargel, H., & Cross, E. S. (2020). Faces do not attract 
more attention than non-social distractors in the Stroop task. Accepted pending 
minor revision at Collabra: Psychology. https://psyarxiv.com/pbfny   
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4. Abstract 
As robots begin to receive citizenship, are treated as beloved pets, and given a 
place at Japanese family tables, it is becoming clear that these machines are 
taking on increasingly social roles. While human-robot interaction research relies 
heavily on self-report measures for assessing people’s perception of robots, a 
distinct lack of robust cognitive and behavioural measures to gauge the scope 
and limits of social motivation towards artificial agents exists. Here we adapted 
Conty and colleagues’ (2010a) social version of the classic Stroop paradigm, in 
which we showed four kinds of distractor images above incongruent and neutral 
words: human faces, robot faces, object faces (for example, a cloud with facial 
features) and flowers (control). We predicted that social stimuli, like human 
faces, would be extremely salient and draw attention away from the to-be-
processed words. A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that the task worked 
(the Stroop effect was observed), and a distractor-dependent enhancement of 
Stroop interference emerged. Planned contrasts indicated that specifically 
human faces presented above incongruent words significantly slowed 
participants’ reaction times. To investigate this small effect further, we 
conducted a second experiment (N=51) with a larger stimulus set. While the 
main effect of the incongruent condition slowing down the reaction time of the 
participants replicated, we did not observe an interaction effect of the social 
distractors (human faces) drawing more attention than the other distractor 
types. We question the suitability of this task as a robust measure for social 
motivation and discuss our findings in the light of recent conflicting results in 
the social attentional capture literature.   
 
 
 
 
61 
4.1. Introduction 
Glancing upon Giuseppe Arcimboldo’s famous 16th century artwork “Air”, a 
collection of colourful birds transforms into the side profile of an elegant man. 
The effect Arcimboldo cleverly applied to many of his paintings is also known as 
pareidolia, which describes the illusory perception of human faces in random 
patterns. This tendency is not only capitalized on in the arts, online 
communication, and product design, but also in research, where variations on 
the visual illusion are used to investigate mechanisms of face perception (Bubic 
et al., 2014; Guido et al., 2019; Martinez-Conde et al., 2015; Pavlova et al., 
2018; Robertson et al., 2017; Wodehouse et al., 2018).  
While the origin of the pareidolia phenomenon is somewhat contentious (with 
explanations ranging from “visual false alarms” to reflecting a deeply ingrained 
need for social contact), it points to the fact that human faces have a unique 
status in our visual environment (DiSalvo & Gemperle, 2003; Wodehouse et al., 
2018; Zhou & Meng, 2019). From birth, babies exhibit a preference for gazing at 
faces compared to scrambled faces, with a bias for gazing at others’ eyes 
developing within the first year of life (Hessels, 2020). Replications of a seminal 
eye-tracking study by Yarbus (1967) confirm that participants invariably have a 
gaze preference for people, faces and eyes (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009). Faces are 
a rich source of information, giving insight into another person’s emotions, their 
intentions, and their personality traits. Willis and Todorov (2006), for example, 
have shown that the proverb “you only get one chance to make a first 
impression” is grounded in empirical truth. They found that participants were 
able to make reliable trait judgements on attractiveness, likeability, 
trustworthiness, competence and aggressiveness within split seconds. In yet 
another study, perceivers were capable of deducing the social class of unfamiliar 
faces above chance level, highlighting the importance of face perception and its 
potential societal impact (Bjornsdottir & Rule, 2017).   
An integrative theoretical account on the relative importance of social cues, 
such as faces, by Chevallier and colleagues describes social motivation by means 
of three main components: social reward, social maintaining, and social 
orienting (2012). Interactions with others, the authors argue, are inherently 
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rewarding, relationships are driven by our goals to maintain and improve them, 
and social cues are thus prioritized. The authors propose that social motivation 
is determined by specialized biological processes, which developed due to an 
evolutionary advantage of collaborating with other humans. Thus, social 
information in the form of facial cues is thought to be extremely powerful in 
terms of claiming attentional resources, increasing our chances for improved 
coordination and cooperative work with others (Chevallier et al., 2012). 
Given their prioritization in our visual environment, it is unsurprising that faces 
have been the central focus of many visual attention studies. Collectively, these 
studies point towards faces ranking above objects in capturing automatic 
attention. Using a change blindness paradigm, Ro, Russel and Lavie (2001) found 
that participants detected changes in temporarily presented faces more quickly 
than changes in any other object. This effect disappeared when the face stimuli 
were inverted. Automatic attentional capture by faces was further investigated 
by Theeuwes and Van der Stigchel (2006), who critized that Ro and colleagues’ 
(2001) results could have been due to merely a preference for attending to 
faces, and not reflective of truly exogenous attentional capture. In their 
inhibition of return paradigm, these authors found evidence for automatic 
attentional capture induced by faces as compared to object stimuli. The authors 
observed a delayed gaze response towards locations that had previously shown a 
face and reasoned that this represented true attentional capture by faces, 
rather than difficulties with disengaging attention from them. Bindemann and 
colleagues (2007) sought to understand whether attentional capture by facial 
cues could be entirely determined by their salience, or whether this effect is 
also modified endogenously, by participants’ own volition. As a matter of fact, 
participants were able to direct their attention away from faces towards objects 
when these were more predictive of the cued target location in a dot-probe 
paradigm. However, the authors claimed an overall face bias persisted, with 
participants showing greater ease at directing attention to predictive faces 
versus predictive objects. Experiments by Langton and colleagues (2008) further 
affirmed the notion that attentional capture by faces is automatic and 
involuntary. Searching a visual array for a butterfly was slowed by the presence 
of an “additional singleton”, a task-irrelevant face. Here, the authors concluded 
that humans became consciously aware of faces before any other none-face 
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item. Overall, a large body of evidence suggests that social attentional capture 
by facial cues is a robust phenomenon, providing evidence for the putative social 
orienting pillar of the social motivation model. 
Beyond seeing faces in oddly shaped clouds, Martian craters or pieces of burnt 
toast, we also encounter deliberate pareidolic design when we interact with 
humanoid robots (DiSalvo et al., 2002; DiSalvo & Gemperle, 2003; Wodehouse et 
al., 2018). Due to the face’s role in communicating emotions, and more 
generally, facilitating social interactions, the design of human-like (or at least 
human-readable) robot faces has attracted considerable attention and 
investment in the domain of social robotics. A key driver behind humanoid robot 
design is the desire to build a believable social agent, while mitigating the 
potential damaging effects an overly human-like appearance could have on the 
user (DiSalvo & Gemperle, 2003). Thus, in order to avoid an uncanny experience, 
or over-promise on the robot’s functionality, a popular design choice for socially 
assistive robots is a humanoid face with simple geometric shapes alluding to 
familiar, human features (Kalegina et al., 2018). Indeed, when participants were 
asked to rate the humanness of humanoid robot heads, only a few features 
accounted for more than 62% of variance: the eyes, eyelids, nose and mouth 
(DiSalvo et al., 2002). This is in line with a study by Omer and colleagues, which 
mapped the features that contributed to the global gestalt of pareidolia faces, 
identifying the eyes and the mouth (2019). Robots’ facial cues are viewed as one 
of the crucial four dimensions in driving human-likeness ratings, and in a survey 
of humanoid robots, 87.5% had at least some facial features (DiSalvo et al., 
2002; Phillips et al., 2018). It is of note that when establishing an impression of 
animacy, viewing the face as a whole is crucial, with participants being more 
hesitant to make judgements about the presence of mind in an agent when 
viewing cropped facial cues in isolation (Looser & Wheatley, 2010). Hence, and 
as Geiger and Balas (2020) point out, robot faces, which we have presented here 
as a special case of intentional pareidolia, constitute a border category of face 
processing, and while some research exists on attentional capture by pareidolic 
faces, less is known about the social relevance of robot faces. This question 
however is crucial, as humanoid robots become increasingly commonplace in 
modern society, taking on care, companionship and support roles. Hence, an 
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important goal is to develop robust behavioural tasks that probe the relevance 
of robotic, compared to human, social cues.  
Research on pareidolic faces and the extent to which they engage social 
attentional processes has yielded mixed results so far, with some researchers 
arguing for the crucial role of top-down information driving the face illusion 
effect (Takahashi & Watanabe, 2013, 2015), and others providing evidence for a 
bottom-up account of the phenomenon (Liu et al., 2014; Robertson et al., 2017). 
Takahashi and Watanabe (2013) investigated reflexive attentional shifts induced 
by pareidolic faces using a gaze cueing paradigm. The authors found a cueing 
effect of pareidolic faces, however, this effect disappeared when participants 
were not explicitly instructed that the presented objects could be interpreted as 
faces. In a follow-up study, Takahashi and Watanabe (2015) found that face 
awareness, i.e. perceiving an object (here: three dots arranged as a triangle) as 
a face improved participants performance on a target detection task. This 
advantage disappeared when subjects were instructed to detect a triangle target 
shape, rather than a face target. The authors concluded that despite their 
identical shape, faces receive prioritized further processing due to top-down 
modulation of face awareness. On the other hand, a study by Ariga and Arihara 
(2017) did not find that pareidolia faces captured visual attention when 
presented as task-irrelevant distractors in a letter identification task. However, 
when human faces were presented as distractors among a rapid serial 
presentation of letters, accuracy was significantly impaired. There was no 
difference between pareidolia faces and their defocused control images for any 
of the various time lag conditions in the letter identification task. While Ariga 
and Arihara (2017) conclude that attentional capture by facial cues is exclusively 
reserved for human faces, yet another study shows that pareidolia faces were 
able to elicit deeper forms of social engagement, surpassing an initial face 
detection stage and eliciting further specialized processing. In their study, 
Palmer and Clifford (2020) presented pareidolic stimuli exhibiting directional eye 
gaze and found that during a subsequent human direct eye gaze task, sensory 
adaptation had taken place: the illusory faces influenced the perception of the 
human face stimuli. This finding is at odds with Robertson, Jenkins and Burton’s 
(2017) conclusion: these authors claim that their participants’ performance on 
several pareidolia face detection tasks was unrelated to their performance on 
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face identification tasks, suggesting a functional dissociation and no higher-level 
face processing taking place elicited by illusory faces.  
While the evidence on how deeply illusory faces are perceived as social is mixed, 
they constitute an ideal control for human facial features in social attentional 
capture tasks. This also raises the question how deliberate pareidolic faces, such 
as humanoid robots, might engage our visual attention, as these agents are 
capable of at least some interactions with the physical world. Some preliminary 
evidence even exists from an electrophysiological study by Geiger and Balas 
(2020), which suggests that robot faces were more likely to be perceived as 
objects, rather than faces when presented in an inversion effect paradigm. The 
authors found that the face sensitive N170 ERP-component was moderately 
influenced by robot faces, ranking somewhere between objects such as clocks 
and real or computer-generated human faces.  
The neuronal architecture underlying the prioritization of social cues has been 
shown to include both cortical and subcortical regions, including the amygdala, 
the ventral striatum, the orbitofrontal cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. These brain structures, which are reliably engaged during other types of 
reward processing as well, seem to be sensitive to, or perhaps even signal, the 
importance of social aspects of our environment (Schilbach et al., 2011). A 
formal theory in favour of a specialized subcortical fast track was put forward by 
Senju and Johnson, who coined the “eye contact effect” (2009). The fast-track 
modulator model claims that eye contact receives prioritized processing via a 
subcortical route. To test this hypothesis, Conty and colleagues (2010a) 
conducted experiments on the distracting effect of social cues while participants 
were engaged in a cognitively demanding task: the classic colour Stroop 
paradigm (MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; Stroop, 1935). 
Despite the above reviewed variety of paradigms which probe (social) 
attentional capture, the Stroop task has proven to be a particularly popular 
vehicle. Named after the psychologist who discovered the effect, hundreds of 
studies have shown that naming the ink colour of an incongruent colour word 
(i.e., the word “RED” presented in green) produces slower reaction times than 
determining the colour of a control word (the letters “XXX” presented in green). 
This interference effect, which highlights the fact that task-irrelevant 
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information is processed concomitantly and automatically, has inspired a 
multitude of extensions, including pictorial, spatial, and social versions 
(MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000). For example, in the facial-emotional Stroop, 
participants name the ink colour of emotional, compared to neutral faces, which 
are overlaid with a coloured filter. Past research has shown that sad participants 
and participants with higher trait anger are slower to name the colour of angry 
versus neutral faces (Isaac et al., 2012; Van Honk et al., 2000; van Honk et al., 
2001). Thus, the Stroop task has been validated as a suitable paradigm to assess 
the distracting power of task-irrelevant information, such as facial cues.   
In Conty and colleagues’ study (2010a), the cropped eye-regions of human faces 
with open or closed eyes - in one of two head orientations - were presented as 
task-irrelevant distractors on top of the Stroop task. The authors found that the 
interference effect produced by the competition between the automatic 
processing of word meaning and ink colour was further enhanced in the direct 
gaze condition, regardless of the head orientation. In a follow-up experiment, 
Conty et al. (2010a) showed participants visual gratings and grey colour blocks as 
distractors, which the authors argue excluded the possibility that the effect 
might have been driven by low-level visual properties of the images – as open 
eyes have an inherently stronger visual contrast than closed eyes. In a third 
experiment with a new participant sample, they again found no difference 
between closed or averted eyes when presented as distractors on the task. 
Conty and colleagues conclude that the salience of direct eye contact was so 
strong that it tapped into processing resources needed to perform well on the 
main task: responding quickly and accurately to the target words (2010a).   
A later study from the same lab by Chevallier and colleagues replicated and 
extended the costly eye contact effect (2013). Importantly, the authors tested 
the paradigm in two groups of children: typically developing boys and a group of 
male adolescents with Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC). Again, open and closed 
eyes were presented as distractors above the neutral and incongruent words, 
however, this time a non-social control condition was added: flower images. As 
expected, the authors report the Stroop interference effect, where incongruent 
words significantly slowed participants’ reaction times. The typically developing 
group showed the hypothesized enhanced interference in the social condition 
(here open and closed eyes were taken together as the ‘social’ category), while 
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the ASC group showed the opposite effect. However, when investigating only the 
open versus closed eyes, stronger interference for open eyes was preserved in 
adolescents with ASC. The authors interpreted their findings as yet another 
confirmation for the strong salience of task-irrelevant social distractors but 
remark that their results are limited by their specific stimulus set and invite 
future studies to investigate other types of social distractors, such as whole 
faces.  
In the current study, we built on their paradigm by testing the extent to which 
human, robot or object faces capture attention automatically, by presenting 
them on top of the classic colour Stroop task. We were interested in extending 
the Stroop paradigm to test a wider variety of social cues in terms of their 
motivational value, as well as in evaluating the utility of the social Stroop task 
with robot faces as a valid behavioural task to probe social perception in HRI 
research.  
Hypotheses. In line with a large body of literature on the Stroop interference 
effect, we expected that incongruent words would slow reaction times in 
comparison to the neutral target word condition, leading to the classic 
interference effect (MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000). Based on the findings by 
Conty et al. (2010a) and Chevallier et al. (2013), as well as the established 
literature on social attentional capture, we further predicted that the more 
socially salient a cue is, the more it would lead to enhanced Stroop interference 
in this conceptual extension of the paradigm. The most socially salient stimuli 
used in the present study were human faces, which we predicted would increase 
reaction times in the incongruent Stroop condition. Less salient distractors were 
the robotic faces, which in theory allow for a more minimal form of social 
interaction. Even less socially salient distractors, the object (pareidolic) faces, 
contained facial cues but no capacity for the object to interact with the world in 
a social manner. Finally, we expected the control images, which held no social 
relevance whatsoever, to have no effect on reaction times in the incongruent 
condition of the Stroop task.  
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4.2. Experiment 1 
4.2.1. Method 
Preregistration and data statement. The experiment was pre-registered via 
www.AsPredicted.org. The document can be found at https://osf.io/ky4b7/.  
We report all measures in the experiment, all manipulations, any data exclusions 
and the sample size determination rule (Simmons et al., 2012). Data and the R 
analysis scripts are available (https://osf.io/xyz4m/). Due to copyright 
restrictions, the full stimulus set is not openly available, however it can be 
shared upon request. 
 
Figure 7 - Stimulus categories.  
A representation of the four different stimulus categories: human faces, robot faces, 
pareidolic faces and the control images, flowers. The human, robot and object distractors 
all have a direct gaze orientation and show a neutral facial expression. The full stimulus set 
is available upon request, as individual images are restricted by copyright.  
 
Participants. An a-priori power analysis based on the contrast of interest 
resulted in a total sample size of 47 participants (dz=0.49, α= 0.05, power=0.95, 
noncentrality parameter = 3.359, critical t=1.678, Df=46, actual power=0.95). 
We recruited 50 participants, however, based on our pre-registered exclusion 
criteria (diagnosis of ASD and having had a previous interaction with a robot) we 
excluded 9 participants. Two additional participants had insufficient English 
language skills, and thus the total number of exclusions was 11. The pre-
registered exclusions were made based on participant answers on the 
experiment questionnaires’ self-report items (for example: “Do you have a 
diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder?” and “Have you interacted with a robot 
before?”). The other exclusions had to be made in addition, based on the 
difficulties of the participants with the task. We report a final sample size of 
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N=39. Of the 39 participants, 26 were female, and reported a mean age of 27.41 
years (SD= 7.35). Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Glasgow 
ethics review board (300170224). All participants provided written informed 
consent prior to taking part and were reimbursed for their participation by 
payment. As in the original study, the experiment was framed as an experiment 
on colour perception.   
Stimuli. A new stimulus set was built for this adapted version of the Stroop 
paradigm (Figure 7). The human faces were selected from neutral, frontally 
oriented facial expressions in the Radboud Faces Dataset and the London Faces 
Database (Langner, Dotsch, Bijlstra, et al., 2010; DeBruine & Jones, 2017). The 
robot and object faces, as well as the flowers, were selected from Google, with 
the aim to include only neutral, frontally-oriented faces. The rationale behind 
including only neutral faces was that emotional facial cues have been shown to 
draw attention, especially in comparison to neutral facial expressions (Pessoa et 
al., 2002; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2002). 
 
Figure 8 - Schematic representation of a trial time course.   
 
An independent sample rated the first pool of human and robot images, resulting 
in a pre-selection of more neutrally perceived faces (more details can be found 
in Appendix C). Twelve unique images were obtained in each of the 4 categories 
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and were edited to achieve a standard round form, mirrored, transformed to 
grey-scale and averaged according to mean contrast and luminance using the 
SHINE toolbox in MATLAB (Willenbockel et al., 2010). This resulted in 96 unique 
images in Experiment 1 (i.e. 24 per each of the four distractor conditions). Since 
the overall number of trials was 192 (closely modelled on the original study by 
Conty et al., 2010a), the distractor images were presented twice. 
Procedure. Participants were tested in a quiet, dark cubicle on a computer, 
sitting 50 cm away from the screen. Participants familiarized themselves with 
the key responses in two training rounds. In the first training, colour-unrelated 
words (such as “BOWL” or “HAT”) were presented in red, yellow, blue and green 
ink. Words low in arousal and with a medium valence score from the Affective 
Norms for English Words (Bradley & Lang, 1999) were selected. In this first 
practice block, participants received feedback on their performance accuracy 
and speed, whereas in the second round, the feedback was removed. Each 
practice block consisted of 48 trials. The experiment was split in 4 blocks, with 
short breaks after 48 trials. In total, the experiment took 25 minutes to 
complete.  
An experimental trial consisted of a centrally presented fixation cross, whose 
duration was jittered between 800 and 1300 milliseconds (Figure 8). After the 
fixation cross, the target word appeared, which extended horizontally over 1° of 
visual angle, and vertically over 0.5° of visual angle. Directly above the target 
words, the distractors were presented, extending over ca. 6° of visual angle. 
The images and word pairs remained on the screen until a response was made. 
There were equal numbers of incongruent and neutral Stroop trials, and no 
restrictions regarding the switch between incongruent and neutral trials were 
put in place, as they were presented randomly. The target word and distractor 
image pairs were fixed. Due to an error when setting up the PsychoPy 
experiment (Peirce, 2007), only female human faces were presented in the 
incongruent condition of the Stroop task, with all the male faces presented in 
the neutral condition. The object and robot distractor images in Experiment 1 
were not one-to-one controlled by their mirror images across the incongruent 
and neutral conditions. 
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Statistical analysis (pre-registered). The percentage of accurate responses was 
calculated and analysed by means of a repeated measures ANOVA. For the 
analysis of the reaction times, incorrect responses were excluded, as were RTs 
that were two standard deviations above the mean or below 200ms. As a result, 
606 trials (8.09%) were discarded (a detailed breakdown of the trial number per 
condition can be found in the Appendix C).  
We calculated a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the target 
(incongruent vs. neutral) and distractor (human, robot, object, flower) as 
within-subjects conditions. Finally, we conducted planned contrasts. All analyses 
were conducted in R 3.5.3 (2019), using the {ez}, {psych}, {afex} and {emmeans} 
packages (Lawrence, 2016; Revelle, 2018; Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, & Aust, 
2019; Lenth, 2019).  
4.2.2. Results 
Accuracy. The repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of target, 
suggesting participants were more accurate in the neutral target word condition: 
F(1, 38)= 7.48, p=0.009, ηG2= .03. However, the overall accuracy was very high 
(95.72%) and the effect size is considered small, so this was not further 
investigated.  
Table 2 - Mean reaction times and standard errors in milliseconds (Experiment 1). 
 
Reaction times. A second repeated measures ANOVA was calculated and as 
predicted, we saw a main effect of target, with incongruent words slowing down 
the reaction times of the participants: F(1, 38)= 39.24, p<.001, ηG2= .03. This 
finding confirms that our modified task was still effective at inducing a Stroop 
interference effect. In addition, we observed a small interaction effect of target 
 Humans Robots Objects Flowers 
Incongruent 
target 
M (SE) 843 ± 11 807 ± 11 815 ± 11 796 ± 11 
Neutral target M (SE) 753 ± 10 768 ± 11 763 ± 10 760 ± 10 
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x distractor: F(3, 114)= 2.69, p=.049, ηG2= .003. To investigate the difference in 
reaction times between specific conditions (comparing the effect of the human 
distractors in the incongruent condition with the flower distractors in the 
incongruent condition), planned contrasts were computed.  
 
Figure 9 - Results (Experiment 1). 
The Stroop interference scores were calculated by subtracting the neutral from the 
incongruent trials. Here the mean Stroop interference scores are shown for each of the 
distractor categories in Experiment 1. 
 
They revealed that the human faces were significantly more distracting than the 
flower images in the incongruent condition: t(227)= -2.95, p=.004 and drew more 
attention than the robotic faces as well (t(227)=-2.15, p=.03), but there was no 
significant difference to the object faces: t(227)=-1.86, p=.06. The Stroop 
interference scores (neutral trials subtracted from incongruent trials) are 
visualized in Figure 9 and the mean reaction times with standard errors are 
summarized in Table 2. 
4.2.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we found an interaction effect in the predicted direction: 
human faces drew more automatic attention than flower images and robot 
faces, leading to enhanced interference in the Stroop task. However, the 
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interaction that emerged, as evaluated by the ANOVA, was very small and just 
above the set significance level (p=.049). In addition, due to our conservative 
participant exclusion criteria, we experienced a larger drop-off in overall 
subject number than expected. Thus, the experiment was perhaps not 
adequately powered to detect the effect of interest. Furthermore, we 
speculated that the effect may have been influenced by the repetition of the 
distractor images, or due to the described programming error. We next decided 
to run the same paradigm again, this time recruiting a sufficiently large subject 
number (accounting for a drop-out rate of approximately 15-20% of 
participants), presenting both male and female faces in the incongruent Stroop 
condition, and doubling the number of unique distractors, thus preventing 
repeated viewing of the stimuli.  
4.3. Experiment 2 
4.3.1. Method 
Preregistration and data statement. We followed the same procedures that 
were described in our preregistration document, as reported in Experiment 1.  
Participants. A new set of participants (N=70) was recruited. In addition to the 
pre-registered exclusion criteria (outlined in Experiment 1 - Method), we added 
the condition of not having participated in the first experiment. After subject 
exclusion, 51 participants remained in the sample (39 female). The participants’ 
mean age was 23.24 years (SD=6.27).  All participants provided written informed 
consent prior to volunteering for this experiment and were reimbursed by 
payment. The experiment was approved by the University of Glasgow ethics 
review board (300180052).  
Stimuli. The stimulus set was extended to include 12 new unique images for 
each distractor condition, which were mirrored and edited in the same way as 
outlined in Experiment 1. In total, we now had 192 unique distractors.  
Procedure. The same experimental procedure was followed as described in 
Experiment 1. Following the completion of the Stroop task, we also asked 
participants to rate the unique (unmirrored) distractors based on agency (ability 
74 
to plan and act) and experience (ability to sense and feel), to establish that the 
distractor categories were indeed perceived differently, with regard to their 
varying levels of social saliency. Participants rated each of the 96 images on 
both characteristics using a sliding scale from 0 to 100 in FormR (Arslan et al., 
2019). The questions were derived from Gray, Gray and Wegner’s study (2007) 
on mind perception of different kinds of agents. We used mind perception as a 
socialness proxy to distinguish between the control condition (flowers), 
inanimate (robot and pareidolic faces) and agents with a mind (humans). The 
analysis of the ratings confirmed that the stimulus categories were perceived 
differently: the human images received the highest agency and experience 
ratings. A detailed report of the stimulus ratings can be found in Appendix C. 
Statistical analysis. We followed the same data cleaning and analysis procedure 
as in Experiment 1. Incorrect trials were excluded, as well as reaction times 
below 200ms or 2 standard deviations above the mean (i.e. 1910ms). With this 
reaction time trimming criterion, we discarded 1061 trials (10.84%). A detailed 
breakdown of the number of trials remaining per condition can be found in 
Appendix C.  
4.3.2. Results 
Accuracy. The repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant main effect of 
target or distractors, nor any significant interaction effects. Overall, the 
participants’ performance on the task was very accurate again (93.29%).  
Table 3 - Mean reaction times and standard errors in milliseconds (Experiment 2). 
 
 
 Humans Robots Objects Flowers 
Incongruent 
target 
M (SE) 811 ± 10 808 ± 11 809 ± 11 816 ± 10 
Neutral target M (SE) 723 ± 9 747 ± 9 730 ± 9 735 ± 9 
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Reaction times. The repeated measures ANOVA on the reaction time data 
revealed a main effect of target, consistent with the expected Stroop 
interference in the incongruent condition of the task: F(1, 50)=70.31, p<.001, 
ηG2=.06. Again, this showed that the task worked as expected. The target x 
distractor interaction was not significant: F(3, 150)= 0.36, p=.78, ηG2 =.0003. 
Planned contrasts were computed using estimated marginal means. No contrast 
of interest reached significance: there was no difference between human faces 
and flower images in the incongruent condition: t(300)= .094, p=.92. The mean 
reaction times and standard errors are summarized in Table 3 and the Stroop 
interference scores are visualized in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 - Results (Experiment 2). 
The mean Stroop interference scores (incongruent – neutral conditions) for each of the 
distractor categories in Experiment 2.  
 
Bayesian regression analysis (exploratory). Given the results of Experiment 2, 
we explored the extent to which our data provided compelling evidence for the 
null hypothesis (no enhanced Stroop effect when human faces are presented 
compared to the control flower condition) by using a Bayesian regression 
modelling approach {brms} package in R and Stan (Version 2.9.0, Bürkner, 2017), 
as the null cannot be confirmed with Frequentist statistics.  
Following Balota and Yap (2011), we fitted an ex-gaussian distribution to data, 
as the response shows a strong right-skew (Figure 11). The ex-gaussian 
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distribution is the convolution of the normal and exponential distributions and 
has been shown to provide a good fit to reaction time data (Balota & Yap, 2011). 
We included target word and distractor type as fixed effects predictors and 
included random intercepts and random slopes for each participant in a maximal 
random effects structure. The same weakly informative prior was applied to all 
variables, with a Student’s t-distribution of 3 degrees of freedom, a mean of 0 
and a scale of 1. We used the default number of 4 Markov chains, each with 4000 
iterations and a warm-up of 1000. This model converged, as supported by R-hat 
values below 1.01. 
 
Figure 11 - Reaction time distribution (Experiment 2). 
Distribution of the reaction times for each experimental condition (Experiment 2).  
 
We report the estimate (b), estimated error (EE) and the 95% credible interval in 
Table 4 below. The reaction time data was pre-processed in the same way as 
outlined in the data analysis section of Experiment 1.  
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Table 4 - Parameter estimates for the population-level effects of the maximal Bayesian 
model including random intercepts and slopes per participant.  
The beta-values of the parameters (b), estimated error (EE) and credible intervals (CI) are 
shown (Experiment 2). 
Predictor b (EE) 95% CI 
Intercept .76 (.01) [.74, .78] 
Incongruent target .04 (.01) [.02, .05] 
Human distractor .00 (.01) [-.02,.01] 
Object distractor .00 (.01) [-.02, .01] 
Robot distractor .00 (.01) [-.02, .01] 
Incongruent target x human distractor -.01 (.01) [-.01, .04] 
Incongruent target x object distractor .00 (.01) [-.02, .02] 
Incongruent target x robot distractor .00 (.01) [-.02, .02] 
 
To decide on the acceptance or rejection of a parameter null value we followed 
the approach outlined by Kruschke and colleagues (2018). Here, a range of 
plausible values are considered (indicated by the highest density interval (HDI) 
of the posterior distribution) and how they relate to a region of practical 
equivalence (ROPE) around null (Kruschke, 2018). The ROPE thus describes 
effects that are so small that they can be considered meaningless. In 
determining the ROPE range, we set the limits following the procedure based on 
half of what we consider a small effect (Kruschke, 2018). A small effect in our 
first experiment was an average difference of 47ms between the incongruent 
social and incongruent control distractor, compared to a difference in 34ms in 
Conty and colleagues’ task and 41ms in Chevallier and colleagues’ version 
(2010a, 2013). Choosing the most conservative small effect, we set the ROPE 
limits to [-.017, .017].  
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Figure 12 - Region of practical equivalence with zero analysis (Experiment 2). 
The region of practical equivalence (with zero) is shaded in grey. The effect of interest (the 
incongruent target with the human distractor image) is marked in dark blue as undecided 
(Experiment 2).  
 
As depicted in Figure 12, the ROPE approach here does not offer a 
straightforward decision on the null hypothesis, even though zero is included in 
the range of credible parameter values, a small part of the HDI lies outside of 
the ROPE region for the effect of interest (slower reaction times for human 
distractors in the incongruent condition).  
In summary, in defining our Bayesian regression model, we have increased the 
uncertainty of our estimates by including more random variance in the form of 
subject-level random effects. This increased uncertainty is expressed in Figure 
12. Based on the ROPE analysis, we cannot definitively support the null 
hypothesis. However, considering that zero is contained in the 95% interval of 
credible values of the parameter’s posterior distribution, the evidence for an 
effect is not very strong, and if real, goes in the opposite direction: -10ms [-10, 
40].   
4.4. General discussion 
Across two experiments, we investigated how distracting faces with varying 
degrees of social salience were during a classic Stroop paradigm. Contrary to 
(s) 
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predictions derived from the fast track modulator model by Senju and Johnson 
(2009), and previous studies demonstrating robust attentional capture by task-
irrelevant faces, we did not consistently observe the most salient social cues 
(human faces) leading to greater interference on the Stroop task. While we 
report a marginally significant interaction in Experiment 1, suggesting stronger 
distractibility of human faces in the incongruent condition, we caution 
interpretation of this finding, as we conducted our analysis on a smaller 
participant sample than planned. Thus, we reran our experiment with sufficient 
power, where we also used a larger number of unique distractor images. While 
we again observed the predicted general Stroop effect, the target by distractor 
interaction disappeared. Bayesian reanalysis of the data does not exclude the 
possibility of the human distractors influencing reaction times more than the 
neutral control distractors in the incongruent condition. However, this small 
predicted effect is likely not very strong. Overall, our findings contradict those 
reported by Conty and colleagues (2010a) and Chevallier and colleagues (2013), 
who both found task-irrelevant social cues automatically captured attention. 
While their findings provided empirical evidence for the fast-track modulator 
model, which posits that social cues should exogenously and automatically 
engage attention, we don’t see convincing evidence for this from our study. Our 
results not only appear counter-intuitive given the previous studies this work was 
based on, but also within the wider context of the literature documenting the 
reward value of social cues (Chevallier et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2019; 
Williams & Cross, 2018).  
However, empirical evidence for social distractors always capturing attention is 
less convincing than the two studies by Conty and colleagues (2010a) and 
Chevallier and colleagues (2013) suggest. A conceptual extension of their task 
from the lab of Hietanen, Myllyneva, Helminen and Lyyra (2016) failed to 
replicate the enhanced Stroop effect by direct gaze in a real-life version of the 
task. In their study, a confederate was looking at participants directly above a 
screen, which displayed a colour-matching version of the Stroop task. Hietanen 
and colleagues (2016) found a main effect of direct gaze speeding up the RTs of 
the participants, as compared to averted gaze. The authors reconcile their 
contradictory findings by relating them to the higher arousal produced by their 
stimuli: eye contact with a real person should be more engaging than pictorial 
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representations thereof. In so-called low arousal contexts, they argue, salient 
social cues should recruit attentional resources and interfere with participants’ 
performance on cognitive tasks. In our experiments, even in a context that 
Hietanen and colleagues (2016) describe as “low arousal”, it is most probable 
that any social salience effect is practically equivalent to zero.  
How can our results then be explained? Of course, the stimuli we presented were 
more complex than those used in the original studies, so it is possible that the 
eye-contact effect only holds in (more) simplified contexts. The eye region in 
our stimulus set appeared smaller than in the original experiments, due to it 
taking up a smaller percentage of pixels in our distractor images. While the eye 
region itself was smaller, all our social stimuli (the human, robot and object 
faces) depicted direct gaze and a frontally oriented face. They only varied in 
their potential as a social interaction partner. So, if the eye-contact effect were 
to hold, we should have seen a consistent difference between our most salient 
social stimuli with direct eye gaze (the human faces) and the neutral control 
condition (flowers). The fact that our data did not support this pattern is 
especially surprising given that past studies examining direct gaze have also used 
full-face stimuli in similar, cognitively demanding tasks (Burton et al., 2009; 
Conty, Russo, et al., 2010b). 
A close look at the social attentional capture literature reveals a variety of 
methodological issues and contradicting findings across studies investigating 
faces and facial features as task-irrelevant distractors. Many studies report 
effects based on very small samples (some as small as 8 participants per 
experiment; (Ariga & Arihara, 2017; Miyazaki et al., 2012; Sato & Kawahara, 
2015), make bold statements based on modest statistical evidence (“the three-
way interaction approached significance, F(2,76) = 2.46, p<.10”, p. 1103, 
Hietanen et al., 2016) or use small sets of distractor images which are repeated 
across many experimental trials (Bindemann et al., 2007; Theeuwes & Van der 
Stigchel, 2006). Indeed, some of these problematic confounds have been 
highlighted and tested by Pereira and colleagues (2019; 2020).  
Pereira and colleagues (2019, 2020) systematically controlled for each known 
confound in the social attentional literature, including the perceived 
attractiveness of stimuli, low-level features and a list of other stimulus 
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properties. In their studies, the authors utilized the dot-probe paradigm, with 
faces, houses and scrambled distractor images as task-irrelevant cues. The 
targets appeared with an equal likelihood at six different locations. Pereira and 
colleagues found across multiple experiments that faces did not reliably draw 
attention to their cued location, as indexed by participants’ reaction time. In a 
follow-up Bayesian analysis on one of their experiments, the authors found 
evidence for the null hypothesis of no reaction time differences emerging for 
targets appearing at locations that were cued by faces or houses (Pereira, 2019). 
While a different task was used in these studies, the authors’ findings closely 
align with ours: faces are not reliably capturing attention and impairing the 
performance on an unrelated cognitive task. Interestingly, in a direct replication 
of Bindemann and colleagues (2007), using less well-controlled stimuli, the 
authors were able to replicate the effect of attentional capture by task-
irrelevant faces, providing convincing evidence for systematic confounds 
obscuring the true picture in the existing literature. 
More evidence for the variable nature of findings on automatic attentional 
biasing by social cues comes from a series of experiments by Framorando and 
colleagues (2016), who, similar to Hietanen and colleagues (2016), also failed to 
replicate attentional capture by direct gaze, when faces were presented in a 
stare-in-crowd task paradigm. Based on previous literature on this effect, one 
should expect that faces with direct gaze should be more distracting than faces 
with averted gaze. The authors found that straight gaze had a faciliatory effect 
when it was part of the target of the task, not a task-irrelevant distractor cue. 
These findings were later extended by the same authors, emphasizing again the 
task-dependent nature of directly gazing faces, which in this study hinged on the 
social or non-social nature of the task (2018). These empirical findings echo an 
fMRI study by Pessoa and colleagues (2002), who investigated attentional 
capture by emotional facial cues. Here, like the fast-track modulator model, a 
popular theory suggests that a subcortical route gives preference to the 
processing of emotional facial cues. However, the authors found that brain 
regions implicated in emotion perception were only active when participants 
were able to attend to the emotional facial cues, and these same brain regions 
were not differentially modulated when participants were engaged in a 
cognitively demanding task. This, the authors conclude, means that attentional 
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resources are in fact necessary to allow the neural processing of emotional facial 
cues.   
While we can reconcile our results with these studies, one may still wonder why 
social cues, which are thought to be inherently rewarding, failed to engage 
participants in our experiments in the expected manner (Anderson, 2016). 
Speaking to this, recent findings on reward-related distractors impairing 
participants’ performance have also called this intuitive hypothesis into question 
(Rusz et al., 2019). A new meta-analysis suggests that the effect size of studies 
on reward-related distraction is small, and that findings across reviewed studies 
are highly variable, with reverse results not being uncommon (Rusz et al., 2020). 
This dovetails with the contradictory results we have found in the literature of 
social attentional biasing and which have also been addressed by Pereira and 
colleagues (2020). 
Of course, based on this small number of empirical studies, we do not wish to 
claim that salient social cues, such as faces, never capture automatic attention 
in any context. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that overt attention (i.e. eye 
saccades towards social cues), as opposed to covert attention, which is 
measured by manual reaction time, is consistently directed towards the eye 
region of faces (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Hayward et al., 2017; E. J. Pereira et 
al., 2020). Still, we do wish to challenge the putative fast track modulator 
model and speculate that when faces are presented as task-irrelevant 
distractors, they may not be salient enough to draw attention and cognitive 
processing resources away from the task at hand. Furthermore, we question the 
suitability of the task as a “proxy for social motivation”, as suggested by 
Chevallier and colleagues (2013, p. 1649).  
However, our findings should also be interpreted with the following limitations 
in mind: over the course of two experiments, we recruited from an ethnically 
diverse participant pool at the University of Glasgow, while presenting rather 
homogenous looking human faces, consisting exclusively of Caucasian 
individuals. Given that the studies we based our experiments on did not 
explicitly mention or measure this factor, we did not assess ethnic background in 
the short demographic survey preceding both studies. As such, we cannot test 
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whether this aspect played a role in the missing enhanced Stroop interference 
effect for the human distractor images.  
A further stimulus-based limitation was that in Experiment 1, distractors were 
not controlled by their mirror and presented twice. Thus, the repeat 
presentation could have led to a particularly memorable stimulus set. In 
Experiment 2, the unique distractors in the incongruent condition were 
controlled by their mirror images. Of course, on the other hand, the repeat 
presentation of distractor images is common practice in the social attentional 
capture literature (for example, a set of four unique human and pareidolic face 
images used for an experiment consisting of 450 trials, (Ariga & Arihara, 2017). 
Takahashi and colleagues (2013) used stimuli with three unique identities over 
many trials, and only four unique stimuli in another study (Takahashi & 
Watanabe, 2015). Theeuwes et al. (2006) presented 12 unique distractor images 
across 96 trials. To put it differently, based on the conventions of the social 
attentional biasing literature, it is unlikely that we did not observe the expected 
effect due to the number of unique distractor images we presented. 
Despite our best efforts to only include neutral faces, the emotional content of 
the social stimuli could not be controlled to a fine-grained degree, as it was 
limited by the design and availability of the robots and objects that were 
identified through our Google search. In the emotion rating experiment, which 
we undertook prior to Experiment 1, the robot faces were not rated as 
unambiguously neutral as the human faces, even after excluding the outliers. 
Human faces were selected from the neutral category of the Radboud and 
London faces database, so these stimuli would have contained inherently less 
variance in perceived emotionality than the robot and object faces. However, 
given the scarcity of frontally oriented and high-quality robot and object faces, 
we chose to operate within those constraints. Moreover, in comparison with 
other studies on social attentional biasing we were able to control for the 
following confounds (as outlined in Pereira et al., 2020): size and shape of the 
distractors, luminance and contrast, distance from fixation, the internal 
configuration of facial features of the human, robot and object images (i.e. a 
comparable set of features including eyes, a nose and a mouth in most of the 
images), as well as the task context.  
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While this set of experiments constitutes a conceptual extension to face stimuli, 
rather than a direct replication of the eye contact effect, we kept most other 
aspects of the experimental procedure identical to the studies we modelled our 
task on. Based on these studies and the facial attentional capture literature, we 
would have expected that human faces would be most salient, regardless of the 
small modifications we made. Indeed, keeping in mind recent calls for more 
generalisation efforts in psychological science (Yarkoni, 2016), we feel that a 
conceptual replication adds crucial insight to the field of motivated cognition. 
Further to the arguments we presented, our question and approach directly 
relate to the conceptualized fast-track modulator model: we tested and failed 
to support Chevallier and colleagues’ (2013) hypothesis that this effect should 
generalize to other social cues – like faces - as well.  
For future research, our findings have important implications: many researchers 
in human-robot interaction (HRI) lament the absence of robust behavioural tasks 
to assess social interactions with robots, especially regarding changes in social 
motivation towards them (Baxter et al., 2016; Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, 2012; 
Henschel & Cross, 2020a). A few research groups have successfully adapted 
cognitive tasks for HRI, for example the inversion effect (to examine 
anthropomorphism), and the Posner gaze-cueing paradigm (Wykowska et al., 
2014; Zlotowski & Bartneck, 2013). Yet, behavioural tasks that reliably assess 
social motivation towards robots are still scarce. Based on our findings, a 
suitable point of departure for future generations of social robotics researchers 
could be to examine overt attention in preferential looking paradigms or 
saccadic choice tasks, utilizing eye tracking technology (Crouzet & Thorpe, 2010; 
Fletcher-Watson et al., 2008), as these effects appear robust (Hayward et al., 
2017). Another option could be to implement more natural social interaction 
tasks and measure attentional engagement and shifts in a similar manner as 
Hayward and colleagues in their conversational paradigm, in which participants’ 
eye gaze behaviour was recorded with spyglasses and cameras (2017). 
Interestingly, the authors found that the social attention of participants in a 
natural context was unrelated to their behaviour in the classic Posner gaze 
cueing task. Their findings also speak to recent calls in the HRI literature to 
implement more natural, embodied experiments with robots to test changes in 
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attitudes, behaviours and neural correlates in a more ecologically valid context 
(Henschel, Hortensius, et al., 2020b).  
On a more fundamental level, one should reflect on the issue of small effect 
sizes to be expected in experimental psychology (Funder & Ozer, 2019; Ramsey, 
2020; Schäfer & Schwarz, 2019). Based on the insights of recent large scale 
replication projects, we can be fairly certain that many established effects in 
the literature are much smaller than initially presented, if replicable at all 
(Camerer et al., 2018). One should then question what the smallest effect size is 
that one would consider interesting. Going forward, researchers should aim to 
conduct well-powered direct replications and consider expected effect sizes 
before adapting social motivation paradigms for HRI. 
When Arcimboldo originally painted his whimsical portraits in the late 16th 
century, little did he know that machines today would be endowed with facial 
features to evoke illusory socialness – a simple, yet effective trick, corroborated 
by data that show that mechanical and screen-based robot faces are rated as 
humanlike, friendly, intelligent or in some cases, as uncanny (Chesher & 
Andreallo, 2020; Kalegina et al., 2018; Phillips et al., 2018; Vallverdú & Trovato, 
2016). As our surroundings become increasingly populated by a variety of 
artificial agents (including robots and virtual agents), an important aim will be 
to probe how different types of faces are processed, and what we might learn 
about humans’ intrinsic social motivation toward artificial agents’ faces (Geiger 
& Balas, 2020).  
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Chapter 5 Social Cognition in the Age of Human-
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5. Abstract 
Artificial intelligence advances have led to robots endowed with increasingly 
sophisticated social abilities. These machines speak to our innate desire to 
perceive social cues in the environment, as well as the promise of robots 
enhancing our daily lives. However, a strong mismatch still exists between our 
expectations and the reality of social robots. We argue that careful delineation 
of the neurocognitive mechanisms supporting human-robot interaction will 
enable us to gather insights critical for optimising social encounters between 
humans and robots. To achieve this, the field must incorporate human 
neuroscience tools including mobile neuroimaging to explore long-term, 
embodied human-robot interaction in situ. New analytical neuroimaging 
approaches will enable characterisation of social cognition representations on a 
finer scale using sensitive and adequate categorical comparisons (human, 
animal, tool, or object). The future of social robotics is undeniably exciting, and 
insights from human neuroscience research will bring us closer to interacting and 
collaborating with socially sophisticated robots. 
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5.1. Human Neuroscience as the Icebreaker in a Social 
Robotics Winter  
Human-robot interaction (see Glossary) is a young field currently in a phase of 
unrest. Since the development of KISMET in the MIT Media Lab in the late 1990s, 
one of the first social robots, significant progress has been made towards 
engineering robots capable of engaging humans on a social level. Robots that 
respond to and trigger human emotions not only enable closer human-machine 
collaboration but can also spur human users to develop long-term social bonds 
with these agents. While progress in developing increasingly innovative and 
socially capable robots has advanced considerably over the past decade or so, 
some have suggested that the field is approaching a social robotics winter. 
Referencing the period of disillusionment following escalating hype surrounding 
artificial intelligence (S. Natale & Ballatore, 2020), the still-limited social 
repertoire of even the most advanced embodied robots calls into question the 
proclaimed “rise of the social robots” (Campa, 2016; Tulli et al., 2019). 
With robots failing to deliver on expectations, social interaction has been named 
one of the ten grand challenges the field of robotics is now facing (Yang et al., 
2018). To facilitate progress toward this endeavour, the rich literature of 
cognitive neuroscience offers many insights into human social behaviour, not 
only on a surface level, but also relating to underlying functional and biological 
mechanisms (Chaminade & Cheng, 2009; Hortensius & Cross, 2018a; Wykowska 
et al., 2016). Both human-robot interaction researchers and neuroscientists 
working with robots converge in their interest in facilitating smooth and 
successful social encounters between robots and humans. This joint effort should 
ultimately enable society at large to take advantage of the often-heralded 
potential of robots to provide economical care, company and coaching. 
In this Opinion, we argue that studying the human brain when we perceive and 
interact with robots will provide insights for a clearer and deeper understanding 
of the human side of human-robot interaction, and will thus set the stage for a 
social robotics spring. Our focus on the human side of these interactions, 
including consideration of the constraints of social cognition, serves to highlight 
what recent advances in human neuroscience, in terms of method and theory, 
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can contribute to fluent human-robot encounters. The focus of the majority of 
past studies has been the passive perception of other agents. While this work 
provides a first step towards characterising social interactions, a focus on 
perception alone neglects the rich, complex, and dynamic nature of behaviours 
that unfold during social exchanges in the real world. How can social 
neuroscience further our understanding of not only perception but also of 
dynamic relationships with robots? These insights will explain how people view 
and treat these new agents in relation to humans, pets and other animals, and 
tools and objects. Moreover, answers to these questions will help us to 
understand and support resulting societal changes in the domain of care, 
education, ethics and law. In reflecting on the neurocognitive machinery that 
supports human-robot interactions, we suggest that focusing on representations 
of social cognition and how these change during actual and sustained 
interactions with physically present robots will be important. Moreover, we 
argue that minimally invasive mobile neuroimaging techniques offer exceptional 
promise for deepening our understanding of the human side of human-robot 
interaction. These methods will accelerate human-robot interaction research by 
incorporating social dimensions into our exchanges with these machines, thus 
generating crucial insights helpful in meeting the grand challenge of creating 
truly social robots. After all, roboticists, neuroscientists and robots will all 
benefit from an improved understanding of human social cognition in an age of 
robots (Chaminade & Cheng, 2009; Hortensius & Cross, 2018a; Wiese et al., 
2017).  
5.2. The Origins of Imaging the Human Brain During 
Interactions with Robots  
Human fascination with creating a mechanical self dates back to antiquity, with 
writers in ancient Greece and ancient China conjuring human-like automata to 
serve as workers and servants (Broadbent, 2017). In the past century, the type 
of automaton that has most captured the human imagination (and research and 
development investment) is robots, with some contemporary models edging 
closer to the fictionalised ideals that first appeared centuries ago. Concurrent 
with advances in robotics technology has been the advent and rapid 
development of human brain imaging technology. This technology has been vital 
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in developing our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms that support 
social behaviour among humans. More recently, the fields of human-robot 
interaction and neuroscience have begun to intersect, providing new vistas on 
social cognition during interactions with social robots, with seminal studies 
investigating motor resonance, action observation, joint attention, and empathy 
felt towards robots. These studies showcase the diversity of brain imaging 
modalities involved and the technical advances evident from early human-robot 
interaction research and provide a starting point for neurocognitive perspectives 
on these interactions. 
One initial study in this domain (Gazzola et al., 2007) probed the flexibility of 
the Action Observation Network and reported that the parts of the parietal, 
premotor, and middle temporal cortices ascribed to this network respond both 
to watching humans grasp and manipulate objects as well as an industrial robot 
arm perform these same actions. These findings were corroborated by an 
electroencephalography (EEG) study showing mu-suppression over sensorimotor 
or Action Observation network regions for both robotic and human agents 
(Oberman et al., 2007). Insights into motor resonance for robotic actions were 
further replicated and extended when researchers (Cross et al., 2012) reported a 
series of two fMRI experiments that found the Action Observation Network to be, 
in fact, more strongly engaged during observation of (unfamiliar) robot-like 
motion, regardless of whether a human or robotic agent performed the 
movement. These and other surprising findings (reviewed in Press, 2011) were 
attributed to greater modulation of the Action Observation Network following 
greater prediction errors due to the unfamiliarity of robotic motion.  
While observing robotic movements engages action-related brain areas, 
questions remain regarding the extent to which human observers also ascribe 
emotions and intentions to lifeless machines. Past brain imaging studies reveal 
that humans do indeed show engagement of the Person Perception Network 
when observing emotional expressions of robots (Hortensius et al., 2018b) and 
interactions between robots and other humans (Wang & Quadflieg, 2014). The 
circumstances under which similar brain responses linked to empathy might 
emerge when observing humans and robots in simulated pain (Rosenthal-Von Der 
Pütten et al., 2014; Suzuki et al., 2015), or when attempting to decipher the 
intentions of robots (Hortensius & Cross, 2018a), remain an active field of 
92 
inquiry. An fMRI experiment using the gaze cueing paradigm showed behavioural 
and brain responses linked to mentalising, such as enhanced activation of 
bilateral anterior temporo-parietal junction, only when people believed that 
another person controlled the robot (Özdem et al., 2016). 
5.3. State-of-the-Art of Human Neuroscience 
Approaches to Human-Robot Interaction  
Major strides have been made in applying advances in human neuroimaging 
technology to studying human-robot interaction in contexts that approximate 
more naturalistic social interactions. These studies further illuminate not only 
the flexibility and limits of human social neurocognition when perceiving and 
interacting with robots, but also some of the challenges and opportunities that 
roboticists face (and will continue to face) as they develop increasingly social 
robots. Work in this domain highlights the importance of not only stimulus cues 
to socialness (i.e., does the agent look and move like a human or a machine?), 
but also, and arguably even more importantly, how perceivers’ prior beliefs or 
expectations shape brain responses and behaviour (Cross et al., 2016; Gowen, 
2016; Klapper et al., 2014).  
Neuroscientists are now also taking advantage of increasingly sophisticated and 
multivariate analytical approaches to more sensitively probe how the human 
brain represents robots compared to people (Box I). Recent work has applied 
representational similarity analyses to fMRI data collected when participants 
viewed three agents (a human, an android, and a mechanical-looking robot) 
performing different actions (Urgen et al., 2019). Results revealed that different 
nodes of the Action Observation Network represent distinct aspects of these 
actions, and these representations appear to be hierarchically arranged. 
Specifically, occipitotemporal regions coded for lower level action features (such 
as form and motion integration), while parietal regions coded more abstract and 
semantic representational content, such as the action category and intention. 
These findings corroborate related work that examined effective connectivity 
between these two nodes when participants viewed actions of varying familiarity 
(Gardner et al., 2015).  
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Additional recent work highlights important aspects of how the human brain 
computes and evaluates anthropomorphism (Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al., 
2019; Waytz et al., 2019; Wiese, 2018). One study has attempted to evaluate the 
uncanny valley hypothesis using an elegant combination of modelling 
behavioural ratings and functional connectivity brain data (Rosenthal-von der 
Pütten et al., 2019). The authors reported a response profile within the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex that closely reflected the hypothesised, 
nonlinear, uncanny valley shape when viewing images of robots and humans 
rated more or less unsettling. Further modelling demonstrated that a distinct 
signal originating in the amygdala predicted when participants would reject 
artificial agents. This finding ties in with another recent study (Waytz et al., 
2019) that examined anthropomorphising behaviour among a small group of 
individuals with rare basolateral amygdala lesions. These individuals were able 
to anthropomorphise animate and living entities similarly to neurologically intact 
individuals, but anthropomorphised inanimate stimuli (such as a robot) less than 
controls. The authors suggest that the limbic system plays a key role in 
processing signals originating from artificial agents in a social versus non-social 
manner. 
However, mere observation of robots in one-off laboratory studies can tell us 
only so much about human-robot interaction. Two recent fMRI studies highlight 
further innovations in bringing together neuroscience, robots, and real-world 
interactions to advance the fields of social cognition and social robotics 
collectively. The first paves the way for future social neuroscience studies that 
incorporate unrestricted social interactions with autonomous agents while 
simultaneously measuring brain responses (Rauchbauer et al., 2019). The authors 
describe a framework that allows participants to interact with a conversational 
agent (a Furhat robot) or a human partner while a multimodal dataset is 
collected including behaviour (e.g., speech, eye gaze) and physiology (e.g., 
respiration, neural activity). Initial results show less engagement of specific 
brain regions playing a role in everyday social cognition, such as the temporo-
parietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, during live human-robot 
interaction compared to human-human interaction (Rauchbauer et al., 2019). 
Another study examined the extent to which a prolonged period of time spent 
socialising with Cozmo, a palm-sized, playful robot, shapes empathic responses 
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to seeing that same robot “in pain” (Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019). These authors 
employed pre- and post-socialisation intervention fMRI sessions and measured 
repetition suppression within the pain matrix to determine whether a week of 
daily interactions with Cozmo would shift participants’ empathy toward the 
robot to look more like empathy for another person, based on neural activity as 
well as behavioural responses. While this study did not find compelling evidence 
that a week of socialising with a robot discernibly shifted empathic responses to 
look more human-like (Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019), this work nonetheless sets 
the stage for studying the impact of longer-term interactions with robots on 
social neurocognitive processes. This area of work is crucial if robots will indeed 
be taking on more social roles in close proximity to humans in our daily lives and 
should inform robotics developers on ways to maximise social engagement not 
just for an hour or during an initial encounter, but over the long term.  
Together, the findings currently emerging from neuroscientific investigations 
into human-robot interactions highlight how robots are useful tools for probing 
core features (actions, emotions, intentions) as well as the flexibility of social 
cognitive processing in the human brain. While significant progress has been 
made, efforts to capture and characterise brain responses during live, ongoing 
interactions with robots remain in the very early stages. As we suggest below, 
this is likely to be one of the most fruitful areas for further exploration and 
development. However, before moving forward with real social interactions, 
clarification is required regarding the engagement of social cognitive brain 
regions.   
5.4. How Should we Probe the Neurocognitive Reality of 
Human-Robot Interaction? 
Neural responses, as measured with fMRI and EEG, when perceiving or 
interacting with robots differ vastly across different brain networks. Generally, 
activity within the Person Perception Network is not reduced when people 
observe social robots and other artificial agents compared to people, while 
activity within the Theory-of-Mind network is reduced (Cross et al., 2019; 
Hortensius & Cross, 2018a). Going beyond differences in neural activation 
magnitude, future research in this area will be propelled by mapping the neural 
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representation of social cognition when we engage with robots and 
characterising how these representations change over time (Box I).  
Many studies examining how humans perceive and interact with robots have 
focussed on the Theory-of-Mind network and the Person Perception Network. 
These two networks underlie everyday social cognition and are a suitable 
starting point to investigate the engagement of social cognitive brain regions 
when encountering robots. Yet, emerging evidence suggests that other brain 
regions, including the inferior parietal lobule, play a key role when we engage 
with social robots (Figure 13). Increased activity in object-selective brain regions 
has consistently been reported across studies using different robotic agents 
(Cross et al., 2012; Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019b; Rauchbauer et al., 2019). It is 
therefore critical to capture changes beyond the standard Person Perception and 
Theory-of-Mind networks to provide an unbiased account of human-robot 
interaction, while simultaneously acknowledging the possibility that the robots 
are perceived as objects after all, at least in some respect or in certain 
circumstances. 
 
Figure 13 - Activity in object-specific brain regions during human-robot interactions. 
Across several studies that employed different robotic platforms and experimental 
procedures, a consistent finding is that engaging with robots, compared to engaging with 
humans, robustly activates object-specific brain regions. (1) Observing robots compared to 
humans ostensibly experiencing pain or pleasure elicited more activity in the fusiform gyrus 
(FG), middle occipital gyrus (MOG), and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (Cross et al., 2019b). 
While (2) live interactions with a robot elicited some of these regions (Rauchbauer et al., 
2019), observations of (3) emotions and intentions expressed by a robot (Hortensius & 
Cross, unpublished data), and (4) robotic movements (Cross et al., 2012) lead to widespread 
activity across these regions. These results indicate the importance of considering brain 
regions that are selective for object perception. Maps for each study are overlaid on top of 
an independent object localizer (Pitcher et al., 2011). Unthresholded group-maps are shown 
for the four studies, while the objects vs faces and bodies statistical map (n = 28) for the 
object localiser is thresholded at FWE < .05 (k = 10). Data for (1) and (2) are from 
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https://identifiers.org/neurovault.image:108836 and 
https://identifiers.org/neurovault.image:112530 respectively (Gorgolewski et al., 2015). 
 
Researchers have almost exclusively tested whether robots elicit human-like 
responses (i.e., do we perceive and react to emotions expressed by a robot 
similarly to those expressed by a human?). Focusing on direct comparisons 
between robots and humans does not acknowledge the possibility that robots 
could elicit subthreshold brain responses in relation to a particular object 
category. Increased activity in response to human stimuli could therefore be the 
result of a narrow (univariate) comparison between the two agent categories. A 
central question in human-robot interaction studies should be what the 
appropriate comparison categories are for different types of robots. Of course, 
these could range from humans to objects to animals, and the best answer will 
naturally depend on the specific research question being tested (Collins, 2019). 
To establish the place robots might occupy in our social milieu, we need to 
measure the (dis)similarity to animate agents (e.g., a human or pet) as well as 
objects (e.g., a phone). Answers to these questions will not only advance our 
understanding of how people perceive robots and the development of 
psychological benchmarks for the success of social robots, but also touch upon 
philosophy, cognitive science and law, which have important implications for 
society at large (e.g. morality, ethics; Bigman, 2019; Kahn et al., 2006; Prescott, 
2017).  
5.5. Towards Understanding Real Interactions with 
Social Robots 
Screen-based experiments, third-person observation and one-off or short-term 
interactions with robots already provide crucial insights on the social cognitive 
processes that underlie engagement with these novel agents. For the field to 
move forward, future studies should investigate real and long-term interactions 
with embodied robots in ecologically valid settings. These studies will provide 
much needed evidence as to how the human brain negotiates interactions with 
these agents in real-life settings. Interactions in social spaces that go beyond the 
laboratory and are relevant to the robotic platform and the user (e.g. schools, 
care facilities, hospitals) will be particularly important (Broadbent, 2017). The 
field of social robotics has a long tradition of usability and user experience 
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studies and these investigations will benefit from the sharpened focus on rigor 
and reproducibility that contemporary psychology and neuroscience bring to the 
table (Box II).  
The field of social neuroscience in general still needs to answer the call for 
taking into account the importance of the second person in an interaction 
(Schilbach, 2012); this challenge is especially relevant for the study of human 
interactions with social robots. Paradigms employing free-flow interactions, 
wherein a recursive perception-action loop exists between two or more agents, 
are needed. Fortunately, several studies have begun to look at the impact of 
exposure to or interactions with robots – covering a wider variety of robot design 
and morphology (Özdem et al., 2016; Wiese et al., 2017). This work is starting to 
explore neurocognitive aspects of human-robot interactions by integrating 
information derived from behaviour (e.g., speech, eye gaze) and physiology 
(e.g., respiration, neural activity) (Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019; Rauchbauer et 
al., 2019). One of next steps towards measuring truly unrestricted social 
interactions is through the use of mobile functional near-infrared spectroscopy 
(as highlighted below). Combining these state-of-the-art neuroscience methods 
with new developments in natural language processing should enable 
researchers to step away from Wizard-of-Oz methods and provide new ways to 
examine the social nature of human-robot interactions.  
Human-robot interactions are shaped by prior experiences, expectations and 
beliefs that are continuously updated (Hortensius & Cross, 2018a). It is therefore 
critical to go beyond contrasting pre- versus post-interaction measures and 
incorporate longitudinal experimental designs to address questions on 
experience-dependent plasticity of human social cognition when interacting with 
social robots. Of note, several commercially available robots allow researchers 
to collect large datasets per experimental subject over long periods of time, 
somewhat akin to the experience sampling method (an intensive longitudinal 
collection of self-report measures). For example, the Cozmo robot (Ciardo et 
al., 2020; Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019) collects a rich set of data spanning facial 
recognition, game performance, and “emotional responses” performed by the 
robot. Of course, these procedures must consider privacy, data protection and 
other ethical issues (Rafaeli et al., 2019), but nonetheless offer promise if 
employed responsibly.  
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A consideration to keep in mind in the context of social cognition when 
interacting with robots is the target population that the robots are designed for, 
and the purpose of these interactions. Whereas two key target populations for 
robotics developers are children and older adults, participant samples in 
neuroscience and psychology are predominantly comprise young adults and are 
often biased towards specific sectors of society (e.g., educated and a relatively 
high socio-economic status; Henrich et al., 2010). Further, cultural variation 
exists in the acceptance and uptake of robots (Broadbent, 2017), and this 
cultural heterogeneity is not fully represented in basic research, which tends to 
be conducted in industrialized countries, often in western ones. As research on 
human-robot interaction gradually moves towards broader geographical and 
societal representation, it is important to consider differences in expectations, 
attitudes, and beliefs, as well as in prior experiences with robots. This variation 
needs to be considered in the forms of individual differences (e.g. in learning 
and plasticity), as well as differences between age groups (e.g. Kirsch & Cross, 
2018) and cultures. As one example, one needs to take into consideration that 
countries such as Japan and South Korea have a longer tradition of research and 
development in this area (Cameron et al., 2017; Hinz et al., 2019; Jairo Perez-
Osorio et al., 2019). Similar to an individualised approach that many technology 
companies adopt (e.g., social media, streaming services), for which cognitive 
neuroscience has also advocated (Gordon, 2017), the time is ripe for research 
into human-robot interaction to adopt methods that are sensitive to and 
capitalise upon individual differences. Considering how quickly people adopt and 
can adapt to new technologies, as well as the impact of potential generational 
differences on attitudes towards such technologies, and the continuous 
development of new social robotics platforms, it is imperative to keep in mind 
what a fast-moving and continuously evolving target human-robot interaction is. 
In order for research in this dynamic area to maximise relevance and 
generalisability, we argue for the use of specialised methods that enable 
researchers to map this variation. Combining real and extended interactions with 
continuous data collection, neuroscience methods and machine learning, could 
thus be major step towards personalised human-robot interaction (Clabaugh & 
Matarić, 2018). 
99 
5.6. The Promises and Pitfalls of Using Mobile Brain 
Imaging in Embodied Human-Robot Interaction 
Studies  
New developments in mobile neuroimaging techniques provide the necessary 
testing ground for how robots might resonate at the social level. One promising 
technique for studying human-robot interactions is functional near infrared 
spectroscopy (fNIRS). This technique has been advancing steadily since a 
connection between human brain function and corresponding light absorption 
was originally established (Chance et al., 1993). This imaging modality, like 
fMRI, maps the blood oxygen level dependent response, taking advantage of the 
transparency of biological tissue (such as skin and bone) in the near-infrared 
spectrum (for a comprehensive review see Pinti, Tachtsidis, et al., 2020). Light 
shone on the head with laser diodes or LEDs travels through the skull, scatters 
back in a banana-shaped curve and is eventually picked up by a detector located 
at approximately 3 cm separation. The constraints of fNIRS relate to its 
relatively shallow penetration depth (reaching the outer layers of the cerebral 
cortex) and relatively low spatial (2-3cm) and temporal resolution (up to 10Hz). 
It has a lower spatial resolution than fMRI and a slower temporal resolution than 
EEG, yet brings the advantages of being cost effective, portable and relatively 
robust to movement artefacts. 
 
These advantages allow for mobile and unobtrusive neuroimaging, thus 
presenting fNIRS as an optimal candidate for conducting embodied human-robot 
experiments - especially with under-represented groups such as young children, 
patients and older adults that often cannot participate in more constraining 
types of data collection. Researchers in human-robot interaction have embraced 
fNIRS as a tool to construct feedback loops to control robotic movement or 
behaviour (Solovey et al., 2012) and as an implicit response evaluation to various 
robotic systems (Kawaguchi et al., 2012; Mehta, 2019; Strait & Scheutz, 2014b; 
for a review see Canning & Scheutz, 2013). Various high-quality, commercial 
imaging systems that allow high-density channel and hyper-scanning set-ups with 
great potential for research on dyads or groups interacting with a robot are now 
100 
available, and some recent proof of concept studies have shown the possibility 
of using fNIRS for connectivity analysis (Bulgarelli et al., 2018). 
The transition from lab-constrained experiments that employ screen-based 
evaluations of social robots to the measurement of unrestricted real-world 
interactions with physically embodied robots using fNIRS should be a gradual 
process, adding complexity in a stepwise fashion (Figure 14). For example, in 
recent years, the brain networks involved in observing social interaction have 
been mapped in detail (Quadflieg & Koldewyn, 2017). Two regions, the posterior 
STS and the TPJ, code different aspects of observed interactions (Isik et al., 
2017; Walbrin et al., 2018; Walbrin & Koldewyn, 2019). A logical next question is 
the extent to which the presence and content of interactions with robots is also 
coded in these regions in third-person encounters. Following on, insights gained 
from these experiments will pave the way for an embodied research approach 
where brain activity can be measured during real interactions between humans 
and robots in unconstrained interactions. In a recent study, for instance, the 
authors used a GLM-based analysis to automatically identify functional events in 
fNIRS data, and employed  a “brain-first” approach, where instead of being 
constrained by a block- or event-related task design, a more ecologically valid 
setting can be chosen (Pinti, 2017). One can envision applying similar 
methodologies in the context of human-robot interaction experiments. 
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Figure 14 - Employing functional near infrared spectroscopy for unconstrained human-robot 
interactions.  
A stepwise approach can be undertaken to allow for unconstrained human-robot 
interactions outside the laboratory in the real world. A first step is the identification of brain 
regions implicated in a social cognitive process of interest as identified in previous findings 
(e.g., literature, pilot studies). This is followed by a screen-based exploration of the 
involvement of these regions during the observation of human-human and human-robot 
interactions. A third step is the relatively unconstrained interaction with a robot in the 
context of a laboratory, followed by a final step that allows for embodied interactions with a 
robot in everyday environments (e.g. schools, homes). The result of each step can inform 
the methodology and analysis employed in the next step. Photographs provided by 
Michaela Kent, Anna Henschel and Rebecca Smith. 
 
 
When using fNIRS in embodied interaction experiments with social robots, 
several decisions need to be taken: will the device be used to control the robot 
or inform the evaluation of the robot? How long and “natural” or unconstrained 
can the interaction be and still yield reliable and interpretable data? Most fNIRS 
systems, while lightweight and portable in a fitted backpack, cannot be worn for 
longer than about 45 minutes, due to the pressure of the optodes on 
participants’ scalps. When performing games or tasks that involve joint 
movement, another important limitation to keep in mind is that most 
commercially available social robots are not capable of repeating the same 
motions for hours on end, as motors can overheat, and batteries run out. 
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However, despite these constraints, using fNIRS in embodied social robotics 
studies promises to take us one step closer to following the tenets of a two-
person neuroscience (Schilbach, 2012): only by freeing the robots from the 
screen can we begin to understand how embodied interactions affect cognitive 
processes in socially relevant areas of the cortex – including the superior 
temporal sulcus, temporo-parietal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
5.7. Concluding remarks 
Neuroscience-informed human-robot interaction is making important advances in 
changing the landscape of social robotics, while concurrently deepening our 
understanding of the human brain. Beyond perceiving robots in screen-based 
experiments, recent insights have shown that more sophisticated analysis 
methods and the trend of gathering data during real-time, embodied 
interactions with robots can deepen our knowledge of core mechanisms 
supporting social cognition. An added (and natural) benefit to this basic human 
neuroscience research is that it also stands to inform the development and 
design of next generation social robots – the same robots that may eventually 
become social companions that provide support and care. With that, just over a 
decade of neuroscientific contributions to human-robot interaction have shown 
that major questions still remain, for instance: How does the sophisticated 
neural machinery of the human brain support our interactions with these novel, 
mechanical companions? How does the representation of social cognition change 
over time as robots become more deeply integrated into our social life (see 
Outstanding Questions)? The insights from future studies combining human 
neuroscience and social robotics will prepare us for a future of living with 
autonomous robots that resonate with us at the social level. 
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5.8. Box 1. Delineating the neural mechanisms of 
human-robot interaction 
How can we examine the functional and temporal changes in neural 
representations of social cognition during human-robot interaction? 
Neuroimaging techniques such as EEG and fMRI provide detailed temporal and 
spatial information on these changes. Traditionally, researchers have looked at 
relative differences in measures of neural activity during the perception of 
human and robotic agents. Most research used univariate analyses thereby 
focussing on distinct networks in the brain, such as the Action Observation 
Network, Person Perception Network and Theory-of-Mind network. This approach 
allows researchers to answer questions such as whether brain activation when 
observing a “happy” robot is higher or lower compared to observing a happy 
human. In recent years, however, the development and employment of 
increasingly more detailed analyses, ranging from repetition suppression, to 
representational similarity analysis, to multi-voxel pattern analysis, provide 
further and new ways to address questions regarding the overlap of neural 
architectures for social engagement with humans compared to robots. Repetition 
suppression enables mapping of potential overlap between similar or dissimilar 
categories, as repeated stimuli lead to deactivation of regions responsive to 
these stimuli. For example, does a “happy” robot followed by a happy human (or 
vice versa) lead to reduced neural activity in a particular region of interest? The 
presence of repetition suppression would argue for shared neural resources 
underlying the processing of perceived robotic and human happiness. The critical 
next step to capture the changes in the representation of social cognition during 
perception and interaction with social robots is the use of multivariate analyses. 
Representational similarity analyses can establish the similarity in neural 
activation during the observation of a happy or angry human and a happy- or 
angry-appearing robot (Figure 15-A). This approach can test if the neural 
activation represents a particular stimulus dimension. For example, does activity 
reflect a representation at the level of agent (activity for robots is dissimilar to 
humans, regardless of expression) or emotion (activity is dissimilar between 
happy and angry expressions, but similar across humans or robots). Lastly, a 
promising way to probe the extent to which perceiving and interacting with 
humans and robots truly share representations at the neural level is to use 
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multivoxel pattern analyses (Figure 15 -B). Instead of measuring magnitude 
changes, this technique assesses patterns of neural activity that are predictive 
of specific task conditions, i.e. the representation of different emotions. One 
way to test possible shared representations is to train a classifier to distinguish 
the observation of a robot displaying happiness from a robot displaying anger, 
and to test this classifier to distinguish a human experiencing happiness from 
experiencing anger. If the human brain represents perceived human and robot 
emotions similarly, then the decision criteria of the classifier can be used to 
distinguish these two different categories. Together, these analytical tools 
provide new vistas on human social cognition during real and long-term 
interactions with social robots and the representation thereof.  
 
Figure 15 - Towards a Shared Representation of Social Cognition During Human–Robot 
Interaction. 
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5.9. Box 2.  Integrating Open Science Practices into 
Human-Robot Interaction studies 
The movement towards open science practices and increased reproducibility is 
gaining momentum across research domains in the life and physical sciences, 
including psychology and human neuroscience (Munafò, 2017; Poldrack et al., 
2019). Similarly, these issues are acknowledged in Artificial Intelligence research 
(Hutson, 2018), and have recently been further reflected upon by robotics 
researchers (Bethel & Murphy, 2010; Eyssel, 2017; Irfan, Kennedy, Lemaignan, et 
al., 2018). Issues of transparency and reproducibility are especially important for 
investigations of the neurocognitive mechanisms supporting human-robot 
interaction. Integrating methods and tools from psychology and neuroscience, 
researchers not only face reproducibility issues key to these fields (e.g. 
reliability of fMRI findings (Button et al., 2013), and researchers’ degrees of 
freedom in pre-processing pipelines of fNIRS and fMRI data (Carp, 2012; Pinti et 
al., 2019), but also issues specific to the field of social robotics (e.g. cross-
platform generalisability, access to expensive and bespoke robotic platforms). 
Encouragingly, experimental reform is being implemented in the human-robot 
interaction community, with the 2020 ACM/ IEEE International Conference on 
Human-Robot Interaction being the first to invite replication studies for 
submission. In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists are more broadly 
embracing open science practices, which will help to remedy many of the 
abovementioned issues. Concrete actions along these lines include taking steps 
like pre-registering studies, conducting replication studies, sharing research 
materials and (anonymized) data, as well as posting pre-print articles (Munafò, 
2017; Poldrack et al., 2019). This scientific reform can especially benefit human-
robot interaction research, as studies are often resource- and time-intensive and 
include relatively small samples of subjects. Sharing data and scripts will enable 
the wider community to conduct secondary and meta-analyses and exploratory 
tests on published data. Sharing of research resources and products should also 
contribute to a more inclusive community, giving, for example, access to data 
from bespoke robotic platforms. Finally, a movement toward greater openness 
and transparency should facilitate more exchange between disciplines as well as 
a more robust human-robot interaction literature, by creating an ecosystem 
conducive of cross-platform replication. One question the field needs to address 
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is the cross-platform generalizability of previous findings (Cross, Hortensius, et 
al., 2019; Hortensius et al., 2018b). Developmental social robotics already 
successfully implements artificial architectures to test cross-platform 
generalizability (Cangelosi & Schlesinger, 2018) and future research should 
further incorporate this practice to replicate and extend previous findings. 
Moving forward, the implementation of open science practices can help 
facilitate more reproducible user studies and can foster a common ground in 
terms of methodology between human-robot interaction researchers and 
cognitive neuroscientists. 
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5.10. Glossary 
Action Observation Network – a collection of brain regions comprising parts of 
parietal, premotor and occipitotemporal cortices that responds when watching 
other agents (human or robotic) in action. 
Automatic imitation – see motor interference.  
Brain-computer interface – a setup that allows for signal relay between the 
brain and an external device, such as robot, usually via a computer.  
Gaze cueing paradigm – a commonly used psychological paradigm used to 
investigate the mechanisms of joint attention. The gaze of an observed other 
(human or non-human, physically present or viewed on a screen) either looks 
towards or away from a visual target the participant is required to attend to, 
and the cost in a participant’s response time is thought to be a measure of social 
engagement. 
Human-robot interaction – see social robotics. 
Mentalising – a cognitive process by which an individual reflects on, explores and 
interprets their own and others’ thoughts and feelings, and how these influence 
behaviour and actions. 
Motor Interference – Observing others perform movements incongruent to one’s 
own has been found to produce motor interference. Motor interference is closely 
related to automatic imitation, a phenomenon that describes the tendency of 
humans to implicitly imitate others’ actions and other social cues.  
Natural language processing – field of study concerned with the recognition and 
production of natural language by computers and algorithms.  
Pain Matrix – collection of brain regions associated with empathy and emotional 
processing when seeing another individual in pain or distress. Primary nodes of 
this network include bilateral anterior insular and medial anterior cingulate 
cortices 
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Person Perception Network – a collection of brain regions responsive to other 
individuals, especially their faces and bodies. Regions include the fusiform face 
area and extrastriate body area, among others.  
Prediction Error – a mismatch between a predicted and observed response. 
Repetition Suppression – In a brain imaging context, this refers to a reduction in 
a neural response that emerges when a stimulus (or a certain aspect of a 
stimulus) is repeated more than once. Also referred to as repetition priming. 
Social robotics – this term encompasses a wide variety of research relating to 
robots designed to engage humans on a social level, often framed in a 
companionship or assistance context. Human-robot interaction is one facet of 
this diverse field, which specifically investigates how humans perceive and 
interact with robots.  
Social robotics winter –a term used to describe the current disillusionment 
surrounding social robots, as technological developments have failed to live up 
to the hopes and expectations fed by robotic depictions in film, television, and 
other media, as well as the failure of several recent robotics start-ups.  
Theory of Mind – the ability to attribute other mental states (thoughts, desires, 
and intentions) to other individuals. Commonly associated with a network of 
brain regions, the Theory-of-Mind network including the medial prefrontal 
cortex, bilateral temporoparietal junction and the precuneus. 
Uncanny Valley Hypothesis – humans prefer anthropomorphic agents but reject 
them if they appear too human-like - to what extent the uncanny valley is an 
artefact of contemporary experimental procedures remains unknown.  
Wizard-of-Oz – describes an experimental set-up in which the robot does not 
operate autonomously, but rather is controlled by the experimenter, thus 
resembling the trickster turned wizard in the eponymous film. 
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5.11. Outstanding questions 
What are the scope and limitations of social cognition when interacting with 
social robots? Beyond responding to movement, recognising emotions, and 
incorporating gaze behaviour of the robot into the equation, are we able to feel 
empathy for, attribute intentions to, and collaborate with these mechanical 
beings? Can we form meaningful social relationships with them? Will it ever be 
possible to develop a robot with a range of social cognitive abilities that 
resembles (or even improves upon) that of humans? 
How do long-term interactions with social robots shape social cognition? Could 
the human brain’s representation of emotions expressed by a robot ever become 
indistinguishable from the representation of emotions expressed by a human? To 
what extent can neurocognitive processes be repurposed during human–robot 
interaction, resulting in shared representations of social cognition when humans 
or robots are involved? 
Do robots need to be framed as social agents at all in order to be useful in social 
contexts? Or are there some situations (e.g., elderly care) where social robots 
are perhaps most successful and useful when introduced simply as ‘tools’? While 
most studies focussed on testing the extent to which robots elicit responses 
similar to humans, might it be more instructive to assign robots to their own 
distinct category, which stands apart from the categories of animate agents 
(e.g., a human or pet) and objects (e.g., a phone)? 
Establishing the neural mechanisms supporting human–robot interaction beyond 
the theory-of-mind network and PPN, what role do object-specific brain regions 
play during human–robot interaction? 
With the field moving towards naturalistic interactions, to what extent will 
previous findings from the laboratory on passive observation of robots (whether 
in situ or on screens) replicate and generalise to the real world? Also, to what 
extent do findings replicate across robotic classes (e.g., humanoid vs. 
mechanoid vs. animal-like) and platforms? 
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What are the individual, cultural, and developmental constraints of human–robot 
interaction? How best can we incorporate findings from ongoing work examining 
questions in these domains to create more diverse, adaptable, and engaging 
robots? 
Does the field need a unifying theoretical framework to explain how robots 
impact different aspects of social cognition (e.g., empathy or reward)? 
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Chapter 6 Validating functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy as a tool for studying embodied 
social interactions with robots 
6. Abstract 
Functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a promising tool for the 
evaluation of embodied human-robot encounters. In this study, we compared the 
quality of the fNIRS signal with the fMRI blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) 
response, to establish the detection rate of brain activity with each modality, 
using a robust Theory of Mind (ToM) localiser task. Using a new method for the 
digitisation of fNIRS probe positions, we also investigated overlap sensitivity of 
the probes and individual participants’ functional regions of interest. We found 
that on the individual subject level, the localiser evoked robust activity in the 
bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), as measured with fMRI. However, the 
channel-wise fNIRS analysis showed more variable results. Finally, the 
photogrammetry and subsequent co-registration with subjects’ anatomical brain 
scans was successfully accomplished for every subject, revealing how inter-
individual differences in the subjects’ brain anatomy could have contributed to 
the lower signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio using fNIRS.  
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6.1. Introduction 
Recent advances in fNIRS have allowed researchers to transform brain imaging 
experiments from those where participants observe social interactions into 
experiments where participants take part in actual embodied social interactions, 
moving the field closer towards a more ecologically valid ‘second-person 
neuroscience’ (Pinti et al., 2018; Schilbach, 2012). There are clear advantages 
of using fNIRS over other brain imaging methods like electroencephalography 
(EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in naturalistic HRI 
environments. Both social neuroscientists and HRI researchers have reflected on 
the synergies that emerge from implementing fNIRS into evaluations of social 
robots, i.e. those robots that are designed to engage humans on an interpersonal 
level (Henschel, Hortensius, et al., 2020b). Indeed, Strait and Scheutz (2014a, p. 
1) see fNIRS as an innovative tool, which can “build […] a literal bridge between 
robotics and neuroscience” either as a brain-computer interface or as an offline 
evaluation method. In comparison to EEG and fMRI, fNIRS offers a reasonable 
option for in-situ neuroimaging, although with lower spatial resolution than 
fMRI, and lower temporal resolution than EEG. Thus, HRI researchers seeking to 
increase the ecological validity of their experiments with fNIRS should keep 
these limitations in mind.    
While EEG offers higher temporal resolution in the millisecond range, it is 
extremely sensitive to subject motion, and is thus only of limited use in 
embodied encounters with robots. Functional MRI, which offers relatively 
superior spatial resolution, also constrains the scope of participants’ motor 
responses. Young children in particular, who have been shown to exhibit 
differential reactions to social robots (as compared to adults), are not ideal 
scanner participants due to the signal’s susceptibility to motion (Greene et al., 
2018; Vollmer et al., 2018). Mobile fNIRS systems, on the other hand, are more 
robust to subject motion, as long as the optodes are tightly fixed to the head of 
the participant (Huppert et al., 2009). With this brain imaging modality, very 
young children can move more freely and can be directly supported by their 
parents while data are recorded (Powell et al., 2018). To summarize, fNIRS 
might not have the spatial resolution of fMRI or the temporal resolution of EEG, 
yet it fares better than these more established modalities in terms of robustness 
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to motion, as well as better portability and lower cost associated with scanning 
time.   
In addition to these advantages, fNIRS has also been emphasized as a valuable 
tool to objectively assess human-robot encounters (Balconi & Molteni, 2016). 
Wiese and colleagues’ (2017) recent perspective on the intersection between 
neuroscience and HRI critically reflects on current empirical work with social 
robots, which, they argue, is limited by inconsistent assessments of robots. The 
authors argue that in order to build successful social robots (where ‘successful’ 
means robots that are accepted by humans as a social companion), behavioural 
and neuroscientific methods are needed to systematically probe neurocognitive 
mechanisms at play (Chevalier et al., 2020; Wiese et al., 2017). Chevalier and 
colleagues (2020) stress that cognitive neuroscience can bring this meticulous 
approach to the table when studying human-robot interaction, as specific, 
isolated (social-)cognitive mechanisms are targeted and observed.  
Recently, we proposed that before adapting embodied paradigms for human-
robot interaction experiments, an iterative process should occur: first, 
researchers should identify a target region relevant in human-human interaction 
and replicate activity of this region with fNIRS in screen-based paradigms 
(Henschel, Hortensius, et al., 2020b). In the next step - if robust activation is 
found, complexity can be added in the form of embodied interactions with 
robots in the laboratory. In the final step, brain activity can be recorded in 
naturalistic environments, for example in care-homes or children’s nurseries – 
current popular use cases for human-robot interaction (Pinti, Devoto, et al., 
2020; Pinti et al., 2018; Quaresima & Ferrari, 2019). A rationale for using this 
gradual approach is that the evaluation of each step can inform the pre-
registration of the methodology and analytical plans for the more complex, 
following steps. Further, this method could also help social neuroscientists 
uncover discrepancies or overlap between real encounters and their passive 
observation (Schilbach, 2012).  
Following our proposal, in this proof-of-concept study, we sought to test the 
feasibility of fNIRS as a tool for embodied social interaction experiments with 
robots. The main focus of the investigation was to transparently report and 
highlight any challenges we encountered, as well as test a new methodology to 
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spatially register the probes, in order to inform the development of future fNIRS-
for-HRI studies (Clausner et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2020).  
6.2. Mechanisms of optical brain imaging  
fNIRS, an optical imaging technique, benefits from the fact that biological 
tissue, like skin and bone, is relatively invisible in the near-infrared light range 
(600-900nm) and thus offers an ‘optical window’ into the activity of the outer 
layers of the cerebral cortex (Ferrari & Quaresima, 2012; Scholkmann et al., 
2014). Oxygenated hemoglobin (HbO) and deoxygenated (HbR) are chromophores 
- they absorb near-infrared light to a different extent. Based on the differential 
absorbance of light, concentrations of HbO and HbR can be calculated, which is 
closely tied to the stimulus-evoked response, eliciting local vascular and 
metabolic effects that are commonly known as the hemodynamic response 
function (HRF; Huppert et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 16 - Schematic depiction of the shape of the hemodynamic response function (HRF) 
Here the different traces relate to differences in BOLD response magnitude due to variations 
in stimulus conditions – or differences in individual participants (see also Poldrack et al, 
2011, p. 3). Graph by Dan Gale used with permission.    
 
The HRF maps the time-lagged vascular response induced by brain activity, 
which is followed by a local oversupply of HbO, coupled with a decrease in HbR. 
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Thus, similar to fMRI, the fNIRS signal is based on neurovascular coupling (Wan et 
al., 2006), as it measures the increase in cerebral blood flow following neuronal 
activation (Figure 16). The HRF is elicited through the presentation of a 
stimulus, and for healthy adults it peaks at about 5-6 seconds (Friston et al., 
2000; Poldrack et al., 2011). Depending on the stimulus (or repeated 
presentation of the stimulus), the magnitude of the HRF may differ (Figure 16). 
Light shone on the head with the light-emitting optodes penetrates a little less 
than half the source-detector separation, usually spaced at 3cm distance for 
adults (Pinti et al., 2019). The investigated tissue volume that lies in between is 
referred to as a ‘channel’. fNIRS, despite being constrained to a relatively 
shallow penetration depth, has been used to study a multitude of processes, 
including motor, visual, language, auditory and cognitive systems (Huppert et 
al., 2009).  
6.3. Validating fNIRS with fMRI 
To validate fNIRS as a feasible tool for embodied HRI studies, we followed the 
established tradition of fMRI-based verification, as fMRI is still considered the 
“gold standard for neuroimaging” (Wijeakumar et al., 2017, p. 204). Using the 
new spatial registration method, it was our goal to establish an anatomical and 
functional ground truth using MRI and relate this ground truth back to the fNIRS 
probe placement. Evidence from previous studies validating NIRS with fMRI has 
shown that overall there is a relatively strong degree of correspondence 
between the signals. Cui and colleagues (2011) scanned participants 
concurrently with fMRI and fNIRS, placing optodes over frontal and parietal 
regions and testing a battery of cognitive tasks. The fNIRS measure showed a 
lower signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio than fMRI (as would be expected). However, the 
authors reported a significant correlation between HbO and the BOLD response, 
which they attribute to the fact that HbO has a higher SNR than HbR. Task-
characteristics also played a role: motor, language and visual tasks showed 
robust correlations, however, the authors also report that longer scalp-brain 
distance negatively impacted the signal correlations. A mean scalp-brain 
distance of 16.8mm was reported, importantly, with a larger distance in parietal 
regions (i.e. those of interest to social neuroscientists and HRI researchers). The 
117 
authors explicitly encouraged future research to investigate the correspondence 
of fNIRS and fMRI for event-related (rather than block-design) tasks with more 
subtle effects, which we addressed in the current validation study.  
Noah and colleagues (2015) compared fNIRS and fMRI by sequentially recording 
brain activity using an adapted dance video game task designed to assess the 
integration of multi-modal stimuli. The authors correlated the two signals and 
found good correspondence between them, concluding that this constitutes 
positive evidence for the feasibility of replicating fMRI findings using fNIRS in a 
naturalistic scenario. In their scanner-adapted version of Dance Dance 
Revolution, participants responded on a modified foot platform in a block-design 
task consisting of rest and play epochs. These authors highlight that they chose a 
block design paradigm to “yield strong cortical responses in both procedures” 
(p.9). In a sophisticated study by Wijeakumar and team (2017), fNIRS and fMRI 
was recorded simultaneously, and to test the correspondence of the signals, an 
image-reconstruction approach for the fNIRS data was used. To allow for direct 
comparison with the voxel-based fMRI results, the authors transformed the data 
from channel to voxel space. Here they found significant voxel-wise correlations 
for all experimental conditions in frontoparietal and temporal cortices.  
Overall, the reviewed studies seem to generally support good methodological 
correspondence between fMRI and fNIRS, with some variability in the 
correlations that can be attributed to larger scalp-brain-distances in fNIRS.  
6.4. The role of the TPJ in HRI 
In the current study, we targeted a hub-region central to day-to-day social 
cognition – i.e. “a suitable starting point” when transitioning to the investigation 
of embodied human-robot encounters (Henschel, Hortensius, et al., 2020b, p. 5). 
During human-human interaction, the TPJ forms part of a domain-general 
network, involved in person perception, action observation and mentalizing, but 
also non-social functions (Darda et al., 2018; Olmen, 2018; Schurz et al., 2014, 
2017). Converging results from fMRI and fNIRS studies have added further 
support for TPJ playing a role in imitation and self-other distinction in some 
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observation-only and embodied human-human interaction paradigms (Gallagher 
& Frith, 2003; Oliver et al., 2018; Olmen, 2018; Schurz et al., 2014).  
Due to its crucial role in controlling social interactions with other humans, the 
TPJ has been a central subject of investigation in HRI brain imaging studies as 
well (Hortensius & Cross, 2018a). In an fMRI study by Gobbini and colleagues 
(2011), participants viewed emotionally evocative facial expressions by humans 
and robots. The researchers found that activity in regions commonly referred to 
as the ToM network – which are engaged when we are thinking about the inner 
mental lives of others – was reduced. Specifically, participants’ right medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and right TPJ showed less activation in the robot 
condition. Hortensius and Cross (2018a) reviewed several fMRI studies reporting 
reduced engagement of the bilateral TPJ when robots are observed, compared 
to cues to humanness, and summarised that this reduced activation can be 
linked not so much to the external features of robots, but rather beliefs and 
expectations about them. Hence, an interesting question for future embodied 
HRI studies is whether this reduced activation of the mentalising regions of the 
brain holds in direct interactions with autonomous or Wizard-of-Oz controlled 
robots.  
To effectively target the bilateral TPJ, a validated functional localiser task from 
the fMRI literature was selected for the present study (Jacoby et al., 2016; 
Richardson et al., 2018; Richardson & Saxe, 2020). In their original study, Jacoby 
and colleagues found that the functional region of interest (fROI) detection rate 
for this short Pixar-animated movie was high for the bilateral TPJ: for the left 
TPJ (LTPJ), it was successful for 17 out of 17 participants, and for the right TPJ 
(RTPJ), it was able to elicit functional activity in 16 out of the 17 participants. 
Since then, many fMRI studies have enthusiastically implemented the localizer, 
and a follow-up experiment by Richardson and colleagues (2018) showed that 
ToM regions, including the bilateral TPJ, are developed and functionally distinct 
very early in life – as early as 3.5 years of age. The rationale for using this short 
functional localiser task was that it has shown to be efficient in eliciting robust 
activity on the single-subject level. Using the fMRI activity as our ground truth, 
we wanted to investigate the translation of these findings into the fNIRS 
modality.  
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6.5. The current study: research questions and 
hypotheses 
The main research question we wanted to address in the current study relates to 
overlap sensitivity, i.e. how much would the spatially registered fNIRS probes 
overlap with the functional MRI activity on the single subject level? Related to 
this, we asked how consistent the optodes placements would be over our region 
of interest: bilateral TPJ. The second major question we wanted to address was 
how the detection rate for functional activity on the single-subject level would 
compare across the two modalities. 
As this was an exploratory, proof-of-concept study, we had no directional 
hypotheses about either of these two research questions, however, for each one 
of the two modalities we expected to see increased activity in the bilateral TPJ 
for the contrast of interest: mentalising events in the movie task versus pain 
events.  
6.6. Methods 
6.6.1. Open science statement 
Owing to the exploratory nature of this study, no pre-registration was published 
before data collection, however, the insights gained in here will guide future 
pre-registrations. The task was presented as part of a larger validation project 
posing additional questions regarding test-retest replicability (for both 
modalities) and spatial specificity of the fNIRS modality. Hence, here we report 
only the measures, data exclusions and the sample size determination rule for a 
subsection of this wider project (BOLDlight): the bilateral TPJ functional 
localiser task. Brain and the spatial registration data will be shared at 
Neurovault (https://neurovault.org/) after they are appropriately anonymized 
and de-faced. The data sharing issue is especially salient for the sensitive data 
recorded during the photogrammetry-based spatial registration. Homölle and 
Ooostenveld (2019) have recommended that only the X,Y and Z coordinates of 
the final probe positions should be shared as point clouds, to avoid the 
identification of subject identities.  
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6.6.2. Participants 
Matching the sample sizes of previous fMRI-fNIRS validation studies (Cui et al., 
2011; Wijeakumar et al., 2017), twelve subjects (26.4 ± 6.4 years of age, 8 
female/ 4 male), who met our selection criteria of normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, no learning disability and normal hearing abilities were invited to 
participate for monetary compensation. Subjects were contacted by the 
investigators prior to the testing date to ensure that they understood what their 
participation entailed, as well as to rule out any contraindications for the fMRI 
aspect of the experiment. All procedures were approved by the University of 
Glasgow local ethics committee (Ethics numbers: 300180151 and 300180301) and 
the subjects provided written informed consent.  
6.6.3. Experimental Procedure 
Participants passively observed the CGI-animated short film “Partly Cloudy” 
(Pixar Animation Studios). The movie played after a 10 second fixation cross and 
was presented in PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). Subjects were given the instruction to 
quietly sit (or lie, in fMRI) and observe the movie, while making as few 
movements as possible. In the 5.36 minutes film, clouds conjure human and 
animal babies, which are delivered to earth by helpful storks (Figure 17). 
Throughout the movie, painful events take place (a stork is injured by the spikes 
of a baby porcupine), as well as ToM, during which the observer is prompted to 
consider a character’s thoughts (for example: the stork, who has been 
repeatedly injured by the dangerous babies is caught looking at a cloud 
conjuring fluffy puppies). In the original validation study by Jacoby and 
colleagues (2016), 4 types of events were coded (‘control’, ‘social’, ‘pain’ and 
‘mental’), however, in this study we selected those ‘pain’ and ‘mental’ events 
identified in the reverse correlation analysis by Richardson and colleagues 
(2018).  
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Figure 17 - Screenshot taken from the Partly Cloudy short film.  
Image by Plidezus Leo on Flickr (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) 
 
We selected those events that reliably replicated in an independent sample of 
adults, which resulted in 7 ToM events and 9 pain events, with durations ranging 
from 4 to 16 seconds. The order of the scanning modalities (fMRI or fNIRS) was 
counterbalanced – half of the participants saw the movie first in the MRI 
scanner, half in the fNIRS lab. In the fNIRS modality, we encountered a problem 
with manually sending the triggers – sometimes when the trigger was elicited, 
the task did not start right away. In those cases, a second trigger was sent, 
which was the one we used for the analysis. However, in all three cases there 
was only a 100-millisecond difference between the first and second trigger. 
6.6.4. Photogrammetry-based spatial registration  
A particular challenge associated with fNIRS is the consistent placement of 
optodes onto participants’ heads, once a target brain area has been identified 
(Powell et al., 2018). The standard approach is to follow the landmarks (nasion, 
inion, auricles and Cz) associated with the 10-20 system and spatially register 
optode locations with a 3D magnetic digitizer (such as the Polhemus) to either 
subject brain anatomy or an age-matched template (Clausner et al., 2017; Noah 
et al., 2015). However, several limitations have been identified that are 
associated with this method: the high cost of such electromagnetic digitizers 
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(the Polhemus costs ~ $8000), distortions introduced by nearby metal objects, 
and low spatial accuracy (Clausner et al., 2017; Homölle & Oostenveld, 2019). 
To address these issues, recent advances in computer-vision technology have 
allowed for a more accurate and cost-effective registration method: 
photogrammetry, which describes the method of building 3D models based on 2D 
images, reconstructed from information of overlapping pictures (Wesencraft & 
Clancy, 2019). This new method of spatial registration, which was developed by 
Clausner and colleagues (2017) for EEG electrodes and MEG fiducial markers, 
seems to promise higher accuracy and flexibility.  
The authors developed an open-source toolbox for Matlab (janus3D), which maps 
the spatial location of electrodes to a participants’ anatomical brain scan via a 
matching technique that takes advantage of rigid facial features. Using a replica 
adult head, Clausner and colleagues (2017) compared the performance of this 
technique to the performance of the Polhemus magnetic digitizer and found that 
EEG electrodes were co-registered with an average error of less than .10mm 
with photogrammetry, while the electromagnetic digitizer resulted in an average 
error of 6.1mm. However, the success of the 3D model reconstruction with a 
participant wearing the EEG cap depends on colour difference information, 
which raises the question how successful the translation of this technique will be 
when constructing 3D models of participants wearing fNIRS caps.  
An initial validation study by Hu and colleagues (2020), who were also interested 
in implementing Clausner and colleagues’ toolbox for fNIRS, gives tentative 
support for the feasibility of the method. Although the authors reported a larger 
registration error than Clausner and colleagues, they compared the technique to 
spatial registration of fNIRS optodes with an MRI-derived spatial registration 
technique (using vitamin E capsules sewn in the fNIRS cap). The authors 
attribute the resulting larger error to the movement of the fNIRS cap when 
participants were placed in the MRI head-coil. Complementing the findings of Hu 
and colleagues (2020), in the current validation study, we tested the feasibility 
of the new photogrammetry-based spatial registration method for fNIRS.  
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Figure 18 - The Shimadzu LIGHTNIRS system demonstrated in its portable configuration.  
During the experiment, subjects were seated and the fNIRS recording device was placed on 
a table behind them. The probes were protected from stray light with a dark silk cap placed 
on top of the cap. The subject gave consent for this image to be shared. 
 
To digitise the optode positions, we followed the photogrammetry for EEG 
procedure described by Clausner and colleagues (2017). To ensure consistency, 
the Shimadzu cap (Figure 18) was placed on participants’ heads according to the 
10-20 landmarks: nasion, inion and left and right preauricular points (Jasper, 
1958). Additional colourful stickers (Figure 19) were added to the cap to aid the 
3D reconstruction of the head models, which as described above, relies on 
colour difference information (Clausner et al., 2017). The centre of the cap was 
aligned with the centre of the head, as measured by the distance between 
nasion and inion, as well as the left and right preauricular points. However, due 
to constraints of the setup (i.e. challenges of precisely replicating placement 
between participants), for a subset of the subjects the landmark points 
themselves were not marked and spatially registered. 
In the first step of the spatial registration, pictures were taken with a Canon 
D3500 DSLR camera while participants rotated on the chair in front of a chroma 
key green screen. To ensure consistent lighting, two studio lights were placed to 
the left and right of the subject (Figure 19). Participants rotated with closed 
eyes (to ensure minimal facial motion) in small steps of 10 degrees for three 
different height settings. The procedure was repeated twice, to allow for back-
up photos, should the first run not result in a good quality model. Between 40 
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and 90 pictures were taken for each participant on each of the two 
photogrammetry runs. The photography was not timed; however, this step 
usually took between 15 and 25 minutes to complete.  
The configuration of the camera and further information are described in more 
detail in our manual (Henschel, Kent, et al., 2020c), which can be found at 
[https://zenodo.org/record/4146985#.X5ny0VngphE]. The processing of the 
images was performed offline, after data collection was completed. To build the 
3D head-model, images were first loaded into janus3D, and using the Photo 
Masker functionality, a mask of the chroma green background was created for 
each picture. The pictures and their corresponding masks were then loaded into 
Metashape (Agisoft). 
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Figure 19 - Overview of the photogrammetry-based optode digitisation. 
Three steps are involved in the photogrammetry-based co-registration of the optodes: 
taking the photos, building the 3D head model in Metashape and finally co-registering the 
model and the subject’s MRI anatomical scan in janus3D. The subject gave consent for 
these images to be shared. 
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In Metashape, a matching point cloud was built, then a dense point cloud, a 
polygonal mesh and finally a dense mesh. To obtain the final 3D head model, 
texture information was added. The resulting object file, along with participants 
MRI anatomical scan, was then loaded in janus3D, to perform the final step of 
registering the optode positions to subject brain anatomy (Figure 19). For 11 out 
of 12 subjects we obtained good quality 3D head models. However, even the 
head model that was classified as subpar allowed us to visually identify and mark 
optode positions. Between the two runs, the best quality head model was 
selected for co-registration in janus3D.  
In the first step of the co-registration, the head models are rotated from 
Metashape’s arbitrary to MRI space. Then the head model and MRI scan are 
aligned by outlining the side profile of the subject’s face. Next, the facial 
features are matched to the anatomical scan. The resulting overlay had to be 
manually corrected for most subjects. Three out of the 12 subjects already had 
de-faced MRI anatomical scans. For these three cases, the manual correction of 
the alignment was more comprehensive. After manual correction of the 
alignment, the optode holders of interest were each manually marked, as the 
automatic selection algorithm relies on the contrast between the “electrodes 
and surrounding texture” (Clausner et al., 2017, p. 6). In the case of the grey 
optode holders and the black cap, the contrast was not salient enough for the 
automatic detection to reliably work.  
Extraction of the optode coordinates from the matrix file was completed using 
the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett et al., 2002) in SPM12 (Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, UCL, London) in MATLAB version 8.5 (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, 
USA, 2018b). Using MarsBaR, it is possible to create spheres with the exact 
coordinates obtained during co-registration. This step created 16 nifti files (from 
8 source and 8 detector locations), each one corresponding to the location of 
one of the optodes. To combine these nifti files, again MarsBaR was utilised to 
create a “master” nifti file containing the 16 spheres.  
Finally, the fNIRS optode coordinates were mapped onto the anatomical images 
of the brain in MRIcro (Rorden, 2007). This step was completed in native space 
for each participant. 
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6.7. Data acquisition (fNIRS) 
We used a wearable Shimadzu LIGHTNIRS system (Kyoto, Japan) to record HbO, 
HbR and total hemoglobin concentration changes. 8 light sources (near-infrared 
semiconductor lasers) and 8 detectors (avalanche photodiodes, APD) were 
arranged covering participants’ putative temporoparietal cortex following a 2x4 
(R), 2x4 (L) probe geometry (Figure 20). This probe geometry approximately 
matched previous fNIRS studies’ probe geometry which targeted the TPJ (Hyde 
et al., 2015; Oliver et al., 2018; Olmen, 2018). The configuration resulted in 20 
logical channels: #1-10 on the right side of the head, #11-20 on the left side. The 
LIGHTNIRS uses 3 wavelengths to account for scattering when converting changes 
in optical density to HbO and HbR concentrations: 780, 805, and 830nm (Pinti et 
al., 2018). Before the optodes were attached, hair under the cap probe holders 
was removed with blunt knitting needles, as other fNIRS researchers have 
highlighted that removing the hair from the optode surface is one of the key 
strategies to ensure a good signal to noise ratio (Noah et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 20 - Schematic representation of the fNIRS probe geometry. 
The design of this figure is modelled after Pinti et al. (2020a). 
 
Once the optodes were connected to the cap, a probe check, i.e. the assessment 
of the quality of optical coupling, in the Shimadzu “fNIRS” software was 
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conducted. Channels with low SNR or with an overflow error were adjusted on 
the participant’s head until they showed satisfactory signal quality. Further SNR 
improvements were undertaken by adjusting the voltage of the APDs.  
6.8. Data analysis (fNIRS) 
Data was recorded with a 13.33Hz sampling frequency. The fNIRS data was 
preprocessed with the open-source Matlab toolbox Homer2 (Huppert et al., 
2009). Our preprocessing pipeline was derived from the one described by Pinti 
and colleagues (2020a), taking into consideration recent recommendations for 
standardizing NIRS data processing pipelines (Pinti et al., 2019). Prior to loading 
the files into Homer2, the raw intensity data was transformed from the 
proprietary Shimadzu format into the nirs file format with the help of a custom 
Matlab script.  
Raw intensity was processed with the enPruneChannels function, which 
automatically removes channels from the measurement if the signal is too 
strong, too weak or the standard deviation is too great (Perry, 2019; Powell et 
al., 2018). One channel (channel 3, subject 11) was discarded. Given the fact 
that participants were instructed to sit still and observe the movie, this low 
exclusion rate is perhaps not surprising. The raw intensity data was then 
transformed into changes in optical density (function, hmrIntensity2OD). We 
then removed motion artifacts using a wavelet-based approach (function, 
hmrMotionCorrectWavelet, iqr=1.5), which has been shown to be the most 
effective strategy for identifying spike artifacts elicited by decoupling of optical 
probes from the skin (Molavi & Dumont, 2012; Pinti et al., 2018). Next, many 
sources of noise (heart rate, low frequency noise, & slow trends) were removed 
using a standard third-order Butterworth bandpass filter (function, 
hmrBandpassFilt, band-pass frequency range [0.01, 0.4]). The optical density 
rather than the concentration signal was filtered to avoid “artifact contaminated 
data in calculation of oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin” (Molavi & 
Dumont, 2012, p. 263). Then, using the modified Beer-Lambert law, the changes 
in optical density were converted to changes in concentration (function, 
hmrOD2Conc) with a differential path length factor of 6.  
129 
One chromophore (HbO) was considered for further analysis, as past work has 
focused on this signal due to a higher SNR and better correspondence with the 
BOLD response - however, at the same time this signal may be more confounded 
by physiological noise (Cui et al., 2011; Hyde et al., 2015; Pinti, Tachtsidis, et 
al., 2020b). A general-linear modelling approach was chosen, as this takes 
advantage of the fast event-related task design and is considered more powerful 
than block averaging (Pinti et al., 2019; Wijeakumar et al., 2017). The design 
matrix was composed of the two-task related regressors (pain events and 
mentalizing events), as well as the constant term. We investigated the 
Mental>Pain contrast of interest. Beta values were estimated for each channel, 
for each participant. One-sample t-tests were conducted to investigate the 
hypothesis that the signal in one channel was active at a significance level of α 
=.05. The p-values in this exploratory, single-subject level analysis were not 
corrected for multiple comparisons.  
 
Figure 21 - Time course of HbO and HbR for channel 19 of participant 6. 
Only the mental events are marked. HbO is shown with the solid, and HbR with the dashed 
green line. 
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In Figure 21, an example of preprocessed signal for one subject is reported. The 
preprocessing pipeline was effective in minimizing the noise components in the 
raw fNIRS signals, including slow trends, cardiac pulsation, and motion artifacts. 
In fact, increases in HbO and decreases in HbR can be observed, which are time-
locked to the stimuli presentations (dashed lines). 
6.9. Data analysis (fMRI) 
Participants were scanned with a 3-Tesla Siemens Tim Trio MRI scanner with a 
32-channel head coil and integrated parallel imaging techniques at the Centre 
for Cognitive Neuroimaging, University of Glasgow (CCNi), University of Glasgow. 
Functional images were acquired using an echo planar image (EPI) sequence 
[multi-band EPI, TR =  2000 ms, TE = 26 ms, 68 slices per volume, 2 mms 
isotropic voxels, no gap]. Structural images were acquired using a three-
dimensional T1-weighted imaging sequence scan [1 mm isotropic resolution, TR  
= 2300 ms, TE = 30 ms, FA = 9, field of view = 192 x 256 mm2 ]; as well as a field 
map [3.28 x 3.28 x 3.3 mm voxels, TR = 488 ms, TE = 4.92 / 7.38 ms, FA = 60, 
field of view = 192 x 192 mm2].   
6.9.1. Pre-processing (fMRI) 
Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing performed using 
fMRIPrep 1.5.2 (Esteban et al., 2019) [RRID:SCR_016216], which is based on 
Nipype 1.3.1 (K. Gorgolewski et al., 2011) [RRID:SCR_002502]. Some of the tasks 
and sessions that are referenced in this pipeline were part of a larger project 
(BOLDlight) and are not reported in this chapter. The following fMRI processing 
steps are also reported in a secondary analysis of these data (Hortensius et al., 
in preparation). 
6.9.2. Anatomical data preprocessing 
A total of two T1-weighted (T1w) images were found within the input BIDS 
dataset. All of them were corrected for intensity non-uniformity (INU) with 
N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et al., 2010), distributed with ANTs 2.2.0 
(Avants et al., 2008) [RRID:SCR_004757]. The T1w-reference was then skull-
stripped with a Nipype implementation of the antsBrainExtraction.sh workflow 
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(from ANTs), using OASIS30ANTs as target template. Brain tissue segmentation of 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) was 
performed on the brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:SCR_002823, 
(Zhang et al., 2001)). A T1w-reference map was computed after registration of 2 
T1w images (after INU-correction) using mri_robust_template (FreeSurfer 6.0.1, 
Fischl, 2012). Volume-based spatial normalization to one standard space 
(MNI152NLin2009cAsym) was performed through nonlinear registration with 
antsRegistration (ANTs 2.2.0), using brain-extracted versions of both T1w 
reference and the T1w template. The following template was selected for 
spatial normalization: ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical template version 2009c 
[Fonov et al., 2011, RRID:SCR_008796; TemplateFlow ID: 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym]. 
6.9.3. Functional data preprocessing 
For each of the 10 BOLD runs found per subject (across all tasks and sessions), 
the following preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its 
skull-stripped version were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. 
A deformation field to correct for susceptibility distortions was estimated based 
on a field map that was co-registered to the BOLD reference, using a custom 
workflow of fMRIPrep derived from D. Greve’s epidewarp.fsl script and further 
improvements of HCP Pipelines (Glasser et al., 2013). Based on the estimated 
susceptibility distortion, an unwarped BOLD reference was calculated for a more 
accurate co-registration with the anatomical reference. The BOLD reference was 
then co-registered to the T1w reference using flirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson & 
Smith, 2001) with the boundary-based registration (Greve & Fischl, 2009) cost-
function. Co-registration was configured with nine degrees of freedom to 
account for distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. Head-motion 
parameters with respect to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices, and 
six corresponding rotation and translation parameters) are estimated before any 
spatiotemporal filtering using mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson et al., 2002). BOLD 
runs were slice-time corrected using 3dTshift from AFNI 20160207 (Cox & Hyde, 
1997) [RRID:SCR_005927]. The BOLD time-series (including slice-timing 
correction when applied) were resampled onto their original, native space by 
applying a single, composite transform to correct for head-motion and 
susceptibility distortions. These resampled BOLD time-series will be referred to 
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as preprocessed BOLD in original space, or just preprocessed BOLD. The BOLD 
time-series were resampled into standard space, generating a preprocessed 
BOLD run in [‘MNI152NLin2009cAsym’] space. First, a reference volume and its 
skull-stripped version were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. 
Several confounding time-series were calculated based on the preprocessed 
BOLD: framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three region-wise global signals. 
FD and DVARS are calculated for each functional run, both using their 
implementations in Nipype (following the definitions by Power et al., 2014). The 
three global signals are extracted within the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain 
masks. Additionally, a set of physiological regressors were extracted to allow for 
component-based noise correction (Behzadi et al., 2007) [CompCor]. Principal 
components are estimated after high-pass filtering the preprocessed BOLD time-
series (using a discrete cosine filter with 128s cut-off) for the two CompCor 
variants: temporal (tCompCor) and anatomical (aCompCor). tCompCor 
components are then calculated from the top 5% variable voxels within a mask 
covering the subcortical regions. This subcortical mask is obtained by heavily 
eroding the brain mask, which ensures it does not include cortical GM regions. 
For aCompCor, components are calculated within the intersection of the 
aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calculated in T1w 
space, after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using 
the inverse BOLD-to-T1w transformation). Components are also calculated 
separately within the WM and CSF masks. For each CompCor decomposition, the 
k components with the largest singular values are retained, such that the 
retained components’ time series are sufficient to explain 50 percent of 
variance across the nuisance mask (CSF, WM, combined, or temporal). The 
remaining components are dropped from consideration. The head-motion 
estimates calculated in the correction step were also placed within the 
corresponding confounds file. The confound time series derived from head 
motion estimates and global signals were expanded with the inclusion of 
temporal derivatives and quadratic terms for each (Satterthwaite, 2013). Frames 
that exceeded a threshold of 0.5 mm FD or 1.5 standardised DVARS were 
annotated as motion outliers. All resamplings can be performed with a single 
interpolation step by composing all the pertinent transformations (i.e. head-
motion transform matrices, susceptibility distortion correction when available, 
and co-registrations to anatomical and output spaces). Gridded (volumetric) 
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resamplings were performed using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with 
Lanczos interpolation to minimize the smoothing effects of other kernels 
(Lanczos, 1964). Non-gridded (surface) resamplings were performed using 
mri_vol2surf (FreeSurfer). 
6.10. First and second level analysis (fMRI) 
The data was analysed in SPM12 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, 
London) in MATLAB version 8.5 (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, USA, 2018b). First-
level analyses were conducted by using a general linear model (GLM). The design 
matrix included the previously introduced mental and pain events (Richardson et 
al., 2018), as well as the following predictors of no interest (Hortensius et al, in 
preparation): framewise displacement, six head-motion parameters, and a 
subset of anatomical CompCor confounds (white matter and CSF 
decompositions). A standard hemodynamic response function was modelled, 
complying with the recommendations of Jacoby and colleagues (2016). A grey 
matter mask was used with a threshold of 0.8. For the mental > pain contrast 
images were smoothed using a 5mm smoothing kernel. For the second level 
(group level) analysis, a one-sample t-test was computed (p <0.001 uncorrected, 
k=10). The ROI analysis was done by extracting contrast values for the left and 
right TPJ using the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett et al., 2002) in MATLAB (version 8.5) 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA, 2018b). A 9mm sphere was built using the same 
coordinates (LTPJ: x = -48, y = -62, z = 30 and RTPJ: x = 48, y = 60, z = 30 in MNI 
space) as Richardson and colleagues (2018).  
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Figure 22 - Region of interest analysis (fMRI). 
The region-of-interest analyses showed robust activation for mental events compared to 
pain events across the ToM network, specifically the left and right TPJ. Contrast estimates 
for Mental>Pain (left and right TPJ) are shown on the individual subject level. Colourful dots 
represent each participant’s estimate. The dashed line shows the contrast level of 0. 
 
6.11. Results 
6.11.1. fMRI: Task validation  
The localiser was successful, as it evoked robust activation of the ToM network 
for the mental > pain contrast, as shown by Figure 22 on the individual level for 
bilateral TPJ, and Figure 23 on the group level.  
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Figure 23 - Group map, left side (fMRI) 
The group map shows robust engagement of the ToM network for the Mental > Pain contrast 
(in red) across all participants (middle temporal lobe, superior temporal sulcus, left TPJ 
(arrow), ventro- and dorsolateral medial prefrontal cortex).  
 
6.11.2. fNIRS: Contrast effects 
As illustrated in Figure 24, we report the uncorrected single-subject level results 
for the contrast of interest (Mental > Pain). Channels that were significant at the 
uncorrected level for p <.05 are indicated in green, channels that were not 
active are indicated in grey. These results show that there were significant 
changes in HbO only for a subset of participants: the array over the left side of 
the putative lTPJ shows activation for 7 out of 12 participants, for the putative 
rTPJ (as measured with the fNIRS system), 4 out of 12 participants show 
significant changes. 
We speculated that due to the participants seeing the movie task at least twice 
(as fNIRS and fMRI was not measured concurrently, but subsequently), maybe an 
anticipatory shift was occurring. This has been reported in a recent study by 
Richardson and Saxe, who presented the same localiser to their participants 
twice (2020). To investigate this, we conducted an exploratory second analysis 
for those participants (#1-5, and #12), shifting the events of interest forward for 
two seconds (i.e. one TR, as reported by Richardson & Saxe, 2020). However, we 
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observed the same response pattern, with the only difference of participant 3 
showing no active channels on the left side, and for participant 5 on the right-
side channel 6 was no longer significant.  
 
Figure 24 – Channels significant at the .05 significance level for the Mental>Pain contrast. 
 
Channel 3 (subject 11) was excluded from the analysis. The original event timings were 
used here. More details of the analysis on shifted event timings can be found in section 
6.11.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 25 - Composite images consisting of each subject’s anatomical image, functional activity and co-registered optodes in native space. 
 
 
A closer look at Figure 24 reveals no consistent pattern of active channels: for 
some participants, only the area under the dorsal or ventral channels shows 
activation, for other participants (number 6 & 7), all channels are active for the 
contrast of interest. After checking whether an anticipatory shift had taken 
place, we turned to our overlap sensitivity analysis, to investigate how well the 
co-registered optode positions corresponded with the subject’s functional 
activity in native space.  
6.11.3. Overlap sensitivity (fNIRS/fMRI) 
In Figure 25, we show the composite images resulting from the first level MRI 
analysis. Here we can see the optode positions that were extracted with the 
MarsBaR toolbox on top of individual participants’ anatomical and functional 
images. For 10 out of 12 participants (>83%), we see a good overlap between the 
fMRI functional activity and the positions of the channels. However, inspecting 
individual subjects we also see large variability in the areas of covered cortex 
and arrangement of the optodes. A further important point, which becomes 
evident in this figure, is that some subjects show a much larger distance 
between the cortex and the optodes than others. This could explain some of the 
‘quiet’ arrays we have shown in the previous Figure 24. Overall, Figure 25 shows 
large inter-subject variability of functional activation, anatomical structure and 
variation in optode placement and brain areas covered.  
6.11.4. Detection rate (fNIRS/fMRI) 
Comparing the detection rate on an individual subject level of the two 
modalities revealed that, as in the original study (Jacoby et al., 2016), the 
functional localiser was successful in eliciting activity in the expected functional 
ROIs (Figure 22). The left TPJ fROI was successfully identified for 11 out of 12 
participants, and the right TPJ fROI was significantly active for 10 out of 12 
participants. Hence, the detection rate of the fMRI functional localiser task was 
more successful compared to the fNIRS modality (7 out of 12 participants for the 
left-side probes, 4 out of 12 for the right-side probes).   
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6.12. Discussion 
In this proof-of-concept experiment, we set out to answer two questions: (1) 
how well would optode placement, which was guided by participants’ identified 
fiducial points, overlap with the anatomical and functional MRI images; and (2) 
how would the detection rates of fMRI and fNIRS compare? In addition, we 
sought to investigate how feasible adapting a new method for spatial 
registration from the EEG to the fNIRS modality would be. We answered these 
questions by taking a descriptive approach, visually inspecting the composite 
images consisting of co-registered optode positions, the subject’s anatomy and 
functional activity. For most participants the optodes seemed to cover the brain 
activity recorded with fMRI, but we observed many interindividual differences 
relating to scalp-brain distance, location of the functional activity and 
inconsistent placement of the optodes. Comparing the results of the first-level 
analysis, we were able to replicate a high detection rate in the fMRI modality, 
showing that the localiser task elicited activity of the ToM network at the 
individual subject level. However, our fNIRS channel-wise analysis showed less 
consistent increases in HbO. A little over 50% of the participants had any active 
channels on the left side of the head, and even fewer showed any increases in 
HbO on the right side. 
One possible reason for a muted response could have been that upon viewing the 
movie for a second time, when fNIRS was the second experimental block, an 
anticipatory shift occurred. We investigated this possibility by shifting the events 
2 seconds earlier in time for those participants who had seen the movie for the 
second time. This resulted in a very similar pattern, if not even more reduced 
than the first analysis we conducted, thus suggesting this possibility is less likely.  
Another plausible explanation for the variability of the fNIRS activation is the 
scalp-brain-distance between the probes and the cortex. For those subjects with 
larger scalp-brain-distance, we can be almost certain to have not recorded any 
signal at all. Indeed, a relatively high attrition rate seems to be commonly 
reported in the fNIRS literature. For example, Plichta and colleagues (2006) 
observe good results at the group-level, however a poor outcome on the single-
subject level. Ferrari and Quaresima (2012) highlight that fNIRS activity can be 
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reliably reproduced even over years, at the group level. To summarise, further 
group-level analyses are necessary to definitively answer how successful the 
localiser was at evoking reliable increases in HbO. We can, however, confirm 
previous findings that on the subject-level, for an event-related social task, 
consistent activity is not observed. Thinking further about the proportion of 
active channels reported in the literature, it is often the case that in arrays of 
40 or more channels, 1 or a maximum of 3 channels are reported that also 
survive multiple comparisons correction (Hyde et al., 2015; Powell et al., 2018; 
Wijeakumar et al., 2017).  
Overall, physiological confounds may explain the results we report here. For 
instance, speculating further on why we did not observe consistent HbO 
increases on the individual subject level, one could also imagine that the repeat 
presentation of the movie stimulus could have led to repetition suppression – 
instead of an anticipatory shift (Bhandari et al., 2020; Larson et al., 2013). In 
fMRI and fNIRS studies, repetition suppression is a common approach to 
investigate the engagement of the same brain network (for example the putative 
pain network) for different types of experimental conditions, such as humans or 
robots experiencing pleasure or pain (Cross, Riddoch, et al., 2019; Nordt et al., 
2016). Thus, future analysis could follow-up on possible suppression of the brain 
signal due to repeat presentation of the movie stimulus. Further, we cannot 
exclude the possibility of extracerebral noise playing a role in obscuring the 
signal, as we were constrained by the design of the cap and thus were not able 
to include short-separation channels, which have been proposed as a strategy to 
better account for different types of signal that does not originate from the 
brain (Tachtsidis & Scholkmann, 2016). Task-related systematic activity relating 
to heart rate, blood pressure, breath and the response of the autonomous 
nervous system contribute and obfuscate the true brain signal. As a solution, 
Tachtsidis and Scholkmann (2016) have proposed the use of these short 
separation channels, which can be used to partition the influence of the 
extracerebral activity.  
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6.13. Alternative analytical approaches for fNIRS 
Reflecting on the perhaps not sensitive enough channel-wise analysis approach, 
we also consider alternative methods for future analysis. Indeed, Pinti and 
colleagues (2020a) implemented additional steps when processing the fNIRS 
signal, which were not used in this exploratory study. These authors applied 
correlation-based signal improvement (CBSI), and further down-sampled the 
signal to minimise the impact of serial autocorrelations on the GLM (Pinti et al., 
2019). Beyond the standard array-based analysis we report here, another option 
can be to use an ROI approach, i.e. to consider groups of channels within an ROI 
– which, in the absence of individual anatomical scans can be guided by the fOLD 
toolbox (Zimeo Morais et al., 2018) and which may be more robust to the 
pruning of bad channels (Pinti et al., 2018). Olmen (2018), who was interested in 
identifying relevant channels for their analysis of rTPJ activity, estimated 
cortical sensitivity using the Monte Carlo photon migration simulation algorithm 
with Atlasviewer (a separate functionality of the Homer2 toolbox). With this 
method, one channel of interest was identified and a time-window of 2 seconds 
around the peak of the HRF was analysed.  
Very closely related to the multiple or single channel ROI approach, is the 
promising functional channel of interest (fCOI) method proposed by Powell and 
colleagues (Powell et al., 2018). In their study, which used a similar movie-
stimulus (Baby Einstein, Walt Disney Productions), the authors tested a new 
analytical method by which channels of interest are identified in individual 
subjects, and the response is then tested in an independent set of data. Powell, 
Deen & Saxe (2018) argue that if the contrast of interest is sufficiently specific 
(in their case, video clips containing faces versus scenes, in our case mentalising 
vs. pain events), instead of treating channels with the same array positions as 
equivalent, one could be guided by the functional response profile on the 
subject level to identify the channels of interest in the left out data. Comparing 
the array-based and the fCOI approach (for the HbO results), the authors 
reported that no channel survived multiple comparisons correction in the array-
based approach for the adult sample, and only one channel survived in their 
infant sample. However, with the more sensitive fCOI analysis, the authors were 
able to show that when the anterior portion of the array was analysed, responses 
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were significantly higher for face compared to scene trials for both adults and 
infants, confirming the finding that very young children under the age of 1 
preferentially respond to faces relative to scenes. Powell and colleagues (2018) 
criticise the approach implemented in the current study, where overlap of the 
channels with underlying subject specific functional regions is checked, as the 
size and location of these functional profiles can be highly variable (something 
we have observed also in this study). Thus, accurately matching channels to 
specific functional regions is insufficient. However, an important point to 
consider is power, as both in our study and in the studies by Powell and 
colleagues (2018) subject numbers were small (12, 20, 16, respectively) and 
thus, as they have also argued, the possibility cannot be excluded that with a 
larger sample size, the inherent noisiness in the array-based approach could be 
overcome. Finally, the authors remark that limitations of the fCOI approach 
could be partially addressed by still mapping optode locations to anatomical 
images, where possible.  
6.14. Spatial registration methods 
On balance, spatial registration remains an important point when implementing 
fNIRS studies for HRI. Evaluating the feasibility of the photogrammetry method 
for fNIRS, we conclude that for the majority of participants, with two runs of 
picture-taking, we obtained excellent quality head models. Issues we faced were 
mainly related to the black-and-white design of the cap, which we addressed by 
adding colourful stickers to the cap and then manually selecting the probe 
locations in janus3D. This of course adds time to the processing procedure: 
researchers can budget about 20 minutes for the photography, and between 1 
and 2 hours for the construction of the head models in Metashape (depending on 
number and quality of the pictures), as well as an additional hour rotating and 
aligning the head models with the anatomical scans in janus3D. This would be 
the most salient disadvantage of using this method compared to faster methods, 
like for example video-based construction of head models. When we were 
piloting the video-based method, the resulting head models did not look like an 
accurate representation of reality, so this approach was abandoned early on. 
Since 2019 however, technical advances have resulted in alternative spatial 
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registration methods, that might be more fast-paced and especially useful for 
infant study participants.  
Jaffe-Dax and colleagues used a GoPro with the slow-motion feature and 3D 
surface reconstruction software (Structure from Motion, Visual SfM) to build the 
head models. These authors added colourful stickers on the fiducial points and 
covered the fNIRS cap with a pattern of blue and pink colourful cut-outs. This 
more time-efficient method showed good correspondence between the optode 
positions obtained from the video-based source reconstruction and the 3D 
magnetic digitizer method. This method has the additional advantage of subjects 
being able to move freely while the video is taken.  
Another technical innovation is the use of structured-light 3D scanners for the 
estimation of probe locations (Homölle & Oostenveld, 2019). These low-cost 
scanners (which are for example used in Kinect cameras for Xbox), also allow 
relatively fast (the authors estimate 2 minutes, compared to the 7 minutes 
needed with the Polhemus digitizer) mapping of probe locations. The authors 
also highlight that they tested the approach on 50 subjects, compared to the 
single-subject (or single replica head) that has been commonly observed in the 
spatial registration literature. Overall, the authors found that the structured 
light scanning method showed good overlap with the Polhemus-obtained 
positions, however that this strategy was also not flawless. In one out of 50 
participants the transmission of the electrode positions from the iPad to the 
computer failed, and in one out of 50 participants the Polhemus locations were 
not on the scalp. Homölle and Oostenveld (2019) recommend the 3D structured 
light scanning also for the recording of the position of NIRS optodes, as in their 
study it yielded comparable results to the positions obtained with Polhemus.  
Finally, another promising method could be to use virtual registration, based on 
simulations (Tsuzuki & Dan, 2014), or a further alternative (in the absence of 
structural MRI scans) could be to spatially register probe positions to age-
matched templates (like the MNI template brain) avoiding the need for MRI 
scanning (Bulgarelli et al., 2018). 
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6.15. Limitations 
Several limitations have to be acknowledged. The probe positions in our set up 
were obtained via photogrammetry, before the optodes were attached to the 
fNIRS cap. Experimenters went to great lengths to avoid movement of the cap 
when attaching the optodes, however, especially in those cases where the initial 
probe check flagged problematic sources or detectors, the removal and 
reattachment of the probes could have led to a small margin of error in the final 
co-registered composite images. This small registration error can be assumed to 
lie between 1 - 10mm based on the findings of Clausner and colleagues (2017), 
and Hu and colleagues (2020). Hence, the putative registration error is smaller 
than the fNIRS spatial resolution (Pinti, Tachtsidis, et al., 2020b).  
Furthermore, our placement of the array was guided by standards in the 
previous fNIRS literature, however, a better strategy would be to obtain 
probabilistic brain regions and their corresponding optode locations by using the 
new open-source fOLD toolbox (Zimeo Morais et al., 2018). With the help of the 
toolbox, the initial selection of the array placement could be better guided by 
brain regions of interest, as identified by the simulated photon transport method 
this toolbox applies. Different parcellation methods can be used, but the results 
of the toolbox are currently still restricted to the 10-10 and 10-5 international 
cap systems.  
Another important limitation in this study is the difficulty we encountered with 
the digitisation of participants’ landmarks, which prevented the spatial 
normalisation step to MNI space and the planned mapping of all participants’ 
optode locations, to inspect the variability of the probe placement 
quantitatively. Common approaches in the literature are either adding colourful 
stickers or felt-tip marker points on the subjects’ fiducial points, to later extract 
this important information in the spatial co-registration step (Homölle & 
Oostenveld, 2019; Jaffe-Dax et al., 2019). This information is missing for many 
participants in the current study, so we could not take this part of the analysis 
further.  
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6.16. Planned analyses for BOLDlight 
Future analyses for BOLDlight will include group-level analysis of the fNIRS 
functional localiser task to compare how the channel-level detection rate 
compares to the overall fNIRS literature. Further, the HbR response will also be 
taken into consideration, as well as the multiple comparisons corrected results. 
Moreover, as we have a second dataset of the same task available for the second 
session that participants underwent for the re-test, we will investigate the 
feasibility of the fCOI approach outlined by Powell and colleagues (2018). In 
addition, we will aim to probe the spatial specificity of fNIRS utilizing a finger 
and foot tapping task, as well as a separate functional superior temporal sulcus 
localiser task (Isik et al., 2017).  
It will be interesting to compare the results from these block-design tasks to the 
currently presented event-related functional localiser. Taking into consideration 
also the second scanning sessions for both modalities, we will establish and 
compare test re-test reliability for both fNIRS and fMRI, as recently concerns 
have been raised on the reliability of the fMRI modality (Elliott et al., 2020). 
Future experiments following on from BOLDlight will adhere to the initially 
proposed stepwise procedure of moving “cognitive neuroscience […] from lab to 
life” (Henschel, Hortensius, et al., 2020b; Pinti et al., 2018, p. 369). We plan to 
conduct a direct replication of Walbrin and colleagues’ experiments (2018) using 
social versus non-social animations of interacting geometric shapes, and then 
move to a more ecologically valid stimulus set of robots and humans (Brough, 
Henschel, Rabagliati, Harris, Cross, & Branigan, 2020: Scotbots database, in 
preparation). 
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6.19. Citation Diversity Statement  
Recent work in several fields of science has identified a bias in citation practices 
such that papers from women and other minority scholars are under-cited 
relative to the number of such papers in the field (Dworkin et al., 2020). Here 
we sought to proactively consider choosing references that reflect the diversity 
of the field in thought, form of contribution, gender, race, ethnicity, and other 
factors. First, we obtained the predicted gender of the first and last author of 
each reference by using databases that store the probability of a first name 
being carried by a woman (Dworkin et al., 2020). By this measure (and excluding 
self-citations to the first and last authors of our current paper), our references 
contain 16.22% woman(first)/woman(last), 12.16% man/woman, 14.03% 
woman/man, and 57.59% man/man. This method is limited in that a) names, 
pronouns, and social media profiles used to construct the databases may not, in 
every case, be indicative of gender identity and b) it cannot account for 
intersex, non-binary, or transgender people. We look forward to future work 
that could help us to better understand how to support equitable practices in 
science. 
Adapted from Dworkin and colleagues (2020). 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
Chapter 7 General discussion 
The primary aim of this thesis was to develop robust behavioural and neural 
methods for the investigation of interactions with humanoid robots. Based on 
insights stemming from psychology and neuroscience, I adapted paradigms for 
human-robot interaction, with the ultimate goal of conducting more reliable and 
ecologically valid experiments probing social motivation towards robots. Across 
the chapters outlined in this thesis, I uncovered important issues in adapting 
these paradigms for HRI research. Below, I summarise the main findings and 
contributions, and critically reflect on the limitations of the present work. In the 
sections following the general discussion of the results, I summarise 
methodological implications and highlight recent theoretical considerations. 
Here, I especially highlight the impact of the replication crisis and a move 
towards incorporating open science methods across disciplinary boundaries.  
7. Summary, Contributions & Limitations 
In Chapter 1, I presented a general overview of the field of social robotics and 
its historical development. While reviewing popular definitions of social robots, 
it became clear that the terminology for referring to these machines is far from 
clear-cut. However, most authors describe a social robot as an embodied agent 
that is able to communicate and collaborate with humans in a socially engaging 
way. My review of these definitions also showed that many researchers framed 
social robots in future-oriented terms, with the currently available machines 
perhaps not quite meeting the ideal vision of a truly sociable robot. I also 
reviewed mainstream robotic platforms and highlighted their fields of 
application, which revealed that social robots are expected to be deployed in 
care scenarios, functioning as companions for the elderly and as social skills 
teachers for children with ASC. The introduced robots demonstrate the 
heterogenous morphology of currently available commercial and bespoke 
research systems. In the final part of the chapter, I discussed the social robot 
paradox, which describes a mismatch of expectations and reality when it comes 
to the limited success of integrating especially humanoid robots into the human 
social ecosystem.  
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7.1. Humanoid robots to advance our understanding of 
social cognition 
Despite this limitation, humanoid robots are useful research tools, a point I 
highlighted in Chapter 2. Using robots in cognitive neuroscience and psychology 
experiments allows researchers to explore how these agents, which occupy a 
liminal space in terms of their socialness, appeal to cognitive systems that 
developed over the evolution of successful human-human interaction.  
Humanoid robots also help address a major challenge social neuroscience is 
facing at the moment. The investigation of social perception and behaviour has 
been a primary aim, but experiments have been historically limited by 
presenting mainly screen-based social scenarios (Schilbach, 2012). Bringing 
humanoid robots into the lab allows researchers to take advantage of excellent 
experimental control (to a fine-grained degree), and at the same time achieves 
better ecological validity with embodied, co-located social agents.  
Finally, an important advantage of using social robots in an experimental 
context is that it forces a close examination of fundamental questions, thereby 
contributing to an overall advanced understanding of human social cognition 
(Bolis & Schilbach, 2018). In Chapter 2 I also discussed the tensions that emerge 
at the heart of these interdisciplinary efforts. Given these tensions, some 
researchers have emphasized that a strong theoretical foundation is crucial 
when adapting paradigms for HRI (Eyssel, 2017). After reviewing popular theories 
in HRI, I gave an overview of the framework that underlies this thesis: The Social 
Motivation Theory of Autism (Chevallier et al., 2012). This theory set the stage 
for the following empirical pieces of work, which address two fundamental 
pillars of the framework: the reward value of social interaction and attentional 
capture by salient social cues.  
Chapter 3 was motivated by an observation described in the previous two 
chapters: although many social robots are already deployed in contexts with 
vulnerable users, they often fail to deliver on their promise to adequately and 
autonomously respond in social situations. Other researchers in the field have 
similarly observed that features and behaviours are often implemented in social 
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robots before they are evaluated as being beneficial or crucial for facilitating 
engaging, long-term interactions (Vallverdú & Trovato, 2016).  
In this study, we tested how movement synchrony with a robot would affect its 
likeability and participants’ motivation to spend more time with it in a free, 
conversational interaction. However, after reviewing meta-analyses on the 
effects of interpersonal synchrony on rapport in human-human interaction, we 
identified a problematic confound highlighted by Rennung and Göritz (2016) that 
could obscure the true experimental effect of synchrony on factors such as 
likeability or perceived social cohesion. Many studies failed to ensure 
experimenter blinding, which is particularly problematic as it has been recently 
established that experimenter beliefs influence participant behaviour in 
experimental contexts (Gilder & Heerey, 2018).  
One major contribution of this work is that we ensured a double-blind 
experimental procedure, where neither participants, nor the experimenter, 
were aware of the experimental condition. We found that participants who had 
synchronised with the Pepper robot in a drawing task did not rate the robot as 
more likeable, intelligent or more human-like compared to the group of 
participants that did not synchronise with the robot on this task. Further, we did 
not see that participants in the synchrony group chose to ask the robot more 
questions in a semi-structured conversational interaction scenario that was 
presented as an optional part of the experiment. Across the two groups, 
participants were equally motivated to engage in an interaction with Pepper, as 
the number of questions the participants asked did not differ statistically based 
on their group assignment. An interesting finding that we observed in this 
experiment was that there was a discrepancy between objectively manipulated 
and subjectively perceived synchrony. A larger proportion of participants in the 
asynchrony group stated that they perceived to have been in sync with the robot 
– which highlights the need for including careful manipulation checks in these 
types of experiments.  
Another contribution of this study relates to the lessons we learned using 
humanoid robots in experimental contexts. Through extensive piloting prior to 
data collection, we established that the autonomous mode of the robot was not 
able to successfully sustain interactions with different participants, especially 
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under changing light conditions and when participants spoke with varying 
accents. 
When we piloted the free interaction scenario, we (anecdotally) observed that 
participants quickly felt rejected by the robot when it did not immediately 
orient towards them, when spoken to. This moved us to take advantage of 
remote controlling the robot via a Wizard-of-Oz (WoZ) procedure, where the 
gaze of the robot was always directed at the correct angle towards the 
participant, and it responded to the questions without any larger delays, as the 
answers were triggered by the experimenter behind a room divider. An 
important limitation of this chapter is that we did not outline in detail the scope 
of the perceptual and cognitive WoZ control according to the guidelines 
proposed by Riek (2012). Future studies should seek to report details of wizard 
training (e.g. when experimenters of this study practiced the control of the 
verbal utterances of the robots) and any potential experimenter error (e.g. if 
there was any delay in eliciting the answers of the robot) in more detail.  
Another observation, which is interesting in the light of how the Pepper robot 
was designed (see Chapter 1), was that in order to successfully set up the 
drawing task with the participant and the robot side-by-side, we had to take into 
account the robot sensors, which would lead to freezing its motions if the 
participant, the screen or the table were positioned too close to one another.  
Some additional challenges have to be acknowledged and I will briefly discuss 
these in the following. We did not pre-register our analytical plans and the 
statistical analysis of the null result was limited to a Frequentist approach. To 
investigate whether these data provide evidence for the absence of an effect of 
the synchrony manipulation, an additional Bayesian analysis would have been 
desirable.  
A further limitation, which was addressed by reviewers of the manuscript 
(Appendix B), relates to the fact that we did not assess the extent to which 
participants attributed mind or intentionality to the robot. While the robot 
introduced itself as a member of the research department, the influence of the 
synchrony manipulation could have been obscured by the participants not finding 
the robot believable as an intentional agent. Anecdotally, one participant found 
153 
the robot stating that it did not have a birthdate so devastating, that they 
offered to bake it a cake. Unfortunately, these spontaneous responses were not 
recorded, and point to a need of implementing both quantitative and qualitative 
measures of evaluating interactions in HRI to capture a complete picture of 
perceived mind and intentionality (Riddoch & Cross, 2020). 
Another limitation of the study reported in Chapter 3 was the fact that no 
positive control in the form of a human interaction partner was included. In the 
light of the findings described in the subsequent chapters, I will make the case 
that in addition to including positive controls, it will be important to conduct 
direct replication studies of original effects – and where possible, to go one step 
further by using the Registered Replication Report format (Simons et al., 2014). 
These ideas are outlined in more detail in the following sections of this chapter.   
To evaluate the robot, we used self-report measures developed and validated 
for embodied HRI scenarios (Bartneck et al., 2009; Nomura et al., 2005). 
However, this study uncovered important limitations in using these 
questionnaires: indeed, we detected that subscales of the popular Godspeed 
Questionnaire Series contained duplicate items, which led to the inclusion of 
only 3 of the 5 subscales (Weiss & Bartneck, 2015). The limitations of the 
Godspeed questionnaire have been highlighted by other researchers as well 
(Shen et al., 2015), and in conjunction with the null result, a distinct lack of 
robust behavioural measures to quantify social motivation towards robots 
became apparent (Chevallier et al., 2016). We originally attributed the lack of 
an observed effect to our interaction measure as not sensitive enough to capture 
the subtle experimental manipulation. This led to the empirical study described 
in Chapter 4.  
7.2. Towards robust behavioural measures of social 
motivation 
In Chapter 4, we investigated the social relevance of humanoid robot faces by 
means of conceptually extending the eye-contact effect (Conty, Gimmig, et al., 
2010a). Conty and colleagues (2010a) found that when presenting socially salient 
cues as distractors during a demanding cognitive task, the cues would impair the 
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performance of participants by slowing down reaction times over and above of 
what is normally expected for the Stroop interference effect. This task has been 
proposed as a behavioural “proxy for social motivation” (Chevallier et al., 2013, 
p. 1694). 
In Experiment 1, we found the expected Stroop interference effect, indicating 
that despite the modifications we made in this conceptual extension, the task 
worked as expected.  
The main contribution of this chapter relates to the extension of the eye contact 
effect (Conty, Gimmig, et al., 2010a; Senju & Johnson, 2009) with a newly 
collected stimulus set, that included well-controlled greyscale images of human 
faces (DeBruine & Jones, 2017; Langner et al., 2010), humanoid robot faces, 
object faces and non-social control images of flowers. Chevallier and colleagues 
(2013) anticipated that the effect would extend to other cues, such as whole 
faces, but we cannot support this idea with the data collected in our 
experiments.  
A small, distractor-dependent interaction emerged in Experiment 1, yet this 
effect disappeared in Experiment 2, which was adequately powered to detect 
the effect size of interest. We found no differences across the four different 
stimulus categories of capturing attention due to their more or less social 
nature. Thus, our main conclusion across these two experiments was that 
despite previous literature on social attentional capture, we were not able to 
adapt this effect for HRI. Indeed, we failed to show that the most salient social 
distractor, the human faces, would robustly captured participants’ attention. 
Our findings initially appeared at odds with the established literature around this 
effect. But even so, recent studies by Pereira and colleagues (2019, 2020), which 
carefully controlled for known confounds, also failed to show a social attentional 
capture by human facial cues.  
Some limitations to this empirical work must also be acknowledged. While we 
pre-registered the processing of the reaction time data, we did not take into 
account the garden of forking paths inherent in this procedure. One example of 
this can be seen in the multitude of available processing methods in the R-
package ‘trimr’ (Grange, 2015). Our method of pre-processing the reaction times 
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involved using a standard deviation reaction time trimming criterion, which was 
criticised by a peer reviewer (Appendix D). To investigate whether a 
conservative exclusion of experimental trials played a role, we used an 
alternative, participant-sensitive standard deviation criterion. Still, this resulted 
in similarly shaped reaction time distributions (Appendix D).  
A further challenge was determining adequate limits for the region of practical 
equivalence with zero approach (ROPE) used in the exploratory Bayesian 
modelling analysis. After initially using an automatic procedure via a function 
built into the ‘BayesFactor’ package (Morey et al., 2018), the resulting ROPE 
range was too large, so that we determined it based on half of what we consider 
a small effect (Kruschke, 2018). Contrary to our expectations, the analysis was 
inconclusive. We were not able to find strong support for the null hypothesis, as 
the posterior samples only partially overlapped with the ROPE. We can only 
speculate about the nature of this inconclusive result; however, one underlying 
reason might have been the strategy we chose to determine the bounds of the 
ROPE.  
Together with the recent work by Pereira and colleagues demonstrating the 
influence of confounds in measuring social attentional capture (2019, 2020), we 
can conclude that the task is not suitable for measuring social motivation in 
human-robot interaction studies. Whereas covert measures of social attention 
may not be a fruitful avenue for HRI researchers, overt measures, such as eye-
tracking, may yield more informative findings (Hayward et al., 2017). 
7.3. Mobile brain imaging to facilitate embodied 
experiments with humanoid robots 
In Chapter 5, my co-authors and I provided an intermediate reflection and 
opinion on the current state-of-the-art neuroscience tools in embodied human-
robot interaction studies. Overall, we foresee that the field will be driven 
forward by more transparent, embodied and mobile neuroscience. Here we 
especially highlighted the ‘promises and pitfalls’ of fNIRS, which affords the 
advantage of allowing brain imaging during embodied and interactive encounters 
with social robots. Recent advances in the development of portable and 
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lightweight fNIRS systems can support more ecologically valid experimental 
interaction paradigms.  
Finally, my co-authors and I argue that it will become important in the coming 
years to move beyond a predominantly anthropocentric approach and consider 
other comparison categories (for example pets or objects), as well as brain 
regions beyond popular ‘hub regions’ of social cognition. I will reflect on this 
point in the final sections of this thesis discussion. 
In this chapter, we also highlighted the repercussions of the replication crisis, 
and the move towards open science practices in psychology and neuroscience. 
Especially when implementing fNIRS in embodied human-robot encounters it is 
important to follow a stepwise approach, starting with a replication of effects. 
We argued that it is in the interest of various stakeholders that research builds 
on strong foundations, using rigorous and robust methods.  
Chapter 6 implemented the proposed stepwise approach of the previous 
chapter: here we sought to validate a novel mobile fNIRS system, by comparing 
this brain imaging modality to the current gold-standard in social neuroscience: 
fMRI. A second contribution of this chapter was the adaptation of a new, 
photogrammetry-based method to co-registering the positions of the fNIRS 
probes. The main focus of this chapter was to transparently describe and 
highlight challenges encountered when using this brain imaging method, 
especially in comparison with the results yielded by fMRI.  
We investigated two main questions: the first being the overlap sensitivity 
between the placement of the optodes and the functional regions of interest – as 
determined by fMRI. Secondly, we were interested in the detection rate of each 
modality at the single-subject level. After extensive piloting we constructed a 
reliable photogrammetry pipeline that resulted in 11 out of 12 excellent quality 
head models. We provide a detailed description of every step in the openly 
available manual (Henschel, Kent, et al., 2020c). This new method to digitise 
optode positions was only successful after adding colourful markers to the fNIRS 
cap. We found that the automatic identification algorithm of the janus3D co-
registration toolbox (Clausner et al., 2017) was not reliable for the fNIRS optode 
holders (as opposed to the EEG electrode holders it was designed to detect). 
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Consequently, the experimenters had to choose a more time-consuming route of 
manual tagging the optode locations in janus3D. 
While we found that the position of the optodes overlapped well with 
participants’ functional MRI activity, this method, as highlighted by Powell and 
Saxe (2018), is not without issues. It is challenging to support the success or 
failure of probe location overlap based on single-subject functional activity, as 
anatomical and functional locations were highly variable. The detection rate on 
the single subject level was better for fMRI, as compared to fNIRS. Indeed, by 
showing composite images of the optodes mapped to subject anatomical and 
functional MRI images, we identified that strong inter-subject variability in 
terms of scalp-brain distance was one of the contributing factors. However, we 
also investigated the possibility that an anticipatory shift had taken place, as a 
recent paper by Richardson and colleagues had shown that repeat viewing of this 
particular localiser movie led to a predictive response of the brain (2020). 
Shifting the events forward in time did not lead to more observed fNIRS activity; 
on the contrary, the activity was even more subdued.  
Overall, we can conclude that on the single-subject level, the signal recorded 
with fNIRS showed a lower signal to noise ratio than the fMRI signal, which 
replicated reliable activation of the left and right TPJ almost 100% of the time 
across all subjects. This point is important, as future studies will seek to 
implement the fNIRS system in mobile interaction paradigms with robots, and 
thus through more subject movement, noise levels might further increase. In the 
current task, subjects sat still and passively observed a movie, which still only 
resulted in a success rate of elicited fNRIS activity in just over half of the 
participants. This will be a crucial factor when planning subject recruitment 
numbers, and when calculating power for future studies.  
7.4. What does the replication crisis mean for the future 
of HRI research?  
Most empirical findings reported in this thesis are null results, which are 
inherently challenging to interpret due to the complex factors that could be at 
play contributing to the failure of conceptually extending an effect (Shrout & 
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Rodgers, 2018; Simmons et al., 2017). Publishing null results has become more 
acceptable in the research community in recent years, as more and more 
scientists grappled with replicating well-known effects. This led to the 
replication crisis in psychology and neuroscience (Aarts et al., 2015; Schimmack, 
2020; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). As is perhaps evident through examples 
presented in this thesis, the ripples of these crises have not been limited to 
psychology and neuroscience. They are reaching HRI as well, exacerbating the 
interdisciplinary tensions discussed in Chapter 2 (Irfan et al., 2018).   
Some researchers note that trust in the ‘social sciences’ has been shaken as a 
result of the crisis (Irfan et al., 2018), others have a more optimistic outlook: 
indeed, as Shrout and Rodgers (2018) argue, the sense of urgency invoked 
through the imagery of a crisis has sparked fundamental and sustained positive 
change. The authors highlight how, as a result of this crisis, some of the open 
science movement’s most valuable tools have been created: the Open Science 
Foundation (Nosek, 2013) and a global shift in research conventions, such as the 
increased adoption of pre-registering hypotheses, design and analysis plans 
(2018). As Schimmack (2020) writes in his perspective on replication ‘failures’ 
(where a recent Nature Human Behaviour editorial argues strongly for the fact 
that “replications do not fail”; Kousta, 2020, p. 559), the crises in psychology 
and neuroscience might serve as an important warning message to other 
disciplines, who have not yet felt the severe repercussions riding on their back.   
7.4.1. Adoption of open science methods among the HRI community 
Researchers in HRI have acknowledged this crisis and have started to adopt some 
of the practices that scientists in related fields have been lobbying for over the 
past nine years (Baxter et al., 2016; Belpaeme, 2020; Irfan et al., 2018; 
Schimmack, 2020; Strait et al., 2020). Baxter and colleagues (2016), who 
analysed three years of proceedings stemming from the field’s most important 
meeting, the ACM-HRI conference, note that they observe a clear trend towards 
the adoption of open science practices: for example, journals such as PLOSOne 
now require datasets to be shared openly. Taking even more positive steps in 
this direction, in 2020, ACM-HRI for the first time explicitly invited replication 
studies in a dedicated conference track, with five proceedings replicating their 
studies across robotic platforms and data collection sites (Kubota et al., 2020; 
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James Li et al., 2020; A. Pereira et al., 2020; Sandygulova et al., 2020; Strait et 
al., 2020).  
Strait and colleagues (2020) conducted a conceptual extension and three-site 
replication of the robot-adapted Joint Simon Effect (JSE), which examines how 
people represent the actions of a robotic co-actor (Stenzel et al., 2012). In their 
collaborative replication effort, the authors found that the expected JSE 
replicated. The authors noted that a key component to the success of this effort 
was that all three, international replication sites had access to the same 
platform: the Nao robot (Strait et al., 2020). This speaks to an observation 
described in Chapter 2: commercially available humanoid robots offer many 
advantages to HRI researchers, despite their limited social abilities ‘in the wild’. 
Strait and colleagues (2020) conclude with the reflection that replicating effects 
will become ever more important in the HRI community, especially given the 
fact that attempts of running source code from the 2017 IEEE International 
Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA) proceedings were crowned with 
success in only 2% of the cases (Cervera, 2019).   
7.4.2. Adoption of open science methods in the fNIRS community 
However, HRI is not the only research community to be weighing up the next 
steps in a move toward more open and reproducible research practices: the 
relatively young field surrounding fNIRS research has been relatively slow to 
adopt open science conventions already embraced in other neuroimaging 
communities, for instance among fMRI researchers (Bratt, 2017). Currently, 
there are not many open fNIRS data sets available, and perhaps as a 
consequence, meta-analytical investigation of the robustness of social and 
cognitive tasks measured with fNIRS are scarce (Bendahan et al., 2019). This is 
mainly due to the heterogeneity of fNIRS devices and data processing methods 
used – for example Bendahan and colleagues (2019) sought to conduct a meta-
analysis on the connection between cerebral oxygenation and the presence of 
delirium in patients. The meta-analysis could not be completed due to a large 
variability in fNIRS systems and pre-processing procedures. Increased use of 
standardized localiser tasks in fNIRS could lead to a better comparability across 
studies, and perhaps an increased motivation to share data. As of October 2020, 
there are only 7 datasets shared on OpenFNIRS (Figure 26, 
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https://openfnirs.org/data/). 
 
Figure 26 - The Openfnirs database (https://openfnirs.org/data/). 
 
Another recent development in the fNIRS community may prompt an increased 
uptake of open science practices, as the sNIRF format has been introduced 
(https://github.com/fNIRS/snirf). Encouragingly, a brain imaging data structure 
(BIDS) extension proposal for NIRS has been raised (BIDS Extension Proposal, 
BEP030), which implements the file-naming and file-structure convention 
initially developed for fMRI (and which was used in Chapter 6 to run the 
standardized pre-processing pipeline fMRIprep). The BIDS format, which is 
essentially a standardized brain data management plan, has the potential to 
greatly enhance reproducibility and open science efforts (Gorgolewski et al., 
2016). The extension of BIDS for NIRS will incorporate the already developed 
sNIRF raw data format, which can be converted from most proprietary 
manufacturer file formats (e.g. in Chapter 6 we initially translated the 
Shimadzu files to the nirs format).  
Bratt (2017) laments a lack of open data repositories for fNIRS (in studies on 
emotion – yet, as Figure 26 shows, this is a global problem), in particular relating 
to the ‘curse of dimensionality’ known in the machine learning field. 
Researchers who may want to use machine learning procedures to analyse their 
data, are faced with small samples in fNIRS studies. Using machine learning 
classifiers on highly dimensional data, such as the fNIRS signal, is challenging as 
these data have many features with relatively few observations (Jie Li et al., 
2016). As a result, models are ‘overfit’ and are not generalisable beyond 
individual datasets (Bratt, 2017). One way to address this issue (and in the 
future implement machine-learning methods for fNIRS) may be the aggregation 
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of large, open datasets. In addition, Bratt (2017) argues that while fNIRS and 
FMRI are facing validity issues, increased data sharing, including text-based 
metainformation (see Neurosynth, https://neurosynth.org/), also has the 
potential to facilitate communication (and collaboration) between international 
fNIRS labs.   
To summarise, the HRI research community can greatly benefit from using fNIRS 
as an innovative tool in embodied interaction studies with humanoid robots. HRI 
researchers, who use this new methodology, may further profit from improving 
data sharing infrastructure like the sNIRF file format and data bases such as 
Openfnirs.  
7.5.  Future directions  
To summarise, lessons learned through the replication crisis in psychology and 
neuroscience, and the subsequent increased implementation of open science 
practices, may be of great value to the interdisciplinary HRI research community 
at large (Belpaeme, 2020). As various researchers have noted, conducting 
embodied HRI experiments in conjunction with using brain imaging tools is not a 
trivial challenge – various pieces of hardware and software have to be 
synchronised to ensure a smooth experimental procedure (Belpaeme, 2020; 
Perez-Osorio et al., 2018; Strait et al., 2020). Belpaeme (2020) foresees a new 
future in which experiments will benefit from increased rigor and the field might 
move towards more transparency in reporting findings – including ‘failed’ 
replications and null results.  
7.5.1. Valuable tools (or: Where to go from here?) 
Going forward, researchers working at the intersection of social robotics, 
experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience should strive to pre-register 
their hypotheses, study designs and analysis plans. Several platforms are 
available for this purpose. Compared to the AsPredicted format, which is 
designed to cover essential aspects of the experimental design and analysis in 
nine short questions (e.g.: https://osf.io/ky4b7/), OSF preregistrations allow for 
more detail and nuance, especially when specifying mixed effects models (e.g: 
https://osf.io/a5fby). As many researchers have observed, there is an increased 
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uptake of Bayesian analysis methods across all fields (Baxter et al., 2016; 
Belpaeme, 2020; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). Although more diverse analytical 
approaches are commended, researchers also point out that analysts should 
follow a “principled Bayesian workflow” (Schad et al., 2020, p. 1). For example, 
Bayesian modelling, which was described in Chapter 4, offers the researcher 
great flexibility regarding the types of models that can be specified and the kind 
of data that can be modelled. Despite accessible R packages, like ‘brms’, 
beginners may struggle to navigate across the often-confusing labyrinth of 
decisions that need to be taken in modelling (Bürkner, 2016; Schad et al., 2020). 
Here the authors again emphasize the crucial need for specifying models that 
describe a maximal effects structure already in the pre-registration, to limit 
later researcher degrees of freedom in the analysis. With greater acceptability 
of the publishing of null results will come a greater need for reporting evidence 
for the null. Although the modelling approach used here offers great flexibility, 
in many cases free programmes such as JASP might be a more beginner-friendly 
first step in Bayesian analysis (Belpaeme, 2020). 
One promising opportunity for researchers at the intersection of these 
disciplines lies in new article formats (and journals), that place a focus on 
methodological rigor and meta-scientific perspectives. The vicious cycle of a 
decreased reward structure to pursue replication projects may be broken by 
Registered Reports (Chambers et al., 2015) and Registered Replication Reports 
(RRR) formats (Simons et al., 2014), which encourage large scale collaborative 
efforts and ensure acceptance at the journal before the results are known 
(Schimmack, 2020; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). Adopting these new article formats 
may contribute to an overall more accurate picture of the scientific evidence 
base, as it has been recently revealed that the reporting rate of significant 
results is reduced from about 90 to a mere 50% when the Registered Report 
format is used (Scheel et al., 2020).  
Importantly, these strides to encompass greater transparency in research 
methods should ideally be accompanied by an acknowledgement and awareness 
of systematic disadvantages underlying large parts of the existing literature 
(Dworkin et al., 2020; Pownall et al., 2020; Zurn et al., 2020). In a recent 
preprint, we argue that just as the open science movement has prompted 
researchers to adopt more transparent approaches to research, feminist 
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psychology has much to contribute in constructing an equitable movement 
towards open science (Pownall et al., 2020). One small step could be to include 
citation diversity statements (Zurn et al., 2020), as implemented in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. Whilst not completely without problems, this new convention may 
contribute to more transparency about diversity issues evident across scientific 
disciplines.  
7.5.2. Transparent data visualisation  
Another important tool for future HRI studies will be to use transparent data 
visualisation to communicate research findings (Allen et al., 2019). Repeatedly, 
HRI researchers have lamented issues with the interpretability of psychology and 
neuroscience findings, noting a missing shared language between disciplines 
(Baxter et al., 2016; Belpaeme, 2020; Irfan et al., 2018). One crucial factor in 
efficient communication of experimental findings is the use of clear data 
visualisations. Currently the most commonly used visualisations across research 
and the news media remain bar charts, although it has been shown that these 
visualisations lead to poor decision making when interpreting experimental 
findings (Newman & Scholl, 2012). For example, Newman and Scholl (2012) 
found that when they presented bar graphs, participants were more prone to 
believe that the data were contained within the bars. This visualisation method 
thus does not offer a good impression of the often-chosen measures of central 
tendencies. A popular new visualisation method - the raincloud plot – may be a 
better approach. These graphs depict raw data, distributional information and a 
boxplot with the median and interquartile range (Allen et al., 2019).   
Throughout this thesis, I have used various types of visualisation methods that 
offer the advantage of “inference at a glance” (Allen et al., 2019, p. 33), 
including pirate plots (Chapter 3), box plots, density graphs of distributions 
(Chapter 4) and raincloud plots (Chapter 6). In his chapter on ‘fair statistical 
communication’, Dragicevic (2016, p. 291) applies “End User Dissatisfaction” (p. 
311) as a metaphor. He critically reflects that the field of human-computer 
interaction (adjacent and interrelated with human-robot interaction, see Figure 
1), despite its strong tradition of user experience studies, has adopted 
visualisations that lead to suboptimal communication of empirical findings. New 
approaches to graphically representing data may serve as better “user interfaces 
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meant to help researchers in their task of producing and disseminating 
knowledge, [and] the fields of HCI and infovis can take a head start and show 
the way to other disciplines.” (Dragicevic, 2016, p. 326) 
7.5.3. Our future with social robots: beyond ‘the social brain’? 
Recent years have not only seen a shift in methodological and analytical 
approaches, but also a move towards incorporating new theoretical perspectives 
on social cognition (Cross & Ramsey, under review). As these authors argue, the 
current perspective of using a predominantly anthropocentric approach to 
investigating interactions with robots may limit the scope of potential questions 
and might overall stifle progress in this research area. Cross and Ramsey (under 
review) urge researchers at the intersection of psychology, neuroscience and 
social robotics to consider a wider, shared feature space between social agents 
(like humanoid robots) and objects, rather than focusing solely on the 
commonalities and differences of processing human social interactions compared 
to interactions with machines. Overall, the authors argue that a more domain-
general understanding of human cognition should be adopted, which echoes 
recent critical reflections by researchers requesting more nuance when parsing 
‘the social brain’ – as it remains to be investigated how the purported specificity 
for social perception may be represented in the brain (Lockwood, 2020). These 
recent criticisms can also be seen as a challenge of Chevallier’s Social Motivation 
Theory (2012).  
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Figure 27 - Synthesis of the proposed stepwise process. 
 
To summarise, the future of adapting paradigms for HRI may include new 
methodological, analytical and theoretical approaches, that will contribute to 
our understanding of sharing a social sphere with artificial agents. Through 
Figure 27, I have attempted to integrate the messages of several researchers 
working at the intersection of psychology, neuroscience and HRI, as well as one 
of the main conclusions from this thesis: before conducting studies with 
humanoid robots, researchers should aim to conduct a (pre-registered) direct 
replication of the effect first (Irfan et al., 2018), then implement and adapt the 
paradigm appropriately for (embodied) interactions robots (Perez-Osorio et al., 
2018), take these paradigms outside of controlled lab environments into the real 
world (Henschel, Hortensius, et al., 2020b; Pinti et al., 2018), and finally utilise 
the knowledge gained to inform the design of social robots (Wiese et al., 2017). 
These longitudinal and interdisciplinary efforts, as I have argued, are a 
fundamentally challenging, yet ultimately rewarding undertaking, which may 
herald a sustainable future for social robots as the helpful companions we 
envision them to be.  
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7.6.  Conclusions 
In this thesis, I sought to adapt methods derived from psychology and 
neuroscience for the study of embodied interactions with humanoid social 
robots. Resting on the shoulders of Social Motivation Theory, I have shown that 
an effect that has already been implemented for some robotic platforms (i.e. 
the ability to synchronise movements) may have little grounding in empirical 
truth. Acknowledging the limitations of this null result, I conducted experiments 
to develop a robust behavioural measure for social motivation, adapting a well-
known effect for HRI. Here, the thesis contributes the important insight that this 
putative behavioural proxy for social motivation may not be easily translatable 
to HRI, as I failed to replicate the original effect of salient human social cues in 
this conceptual extension. Taking these mounting findings into account, I 
proposed that when integrating new methodologies into HRI research, a stepwise 
process should occur. One emerging methodology, mobile brain imaging, can be 
used for enhanced ecological validity in the study of social robots outside of the 
lab. Finally, I introduced a new method to spatially register optode positions in 
fNIRS studies and compared the fNIRS signal to fMRI via a validated and robust 
localiser task. Of course, isolated pieces of empirical work cannot be the end of 
the story on social motivation towards humanoid robots – further replication 
efforts are needed to challenge or confirm these findings with new robotic 
platforms and in different experimental contexts. The 2017 workshop ‘The 
Emerging Social Neuroscience of Human-Robot Interaction’ set the stage for this 
budding field of research, bringing together researchers from neuroscience, 
robotics, social cognition and engineering, all with a common interest to 
leverage advances in social neuroscience to inform and advance HRI. Overall, 
the findings of this thesis contribute toward this aim, by placing a stronger 
emphasis on open science methods in the field and contributing to a more 
realistic picture of the nature of social encounters between humans and robots. 
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Appendix A Supplementary materials for “No 
evidence for enhanced likeability and social 
motivation towards robots after synchrony 
experience” 
A) Objective manipulation check: LED bracelet colour changes 
 
 
 
 
 
F1 - Descriptive visualisation of the LED bracelet-based attention check.  
Participants were asked to report potential colour changes of the LED bracelet on 
Pepper’s arm. There were two colour checks, one after the first three drawing blocks and 
one after the final three drawing blocks. Participants first had to report if they noticed 
any colour change (the correct answer is yes, there was one colour change), then how 
many changes they observed, and which colour the bracelet changed to. In the first 
check, the correct colour the bracelet changed to was green, in the second round the 
bracelet changed to red. Due to technical difficulties with the remote control of the LED 
lights, it is however not informative to interpret these results beyond the obvious fact 
that a majority of the participants reported the correct answers on all six checks.  
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B) Subjective manipulation check 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F2 - Descriptive visualisation of the subjective manipulation check.  
To probe perceived synchrony, we asked the participants “Did the robot draw … in 
synchrony with you? …out of synchrony with you?” 10 participants in the asynchrony 
group reported to have been in sync with Pepper on the drawing task, whereas one 
participant in the synchrony condition reported to have been out of sync with Pepper.  
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C) Table specifying the group compositions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T1 - Participant numbers in the planned analysis 
Asynchrony Synchrony Total 
19 
 
26 45 
Participant numbers in the exploratory analysis 
 
Perceived 
asynchrony 
Perceived 
synchrony 
 
20 
 
36 56 
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D) List of questions participants could choose from 
 
 
 
F3 - List of questions. 
The maximum amount of questions participants could ask Pepper was 28 (the two 
additional questions resulting from participants being able to ask for the second and 
third law of robotics after Pepper cites the first one. However, since this was a free 
interaction, some participants chose to either ask zero questions or asked more than 28, 
in which case we had programmed the robot to be able to answer “I don’t know”, 
“Maybe”, and “Yes” or “No”. Thus, individual participants would end up with a score 
higher than the number of questions provided by us.  
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Appendix B Rebuttal for “No evidence for 
enhanced likeability and social motivation towards 
robots after synchrony experience” 
NB: Reviewers gave consent for their anonymous comments to be shared as part 
of this thesis. The Media Consent forms remain with the guest editors of the 
Interaction Studies special issue.   
We would first like to thank the reviewers and the editors for their constructive 
and helpful comments. We very much appreciate that they have taken the time 
to help us improve this manuscript. We have revised the paper according to their 
suggestions and have detailed our response in the comments below. Please note 
that all changes to the main manuscript are denoted in bold face font. 
The major changes that we have made relate to Reviewer 1’s concerns about the 
data analysis. We have followed their suggestion to exclude participants from 
the main analysis, who failed the subjective manipulation check. We have 
followed Reviewer 1, 2 and 3’s suggestions to provide stronger links to previous 
literature to justify the task and to illustrate the expected positive effects of 
interpersonal synchrony on the robots’ perception and behaviour towards it. We 
have added more points to the critical discussion of the nature of these null 
results and hope to have addressed all of the editors’ and reviewers’ concerns by 
doing so. The changes in the manuscript have been marked with track changes. 
The data and the R analysis script are now openly available via the OSF [link]. 
Editors’ comments 
Comment 1 – We would like to add to the reviewer’s comments that it should 
be much clearer what the exact relationship is between cognitive 
neuroscience and psychology is in regard to how these fields have been 
drawn on for the presented study, it seems that studies on cognition on the 
level of neurons is today a more independent field of research? 
To clarify the link between cognitive (neuro)science and psychology, we cite 
Wiese and colleagues (2017), who argues that neurocognitive methods can help 
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develop advanced social robots, and Wykowska and colleagues (2016), who 
elaborate that by using robots in psychological experiments we can learn more 
about the scope and limitations of human social cognition. These two lines of 
argumentation are the underlying scaffolding for the present study. Embedding 
cognitive and experimental psychology, we use the Social Motivation Theory by 
Chevallier and colleagues (2012) as a theoretical framework, to experimentally 
test if synchronizing with a robot can improve its likeability and participants’ 
social motivation towards it. 
Line 73: “Wiese and colleagues (2017) suggest that the best way to make robots 
appear more social is to use the toolbox provided by neurocognitive research 
methods to implement empirically supported behaviors that give “socially 
awkward” robots better “people skills”.” 
Comment 2 – Moreover, it would be great to consider having a separate 
section on lessons learned (instead of including these points in different 
places in the manuscript) to make it very explicit that there were problems 
with the design of the experiment. 
Thank you for this very helpful suggestion. We agree that these points should be 
collected in one place. A final section entitled The Pepper robot as an 
experimental confederate: lessons learned (line 352) has been added to the 
manuscript.  
Comment 3 – We also wonder why the problem of “awkward” social robots is 
paradoxical? It is unclear what this sentence aims to suggest given that it only 
seems to be a challenge for developers to make robots seem more social.  
We agree with the editors that this sentence was unclear. It refers to two papers 
by Duffy (2004) and by Duffy and Joue (2005): ‘The Paradox of Social Robotics: A 
Discussion’. In encounters with naïve participants, off-the-shelf humanoid robots 
such as Pepper can still come across as awkward. We believe that making robots 
appear more social is a team effort to be undertaken by developers and 
roboticists based on evidence derived from psychological research and user 
studies. However, to avoid any misinterpretations, the sentence in line 78 has 
been rephrased to make the message clearer. 
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Line 77: “But how can we solve the problem of designing truly social robots 
(Duffy & Joue, 2005)?” 
Reviewers’ comments 
Reviewer 1 
Comment 1 - A methodological drawback, which is also pointed out by the 
authors, is related to the choice of the synchrony manipulation: Firstly, the 
authors do not motive their choice for drawing as a suitable task that can 
induce the experience of synchrony and expected effects of rapport. In fact, 
a third of the study participants failed to experience the intended feeling of 
asynchrony during the drawing task with the robot (p 11). Thus, it seems that 
this manipulation was too subtle to induce the experience of synchrony. 
Perhaps this could have been avoided by running a pilot study to test the 
perception of the conditions? 
We chose this task based on conceptual and practical grounds that are now 
described on line 197:  
Line 197: “We modelled our task after Hove and Risen (2009). In their study, 
participants were following a visual metronome (a rising and dropping bar), 
which resulted in them tapping either in synchrony or out of synchrony with a 
confederate (Hove & Risen, 2009). Similarly, we used a visual metronome (a 
small circle moving along a larger circular trajectory) and instructed participants 
to follow its movement with the pen. The practical reason for choosing this task 
was that it gave us a high degree of control of the participants’ movement, 
without explicitly asking them to synchronize with the robot, a potential 
confound. In the synchrony condition the metronome was linked to the 
movement of the robot, whereas in the asynchrony condition the robot was 
moving approximately 2.5 times as fast along the circle shape as the participant. 
Participants received the instruction from the experimenter that the goal of the 
task was to follow the moving target as closely as possible and deviate from it as 
little as possible.” 
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Comment 2 - Secondly, it seems there was no objective measure of 
manipulation check. Due to technical difficulties, it was not possible to 
analyse the answers to the colour change attention test - this would have 
been a more accurate way to check whether the participants accurately 
realised whether they were in sync with the robot or not. It would be 
interesting to report precisely what type of questions were used to check for 
self-reported perception of synchrony with the robot (i.e. yes/no question, 
scale).  
To probe perceived synchrony, we asked the participants finally “Did the robot 
draw …  
- In synchrony with you 
- Out of synchrony with you?” 
We agree that the more objective attention check is preferable and have 
included the colour checks in the supplementary material. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible for us to trace back in which cases the remote control was not 
working as expected and in which cases participants simply gave the wrong 
answers. However, looking at the plots in Appendix A, most of the participants 
gave the correct answers on all instances of the checks. Thus, we can be 
confident that they were indeed able to at least see the movement of the 
robotic arm.  
[To avoid duplication, graphs in the supplementary materials are cross-
referenced in the rebuttals.] 
Figure F1, Appendix A 
Comment 3 – Social motivation was assessed using a behavioural measure – 
the number of questions the participants ask the robot in a free interaction, 
after completing a drawing task together. As discussed by the authors, this 
measure was probably “too crude” to reveal the participant’s true 
motivation to engage with the robot socially. A different type of behavioural 
or neural measures could have generated more objective findings. Numerous 
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factors – unrelated to the preceding drawing task might have influenced the 
number of questions asked by the participants. Some of those factors are 
discussed in the paper. Prior experience with the robot is another factor that 
might have influenced the participants’ behaviour – someone who is 
unfamiliar with the robot might be more “curious” to interact socially with it 
-potentially irrespectively of its behaviour during the drawing task. A free 
verbal interaction with the robot is a task that involves a different type of 
robot skills. Therefore, independently of the robot’s synchronisation 
abilities, it is possible that some participants wanted to test the robot’s 
“intelligence” or verbal interaction abilities, and thus engaged in this task. 
We concur with Reviewer 1 that the measure we chose to quantify social 
motivation towards the Pepper robot may have been to crude to pick up on the 
subtle effects the experience of synchrony might have had on their behaviour 
towards the robot. However, an advantage of using this measure is that it 
ensures high ecological validity, as this type of interaction is mainly how users 
are currently interacting with Pepper. Researchers in human-robot interaction 
are actively trying to implement reciprocal and synchronous movements into the 
behavioural toolbox of robots (see: Lorenz, Weiss & Hirche, 2016). However, if 
for example movement synchrony doesn’t affect the quality of the real 
interaction with a user, this is critical for HRI researchers and roboticists to 
know. Indeed, a more objective measure, such as neural activity would have 
been desirable. We are currently working on developing more objective 
measures of social motivation towards robots, as there appears to be a scarcity 
of them available to HRI researchers. Following the suggestions of Reviewer 1, 
we have included ‘prior experiences with the robot’ as one of the factors that 
could have played a stronger motivational role than the preceding experience of 
synchrony/ asynchrony in the manuscript.  
Line 327: “In addition, previous experiences with the robot might have 
influenced their behavior, with participants lacking any experience perhaps 
showing stronger curiosity to interact with Pepper or a lack of familiarity 
affecting the mind perception of the robot (Müller et al., 2011).” 
Comment 4 – Finally, my biggest concern is related with the data analysis. 
Since the goal of the study was to investigate whether synchrony has an 
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effect on social motivation towards the robot, I would expect that 
participants who did not perceive the synchrony manipulation as intended, 
would be excluded from the analysis (manipulation check). Although the 
authors claim to take this into consideration (p 9, line 198), the data analysis 
reporting is difficult to follow. The “Original group split” results, as well as 
Figure 2, do not take into account the manipulation check – and are 
therefore not conclusive (by mixing the ratings of participants who failed to 
perceive the synchrony effects and participants who accurately perceived 
them it is not possible to draw any conclusions about the effects of synchrony 
on the dependent variables). 
We thank Reviewer 1 for bringing to our attention that aspects of our data 
analyses were difficult to follow. We can see how some confusion could arise 
following our line of argumentation in the paper. Based on prior work by our 
group, as well as other research teams, on the role of participants’ beliefs about 
artificial agents’ behaviour (c.f., Klapper et al., 2014; Cross et al., 2016; Liepelt 
& Brass, 2010, Wiese et al., 2012), we were interested in exploring participants’ 
top-down perception of synchrony in addition to the actual synchrony 
manipulation. This is why we also split the data based on participants’ synchrony 
beliefs. Since we can be fairly confident that a majority of participants’ 
attention was on Pepper’s arm (due to the additional colour change detection 
task, added in the supplementary material of the manuscript, Appendix A), we 
explored whether the subjective experience of participants would play a more 
important role than objectively manipulated synchrony. To address the concerns 
of Reviewer 1, we have replaced the first analysis with a new analysis following 
Reviewer 1’s suggestions: we have excluded all participants who failed the 
subjective manipulation check. However, we have kept our second exploratory 
analysis in the manuscript, as we consider the resulting ‘perceived group’ split 
still very interesting, and potentially valuable for future studies to pursue. In 
addition to the corrected results section and figures in the manuscript, our 
analysis script and data are now available via the OSF for any interested 
researchers to explore further. 
Line 159: “11 participants were excluded, as they failed the manipulation check 
of correctly perceiving synchrony or asynchrony.” 
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Comment 5 – In Figure 3, “Individuals, who were in the asynchrony 
condition, but reported to have been in sync with Pepper were combined 
with those, who were objectively in sync with the robot.”. It is unclear why 
the authors follow this approach. Ideally one would expect to see the graphs 
showing only the ratings of participants who passed the manipulation check 
and were thus objectively in/out-of-sync with the robot. 
We have amended the data analysis following the suggestions in the previous 
comment, so that Figure 2 now reflects this case. However, as illustrated above, 
we have kept the exploratory analysis for the perceived groups and thus Figure 3 
remains in the manuscript. To avoid confusion of how the final groups for the 
analysis are composed, we have added a table in the supplementary materials 
(Appendix A) and added this information in the caption of Figure 5 and Figure 6.  
Table T1, Appendix A 
Comment 6 - Taken together, the points mentioned above render the 
experimental results of this study rather weak and inconclusive. Even though 
the lessons learned from this study are interesting and relevant in terms of 
"What Could Go Wrong during HRI studies", the overall impact is limited. In 
revising this paper, the authors should justify methodological choices and 
focus on improving the data analysis, as well as the clarity of the 
presentation of the results. 
Following the suggestions of Reviewer 1, we have clarified our methodological 
choices, data analyses, and figures. 
Reviewer 2 
Strengths 
a) Well-organized paper. Very straightforward use of a couple key 
measures (though they could be explained better and justified better). 
b) Great job of talking about the results section, the analyses used, and 
displaying your data! 
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c) The authors seemed quite intentional about making sure they included 
only participants for whom the study worked well. Keep it up :-) 
We thank Reviewer 2 for their positive feedback. There might have been a slight 
misunderstanding regarding how we excluded participants. Though this study 
was unfortunately not pre-registered, we excluded participants based on a pre-
defined set of criteria. The rationale behind the exclusion criteria is as follows:  
- In the case of participants who deviated significantly from the 
metronome, the manipulation would not work as desired, thus those with 
a large error rate were excluded.  
- Those participants with missing responses on the crucial Godspeed 
questionnaire were excluded as well.  
- Two more participants were excluded because despite our recruitment 
criteria, they reported studying computer science. Our rationale behind 
this was that computer scientists might be more sceptical towards the 
robot, and in the free interaction period might want to test the robot’s 
inbuilt AI, instead of focusing on the social aspect of the interaction.  
- One participant reported a diagnosis of ASD, which, based on previous 
literature on altered social motivation in individuals with ASD (Chevallier 
et al., 2012; Chevallier et al., 2013), we had also defined as an exclusion 
criterion.  
- Following the suggestions of Reviewer 1, for our main analyses we also 
exclude all participants who failed the subjective manipulation check as 
well.  
Weaknesses 
Comment 1 - Missing some pertinent information in the literature review 
regarding studies on synchrony with robots. I include 
recommended studies to look at the detailed comments. 
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In agreement with the comment made by Reviewer 2, we now include additional 
citations based on the literature recommendations given to us. We believe the 
revised manuscript now covers the key aspects of the relevant literature.   
Comment 2 - Further, the study does not take into account other factors of 
importance without which synchrony with the robot will have no effect. It is 
unclear if participants thought the robot had any intentionality or that the 
robots motion had any meaning for them, without which, participants have 
already been shown to have no effects of synchrony (Oberman, McCleery et 
al. 2007, Press, Gillmeister et al. 2007, Wiese, Wykowska et al. 2012). 
We thank Reviewer 2 for raising this issue and for drawing our attention to these 
studies. We address this problem starting from line 303 in the discussion section. 
We have now included the citation of the study by Wiese and colleagues (2012), 
which is in line with the point we are making here: 
Line 303: “In addition to the potential necessity of adaptivity in synchronous 
interpersonal movement, Lorenz, Weiss and Hirche (2016) argue that in order to 
reap the benefits of synchrony in social interactions with robots, the human 
interaction partner needs to attribute a mind to the robot. This idea is 
consistent with research by Wiese and colleagues (2012), which shows that top-
down beliefs about an agent’s intentional stance can influence basic attentional 
mechanisms. Even though we assessed trait negative attitudes towards robots, 
we did not include a self-report or behavioral measure of mind attribution. 
While Pepper introduced itself before starting the drawing task, it remains 
unclear how much independence and intention the participants attributed to the 
robot.” 
Comment 3 - How did the authors choose their synchrony task? The finding of 
no effect of synchrony on liking of/talking to the robot would be more 
interesting if there were a condition in which synchrony with the human 
under the same circumstances did increase liking/talking to the human. This 
is something that the authors can do, and I recommend running parallel 
human conditions for future studies if they follow up on this paradigm. 
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Regarding the nature of the task, please see how we addressed comment 1 of 
Reviewer 1. We agree with Reviewer 2 that the study would be even more 
convincing if it included a positive control, i.e. a human-human condition that 
provides evidence for the success of the manipulation. We aim to include this in 
future studies following up on this one and mention this limitation/future 
direction on line 338 of the revised manuscript.  
Line 338: “Future experiments should further include a positive control to 
ensure the synchrony manipulation works as expected in human-human 
interaction and additional loops of control to ensure that the synchrony 
manipulation is sufficiently immersive and salient.” 
Comment 4 - Incomplete method section makes it unclear if the lack of effect 
of synchrony was because there is no effect or because the experimenter 
treated the robot like a thing (in addition to the concerns in the above bullet 
point). It will also help to justify the question asking measure you chose using 
previous literature. 
In the methods section, we describe how the robot introduces itself (as a 
member of the University research department) in the experimental procedure. 
Experimenters were encouraged to avoid the use of gendered pronouns and 
instead referred to the robot as ‘Pepper’ or ‘the robot’. Our measure of social 
motivation, which relied on how many questions participants chose to ask 
Pepper from a list, was custom made for this experiment, and does not directly 
relate to a similar measure that has been previously used in human-robot 
interaction studies. Our rationale for choosing this measure was that human-
robot interactions with Pepper in real life are usually characterized by these 
question-answer dynamics, so we chose this measure to gauge whether our 
manipulation would have an effect in a relatively natural scenario (see response 
to comment 3 of Reviewer 1).  
Comment 5 - Line 23 "Positively influences likability and prosocial behavior 
towards that individual" sounds strange 
This sentence has been rephrased (line 27):  
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“A wealth of social psychology studies suggests that moving in synchrony with 
another person can positively influence their likeability and prosocial behavior 
towards them.” 
Comment 6 - Around line 71, you assume that adaptive behavior is similar to 
synchrony, but you don't explain why.  
Conceptually, there are two forms of synchrony that are discussed in the 
literature. One refers to orchestrated synchrony, i.e. synchrony that is induced 
by following a shared metronome (the framework chosen for this study), while 
the other form of synchrony is naturally emerging and requires adaptive 
movements from each agent. Shen and colleagues (2015) wanted to emulate 
naturally emerging synchrony and equipped their robot with an information 
distance algorithm, designed to promote emerging synchrony between human 
and robot. Hence, we do not assume that adaptive movements are equivalent 
with synchrony but are important components of naturally emerging synchrony.  
Comment 7 - You are missing a section talking about studies that have 
already examined synchrony (not just adaptive behavior) with robots. I 
recommend the following articles: 
As we explained in our answer to the above comment, the two studies by Mörtl 
and colleagues (2014) and Shen and colleagues (2015) are indeed focused on 
synchrony with robots and even go one step further by trying to emulate the 
natural occurring synchrony we can observe between humans in everyday life 
(for example, synchronized clapping at concerts). However, we appreciate that 
many other articles have discussed human-robot synchrony as well and have 
studied the articles suggested below. The papers by Oztop, Franklin and 
colleagues (2005), Kilner, Paulignan and team (2003) and Sartori et al (2011) 
measure automatic imitation and not interpersonal synchrony. We thank 
Reviewer 2 for recommending additional references – where relevant we have 
included them in the paper (see our answer to comment 2 and line 318 in the 
manuscript).  
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Comment 8 - It is not clear why participants were excluded for studying 
computer science. If you exclude the students, should you also exclude 
psychology students who might be able to guess your purpose? 
This decision mainly relates to their more comprehensive knowledge of robotics 
and artificial intelligence. We expected that they would approach the 
interaction with the robot very differently to a naïve participant. Furthermore, 
all of the included Psychology participants were naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment. Indeed, they repeated the cover story they were told. We explained 
to them in the beginning of the experiment, that we were interested in 
investigating how the presence of a robot might affect their performance on a 
task. We would have removed participants that were able to guess the purpose 
of the study (but this was not necessary). Please see response to Comment 13 of 
Reviewer 2. 
Line 166: “Participants were naïve to the goal of the experiment.” 
Comment 9 - Studies indicate that answering demographic information first 
changes the way the participants respond to experimental protocol. I 
recommended future studies, you ask them demographic information last. 
We were not previously aware of this and thank Reviewer 2 for this 
recommendation, which we will happily follow in the future.  
Comment 10 - When you asked them about "trait attitudes toward robots," - a 
couple of questions arise. What do you mean by trait attitudes? Has someone 
validated a scale for trait attitudes? What questions were asked?  
When talking about trait attitudes towards robots, we use this as a qualifier to 
distinguish it from attitudes towards robots that arise due to the state of a 
situation. We used the NARS (Negative Attitudes towards Robots Scale) by 
Nomura and colleagues (2006) (in the English version by Syrdal, Dautenhahn et 
al., 2009). These references have been added to the paper (line 190/191). The 
scale has been widely used in the field and has been validated in different 
languages (for example, Picarra et al., 2015). 
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Comment 11 - Second, the measure that you said you use is that they were 
responding regarding attitudes about "they" robot (line 141). If they hadn't 
met the robot yet, how did they do this? What did they know about the robot 
when they were answering this question? 
The ‘they’ here refers to the participants, who were asked to fill out the 
questionnaires before the start of the task. The Negative Attitudes Towards 
Robots Scale asks about negative feelings about situations of interactions with 
robots, the social influence of robots and the negative attitude towards 
emotions in interactions with robots (Nomura, 2006). Thus, it asks about robots 
in general, and not the Pepper robot specifically. This is why we refer to it as 
‘trait’ negative attitudes of the naïve participants, before they met the robot. 
We did not enquire what they knew specifically about the Pepper robot before 
introducing it. However, it is unlikely that our participants had met a Pepper 
robot previously, as we were the first lab at the University to conduct an 
experiment with it.  
Comment 12 - How did you treat the robot? Did you call it by name, treated 
like a human, or did you treated like a thing? Some of the above studies cited 
indicate that if people don't think the robot is intentional, synchrony won't 
matter. If the experimenter doesn't treat the robot as a human, people likely 
will not perceive it as intentional. 
As we have addressed this point already above (Reviewer 2, comment 4), we 
only want to briefly explain that the robot was treated as a supposed ‘member 
of the research department’ and was referred to by the experimenters as 
‘Pepper’ or ‘the robot’.  
Comment 13 - What was your cover story? You emphasize the importance of 
experimenter bias, which is great! - but participants might also start guessing 
your purpose if you don't have a solid cover story and they were made to go 
in sync with the robot. 
We agree with Reviewer 2 that a plausible cover story is very important. We 
informed participants that we were interested in investigating the effect of the 
presence of a robot on the performance of a (drawing) task. No participant 
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raised suspicion and all of them remained naïve to the true purpose of the 
experiment. See response to comment 8 of Reviewer 2.  
Comment 14 - What questions were on the paper that they picked up (line 
181)? 
We have added the list of questions to the supplementary material (Appendix 
A). 
Comment 15 - In line 208, P only goes out to one decimal place. Keep it 
consistent please. 
The p-value we found was .6037, so we had rounded to .6. This has now been 
amended to .60.  
Comment 16 - Figures 2 and 3 look great! Very informative.  
We agree with Reviewer 2 that the pirate plots generated with the R yarrr 
package give a great overview of the data, since they show raw data, central 
tendencies and densities, and the 95% highest density intervals, thus combining 
raw, descriptive and inferential visualisation. This information has been added 
to the figure captions on page 11.  
Comment 17 - When participants were split by perceived synchrony, how 
many people were in each condition? 
We have addressed this question by adding a table in the supplementary 
material (Appendix A). The information on how many subjects were in each 
group has also been added to the figure captions on page 11.  
Comment 18 - The paragraph starting in line 224 is great, love it! The 
paragraph after it is also very important. I wish this were earlier and that the 
study could have included this information. 
We feel like the position of this point in the discussion of the findings is 
appropriate, given that we are considering here explanations for why we are 
observing null results using this particular experimental manipulation. In our 
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next studies, we will keep in mind to consider perceived intentionality and add a 
measure to capture it.  
Comment 19 - The information in paragraph starting on line 259 is great! I 
think it should be included in the method section because it relates to how 
you actually ran the study. 
We respectfully disagree with this suggestion, especially as it was suggested by 
the editors to collate the lessons learned into one section, which seems 
appropriate at the end of the paper, following the logical flow of ‘what have we 
learned from the human-robot interaction study as experimental psychologists’.  
Reviewer 3 
Comment 1 - Firstly, at times I missed a clear link between the design and 
the literature, of which I gave the most prominent examples under the minor 
comments below. 
We thank Reviewer 3 for drawing our attention to this problem. We hope that 
Reviewer 3 finds that the revised manuscript makes the link between the design 
and literature far clearer, as the other 2 reviewers raised related points which 
we have addressed in this revision (Reviewer 1: comment 1,3; Reviewer 2: 
comment 2,3,7,10). In our specific answers in response to Reviewer 3’s points 
below, we provide more details as to how we have changed the manuscript to 
reflect this. 
Comment 2 - My other main concern is as follows. I believe strongly in the 
publication of null-results, as long as the study has a scientific contribution, 
which this paper clearly offers. However, I worry that it might also be driven 
by the experimental design or by a lack of statistical power. In terms of 
experimental design, I specifically wonder if the experience of synchrony was 
too subtle (l.222) because the immersion was not deep enough due to mostly 
technical constraints (such as robot movements, its screen turned off, and 
the physical distance between the robot's pen and its screen). Perhaps a 
brief summary of the manipulation check that was carried out would be 
informative.  
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We thank Reviewer 3 for raising their concern regarding the depth of the 
synchrony immersion. We have addressed Reviewer 1 and 2’s concerns regarding 
the two manipulation checks we carried out and have subsequently added two 
figures in the supplementary materials, visualising the objective attention check 
and the check for the participants’ subjective impressions of synchrony 
(Appendix A). While analysing the objective attention check was not informative 
due to technical difficulties with the remote control that changed the colours of 
the LED bracelet, we can see that most participants were able to report the 
colour changes correctly, so we can be fairly confident that they were attending 
to Pepper’s arm movements (also see: comment 2 of Reviewer 2). Future studies 
might include either more loops of control to ensure that the depth and saliency 
of the synchrony experience can be quantified or could include a more natural 
manipulation, based on emerging synchrony between the interacting agents.  
Comment 3 - Additionally, was the task analogous to one used in the reported 
human-human studies? Since the metronome is quite an exogenous cue, 
perhaps social feedback/interaction is not relevant to the participant's 
mindset, as they are simply carrying out the task. If other studies used a 
similar design, please report it. If not, discuss it in more detail; as it would 
enhance the issue touched upon in the paragraph starting at l.224. 
We have addressed the underlying motivation for choosing a paradigm that 
orchestrates synchrony via a shared metronome in response to Reviewer 1 and 
2’s concerns (Reviewer 1, comment 1). We have added the information in the 
manuscript that the task design was modelled on the seminal study by Hove and 
Risen (2009), who used a similar visual metronome to synchronize finger tapping 
between their participants and the confederate.  
Comment 4 - About statistical power: as far as I understood, there were 6 
blocks of 4 trials (=24 trials) in total; or are the 4 repetitions part of the 
same trial? I realise that no variables were measured from 
this interaction itself, so the issue I raise here is not one of measure 
repetition; but I do wonder if it ties back to the immersion aspect. Namely, 
relative to the duration of the entire experimental session, 
the interaction was quite short. I feel like a short sentence or two addressing 
this in the discussion would make this information more transparent. 
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There seems to have been a slight misunderstanding concerning how the blocks 
are composed: Each drawing block consists of the participants following the 
moving dot 4 times around the circle. In total we have 6 drawing blocks, each 
followed by a break, which amounts to 24 trials (=24 drawn circles). We concur 
with Reviewer 3 that this indeed led to a rather short immersion into synchrony 
with the robot, however, this is directly modelled on the short synchrony 
interventions reported in the human-human interaction literature (Hove & Risen, 
2009; Cross, Wilson, & Golonka, 2016). We have added a sentence in the 
discussion addressing this issue.  
Line 292: “Given this finding, it may be that the experimental manipulation of 
synchrony was either too subtle or too short to fully immerse participants in the 
experience and to produce the hypothesized beneficial effect on rapport 
between synchronizing agents.” 
Line 338: “Future experiments should further include a positive control to 
ensure the synchrony manipulation works as expected in human-human 
interaction and additional loops of control to ensure that the synchrony 
manipulation is sufficiently immersive and salient.” 
Comment 5 - In summary, these concerns can mostly be simply addressed in 
the discussion section, to provide a more critical evaluation. Other than that, 
I read this manuscript with great interest and I really recognised a number of 
issues myself (for example, we recently had a near-ceiling effect of 
likeability on the Godspeed questionnaire as well: people just like humanoid 
robots!). I particularly enjoyed the recommendations toward the end. Great 
work in general! 
We thank Reviewer 3 kindly for their feedback.  
Comment 6 - Please describe the task in more detail. Were participants 
meant to trace the visual metronome? I found this unclear. 
We thank Reviewer 3 for drawing our attention to the fact that the task 
description was unclear in the manuscript. We have added an additional 
sentence of explanation in the Experimental Procedure to make clear that the 
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participants were informed that it was the goal of the task to follow the moving 
dot (=visual metronome) as closely as possible and too make as little mistakes as 
possible: 
Line 207: “Participants received the instruction from the experimenter that the 
goal of the task was to follow the moving target as closely as possible and 
deviate from it as little as possible.” 
Comment 7 - Compliments on being so straight-forward about selecting the 
final pool of participants, which appears analogous to the 21-word statement 
by Simmons, Nelson and Simonsohn, 2012. However, to complete this, could 
you provide a sample-size justification? 
This experiment was set up as an initial proof of concept study. Our sample size 
results from our motivation to recruit the highest number of participants in a 
limited amount of time (i.e., before our lab moved in the spring of last year).  
Line 153: “. We aimed to recruit the highest number of participants within the 
testing period (February to April 2018).” 
We now also include a data statement. 
Line 150: “Data statement. We report all measures in the study, all 
manipulations, any data exclusions, and the sample size determination rule. The 
data and the R analysis script are publicly available via the OSF [link].” 
And we critically discuss the fact that the sample size might have been too small 
to detect our effects of interest: 
Line 341: A final limitation we would like to highlight is the fact that given the 
rather high number of participants we had to exclude, the sample size may have 
been too small to show the expected small to medium effect size of a synchrony 
manipulation on perception of and behavior towards the robot. 
Comment 8 - The goal of the study (paragraph starting at l.115) could do with 
more explicit linking to the previous paragraph(s) to clarify these links to the 
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reader. I suggest something along the lines of: "likeability, analogous to the 
findings by Chevallier et al. (2012)" and "increased number of questions 
during a subsequent free interaction as a measure of prosocial behaviour". 
We agree with Reviewer 3 that this would clarify the links to the previous 
paragraphs and have added these references at the end of the introduction 
section.  
Line 140: “We hypothesized that moving in sync with the robot would improve 
its likeability, analogous to the findings of Lehmann and colleagues (2015), and, 
based on Chevallier’s social motivation theory, would also increase the 
motivation to interact with the robot, as measured by the number of questions 
participants chose to ask the robot during a free interaction.” 
Comment 9 - Similarly, I would add a "see experimental procedure" after the 
"losing the metronome" statement in l.123; as the metronome has not been 
introduced yet at this point. 
We thank Reviewer 3 for drawing our attention to this, we have added a 
reference to the experimental procedure.  
Line 154: “Four participants were excluded from further analysis due to large 
error rates (losing the metronome more than 30 times, see experimental 
procedure below) on the task, and four more had to be excluded due to missing 
data on the questionnaires.” 
Comment 10 - Would you be able to provide open data plus a link to it in the 
manuscript? 
We have uploaded the data and the R analysis script, as well as the html output 
file to the OSF and have made the project available to the public. Thank you for 
your helpful comments. 
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Appendix C Supplementary materials for “Faces 
do not attract more attention than non-social 
distractors in the Stroop task” 
A) Emotion rating (online validation study) 
Prior to study 1, we ran an online stimulus validation study to ensure that the 
faces would receive comparable ratings in perceived emotionality. At the time 
of this online validation study (June 2018), we had not yet added the third 
control condition (pareidolic faces), so only the emotional content of unique 
human and robot faces were rated. Furthermore, as this was the first set of 
stimuli, there were less unique images (12 images per condition) compared to 
study 2 (24 images per condition). The validation experiment was presented in 
Jisc Online Surveys (formerly Bristol Online Surveys). Participants rated 18 
unique robot and 18 unique human faces (male and female) on a bespoke 
semantic differential scale between ‘1 – sad’ to ‘7 – happy’. ‘4’ was considered 
‘neutral’, for the purpose of the analysis. The scale was made for this study. 84 
participants (age: M=34.67, SD=11.77) completed the rating study.  
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Most participants were female (n=64) and most reported never having interacted 
with a robot before (n=61). The participants were recruited via advertisements 
on social media.  
While the two groups didn’t differ in mean ratings at first glance (human faces: 
M= 3.69, SD=1.08, robot faces: M=3.97, SD=1.39), ordinal logistic regression with 
the ‘ordinal’ package (Christensen, 2019) suggests that human faces were rated 
more negatively (estimate = -.37, SE= .07, p<.001). Following this result, we 
inspected the mean ratings of the individual stimuli visually and discovered that 
the robotic faces were rated much more variably than the human faces. As the 
stimulus exclusions were costly (i.e. the time and effort to replace and re-
process all images), and we had to work towards keeping at least 12 unique 
images within the pool of 18 images in each condition, we removed the strongest 
outliers in the robot condition (robots  2, 6, 7, 10, 11, & 12) and removed those 
human faces that were rated more negatively than the average, with 3 male and 
3 female faces each (19, 22, 23, 28, 33 & 35).  While the procedure we followed 
is not optimal (limited by the time and stimulus availability constraints), we 
F4 - Emotion ratings. 
The bold dots represent the mean rating scores for each image, and the bars 
represent the standard error. Red & labelled points indicate that those images were 
excluded.  
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gained valuable insights. The robot faces we considered “neutral” upon selection 
were, in fact, perceived not as unambiguously neutral by the raters, and despite 
selecting human faces from the neutral condition of the Radboud Faces Database 
(Langner et al., 2010), they were perceived slightly more negatively than the 
midpoint of our scale.  
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B) Agency and experience ratings (Experiment 2) 
In conjunction with study 2, we included a second survey component, which 
required participants to rate all the unique (un-mirrored) images on agency and 
experience. Again, we used a bespoke rating scale modelled on the conceptual 
ideas of Gray, Gray and Wegner (2007), who define agency as the ability to plan 
and act and experience as the ability to sense and feel. The images and rating 
scales were presented via FormR (Arslan, Walther & Tata, 2019) and the one-
sentence definitions of agency and experience were presented below each 
image. Fifty-one participants (the same sample as in Study 2) rated 96 unique 
images on agency and experience (24 per category, 4 categories). The three 
inbuilt attention checks (for example: “Did the last image show a) an objects or 
b) a human?” were all answered correctly by all subjects.  
 
A within-subjects ANOVA conducted with the R package {ezAnova} suggests that 
there is a main effect of agent: F(3, 150) = 189.71, p<.001. Mauchly’s test for 
sphericity was significant, thus the assumption was violated (W) = 0.37, p < 
F5 - Agency and experience ratings (Experiment 2). 
The agency and experience ratings of the 4 stimulus categories: human faces, robot faces, 
pareidolic faces (objects) and flowers. There is a clustering at the midpoint of the scale, 
which can be explained by the fact that the starting point of the rating scale was always at 
50. 
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.001).  The Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε = 0.74) was used and 
the corrected p-value remains significant (p<.01). Upon inspecting figure 5, it 
appears that humans were rated highest on agency and experience, robots were 
attributed some agency and little experience, pareidolic faces rated lowest on 
both dimensions of mind and surprisingly there was a large spread of ratings for 
the ability of flowers to sense and feel. This satisfies our internal criterion for 
‘category difference’, to ensure that each of the faces were sufficiently distinct.  
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C) Pre-processing of response times 
Table T2 lists the number of remaining trials per experimental condition after 
applying our pre-registered trimming criterion in Experiment 1. Table T3 depicts 
the mean reaction times using our pre-registered standard deviation criterion 
and Figure F6 and F7 depict density plots of the response times for each of the 
pre-processing methods. Applying the suggested standard deviation per 
participant criterion resulted in overall slower reaction times (Table T3), 
compared to the original analysis (Table T2). As the pattern of results 
nonetheless looks similar to what we originally reported, and in the interest of 
adhering to our pre-registration, we decided to keep the current results section 
of Experiment 1 as it is. 
 
T2 - Experiment 1: Number of remaining trials per experimental condition 
after reaction time trimming using the pre-registered standard deviation 
criterion. 192 trials, 39 participants.  
Condition Total number of 
trials 
Trials remaining  % of trials 
remaining 
incongruent_human 936 847 90.5 
incongruent_robot 936 835 89.2 
incongruent_object 936 857 91.6 
incongruent_flower 936 829 88.6 
neutral_human 936 883 94.3 
neutral_robot 936 870 92.9 
neutral_object 936 883 94.3 
neutral_flower 936 878 93.8 
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T3 - Experiment 1: Mean reaction times (in ms) per condition using the pre-
registered standard deviation criterion. 
 Distractor 
 Human Robot Object Flower 
Incongruent 
target 
843 807 815 796 
Neutral target 753 768 763 760 
 
 
 
 
 
F6 - Density plots for reaction times (ms) in Experiment 1 with the pre-registered standard 
deviation trimming criterion. 
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T3 - Experiment 1: Mean reaction times (in ms) per condition using the 
standard deviation per participant criterion. 
 Distractor 
 Human Robot Object Flower 
Incongruent 
target 
840 833 833 809 
Neutral target 769 770 780 776 
 
 
Repeating the same procedure for Experiment 2, we find that with our pre-
registered standard deviation criterion we discard 1061 trials (10.84%) in total 
(with the participant sensitive criterion we discard 11.35% of all trials). Again, 
we see that the overall patterns of results remain the same across these two 
pre-processing methods (illustrated in tables and figures below).  
F7 - Density plots for reaction times (ms) in Experiment 1 with the participant-sensitive 
standard deviation trimming criterion. 
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T4 - Experiment 2: Number of remaining trials per experimental condition 
after reaction time trimming using the pre-registered standard deviation 
criterion. 192 trials, 51 participants.  
Condition Total number of 
trials 
Trials remaining % of trials 
remaining 
incongruent_human 1,224 1062 86.8 
incongruent_robot 1,224 1072 87.6 
incongruent_object 1,224 1061 86.7 
incongruent_flower 1,224 1056 86.3 
neutral_human 1,224 1120 91.5 
neutral_robot 1,224 1100 89.9 
neutral_object 1,224 1109 90.6 
neutral_flower 1,224 1101 90.0 
 
T5 - Experiment 2: Mean reaction times (in ms) per condition using the pre-
registered standard deviation criterion (Experiment 2). 
 Distractor 
 Human Robot Object Flower 
Incongruent 
target 
811 808 809 816 
Neutral target 723 747 730 735 
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T6 - Experiment 2: Mean reaction times (in ms) per condition using the 
standard deviation per participant criterion. 
 Distractor 
 Human Robot Object Flower 
Incongruent 
target 
833 828 834 825 
Neutral target 748 755 750 749 
 
 
 
F8 - Density plots for reaction times (ms) in Experiment 2 with the pre-registered 
standard deviation trimming criterion. 
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F9 - Density plots for reaction times (ms) in Experiment 2 with the per participant standard 
deviation trimming criterion. 
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Appendix D  Rebuttal for “Faces do not attract 
more attention than non-social distractors in the 
Stroop task” 
NB: Shared with permission from the editor. This manuscript is currently 
accepted pending minor revision at Collabra: Psychology (i.e. we opted for open 
peer review).   
Editor 
Summary: Three expert reviewers have provided comments on your work and 
find that some revisions are necessary before it would be suitable for 
publication. The reviewers have made suggestions that cover most of the work 
and many of these points are critical, while described in much more detail in 
the reviewer comments below, I would like to highlight a few that I found 
particularly important to be addressed. (1) Structure of the introduction, as 
detailed by Reviewer 2. (2) Reporting the number of excluded trials. (3) Further 
methodological details need to be included. All of the reviewers thought the 
figures and tables were well done. 
Response: We are very grateful for the reviewers’ detailed comments and 
suggestions and the editor’s synthesis of the overarching points on how best to 
improve this paper. In the revised manuscript and our responses below, we 
detail how we have taken this feedback onboard. In line with the suggestions of 
the reviewers we have placed the strongest emphasis on reworking the 
introduction and the discussion section, providing more synthesis, critical 
commentary and making more explicit our study’s rationale. We have detailed 
the exact number of excluded trials in the supplementary materials (Appendix 
C), as well as added the overall number of excluded trials in each experiment to 
their respective results sections. In order to ensure full transparency, we 
included the alternative reaction time pre-processing method which was 
recommended by one of the reviewers in the supplementary materials as well 
(Appendix C). Finally, we have carefully followed the reviewers’ suggestions to 
include more details on our methods while at the same time removing some 
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information that was flagged as redundant. We highlighted the changes to the 
manuscript in bold typeface. 
Reviewers 
Reviewer D: The authors were interested in human-robot social interaction with 
a focus on social motivation towards artificial agents. In two studies, they 
investigated the effects of distractors with varying social salience on an 
adaptation of a classic Stroop task. In both studies conducted, a classic Stroop 
effect emerged, yet there was no significant effect of salient social cues 
(human face distractors) capturing attention.   
D.1a: The authors do a good job setting up the study's aims by providing a big 
picture question. However, the organization of the literature review is 
somewhat hard to follow. The studies reviewed contain details that do not 
seem necessary and distracts the reader from the main point. For example, 
the sample sizes each study had are unnecessary as well as step-by-step 
accounts of their experimental procedures. I think the introduction would 
benefit from succinct accounts of the main manipulations of the studies (e.g., 
direct vs averted gaze, open vs closed eyes) and relevant results (as the 
authors already do). Additionally, we do not see synthesis or commentary by 
the authors. It would be useful if they could provide their own interpretation 
of the literature and its implications.  
Response: As the introduction has been criticized by all three reviewers, we 
have made major changes to its structure and content, now focusing less on very 
detailed accounts of each study’s experimental procedure and proving a bird’s 
eye view on the current state of the art social attentional capture research.  
Thus, we have removed superfluous details such as participant numbers in the 
revised introduction, for example: 
P.8, l. 237-239: Importantly, the authors tested the paradigm in two groups of 
children: typically developing boys and a group of male adolescents with Autism 
Spectrum Condition (ASC). 
203 
We agree that our evaluations of the literature should include more critical 
reflection, which we have added as well in rewriting the introduction.  
P.6, l. 187-191: While the evidence on how deeply illusory faces are perceived as 
social is mixed, they constitute an ideal control for human facial features in 
social attentional capture tasks. This also raises the question how deliberate 
pareidolic faces, such as humanoid robots, might engage our visual attention, as 
these agents are capable of at least some interactions with the physical world.   
The more strongly emphasized synthesis and critical commentary is especially 
evident in the revised discussion, for example: 
P.21, l. 522-529: Many studies report effects based on very small samples (some 
as small as 8 participants per experiment; Ariga & Arihara, 2017; Miyazaki, 
Wake, Ichihara, & Wake, 2012; Sato & Kawahara, 2015), make bold statements 
based on modest statistical evidence (“the three-way interaction approached 
significance, F(2,76) = 2.46, p<.10”, p. 1103, Hietanen et al., 2016) or use small 
sets of distractor images which are repeated across many experimental trials 
(Bindemann et al., 2007; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006). Indeed, some of 
these problematic confounds have been highlighted and tested by Pereira and 
colleagues (2019; 2020). 
And:  
P.21, l. 539-545: While a different task was used in these studies, the authors’ 
findings closely align with ours: faces are not reliably capturing attention and 
impairing the performance on an unrelated cognitive task. Interestingly, in a 
direct replication of Bindemann and colleagues (2007), using less well-controlled 
stimuli, the authors were able to replicate the effect of attentional capture by 
task-irrelevant faces, providing convincing evidence for systematic confounds 
obscuring the true picture in the existing literature. 
D.1b: Refrain from using direct quotations as it takes away from the authors' 
original thinking. Where "centrally presented direct gaze delay[ing] 
attentional disengagement and recruit[ing] cognitive processing resources, 
and hence, processing times of the peripheral targets and the Stroop 
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interference are increased” is written, perhaps the authors could paraphrase 
the central idea. 
Response: This point is well taken, and similar points have been raised by other 
reviewers. In the revised version of the manuscript, we have completely 
restructured/rewritten the introduction taking this feedback onboard. 
D.1c: Details such as “The experimenter explained the procedure of the 
study and ensured participants understood the task” and “During this part of 
the study, the light in the cubicle was still switched on, and was switched off 
when participants started the test phase of the experiment“ do not 
necessarily have to be in the body of the paper. If the authors would like to 
keep this, it would be better to move this in Supplementary Materials.  
Response: We agree that this information is unnecessary and have removed it.  
D.1d: It might be worth thinking about the importance of controlling for 
emotional valence when using human face stimuli and provide this as a 
motivation for using neutral stimuli, which is missing in the paper. This might 
be useful in the Introduction or in the General Discussion and set this up as a 
limitation or a note for future studies. There are several studies showing that 
emotional human faces (or emotional stimuli in general) have been found to 
capture attention faster than neutral when task-irrelevant (e.g., Theuuwes & 
Van der Stigchel 2006; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; 
Vuilleumier, 2002). This could influence the degree of social salience of 
social agents. 
Response: Indeed, emotional valence of faces plays a crucial role in social 
interaction and has been repeatedly shown to influence attention differentially. 
Thank you for the helpful literature recommendations. We added our rationale 
for selecting neutral faces to the methods:  
P.10, l. 299-306: The rationale behind including only neutral faces was that 
emotional facial cues have been shown to draw attention, especially in 
comparison to neutral facial expressions (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & 
Ungerleider, 2002; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2002). An 
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independent sample rated the first pool of human and robot images, resulting in 
a pre-selection of more neutrally perceived faces (more details can be found in 
the Supplementary Materials). 
To illustrate the point of possibly more varied robot and object images, we show 
below additional stimulus examples for Reviewer D’s information, which, due to 
copyright restrictions we cannot include in the manuscript:  
[This figure had to be excluded due to copyright restrictions.] 
In the revised discussion, we write: 
P.23, l. 605-614: Despite our best efforts to only include neutral faces, the 
emotional content of the social stimuli could not be controlled to a fine-grained 
degree, as it was limited by the design and availability of the robots and objects 
that were identified through our Google search. In the emotion rating 
experiment, which we undertook prior to Experiment 1, the robot faces were 
not rated as unambiguously neutral as the human faces, even after excluding the 
outliers. Human faces were selected from the neutral category of the Radboud 
and London faces database, so these stimuli would have contained inherently 
less variance in perceived emotionality than the robot and object faces. 
However, given the scarcity of frontally oriented and high-quality robot and 
object faces, we chose to operate within those constraints. 
D1e: Statistical analyses are sound. 
D.2: (Figures, Tables, data availability) While sufficiently described, I would 
like to see a schematic of the Stroop task as it is always helpful to readers. 
The plots are beautiful. 
Response: In line with this helpful suggestion, we have added a schematic 
representation of the Stroop task in the Methods section (p.11). 
D.3: (Ethical approval) Ethical approval is present and informed consent is 
declared. 
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D.4: (Language) English is excellent. As per my comments above, the authors 
could be more concise when reviewing the literature, as well as describing 
the methods. 
Response: We hope to have addressed this concern by making the changes we 
outline in the above responses.  
Reviewer H: This manuscript featured two nearly-identical experiments 
designed to examine the impact of social salience during the Stroop Task. 
Specifically, the authors varied the social salience of distractors, including 
images of human faces, robot faces, objects that looked like faces, and flowers, 
and predicted that faces would amplify the stroop effect due to their high 
social salience. They found evidence for this in Experiment 1, but when they 
controlled for a stimulus confound in Experiment 2, they were not able to 
reject the null hypothesis. This investigation has some strengths. For example, 
comparing evaluations of human and robot faces is interesting, their analyses 
were appropriately simple and clear, and basic visual characteristics of the 
stimuli were well controlled for. The authors also took care to evaluate 
whether their data provided evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, which I 
appreciated. In general, I don’t have any concerns about the methods, the data, 
the analyses, or their interpretation. However, I did have quite a few major 
concerns about more general issues that tempered my enthusiasm for the work. 
I’ll explain these in more detail below. 
H.1a: First, the majority of the Introduction is highly specific to research on 
gaze perception, as is the Discussion. And yet gaze direction is not examined, 
nor is it even important, in the current investigation. This reflected a larger 
issue with the Introduction, which seems to cover many topics before finally 
focusing on the hypothesis and aims of the investigation. It didn’t feel like 
the gaps in the literature (as described) necessarily led to the current work 
and its design. Rather, it felt a bit like a literature review was forced around 
the current experiment. In this sense, I did not think that the article was as 
logically structured as it could have been. 
Response: Thank you for this critical reflection – as we have written in response 
to the editor and the other reviewers, we have reframed both our introduction 
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and discussion to better explain our rationale for designing the conceptual 
extension of the eye contact effect. We agree wholeheartedly with this 
criticism. The revised introduction includes a general overview of the social 
attentional capture focusing on whole faces (rather than gaze perception) and 
relates this literature back to human-robot interaction research, as this was one 
of the main motivators for designing this conceptual extension.  
For example: 
P.4, l. 101-105: Given their prioritization in our visual environment, it is 
unsurprising that faces have been the central focus of many visual attention 
studies. Collectively, these studies point towards faces ranking above objects in 
capturing automatic attention. Using a change blindness paradigm, Ro, Russel 
and Lavie (2001) found that participants detected changes in temporarily 
presented faces more quickly than changes in any other object. 
And: 
P.5, l.149-153: Hence, and as Geiger and Balas (2020) point out, robot faces, 
which we have presented here as a special case of intentional pareidolia, 
constitute a border category of face processing, and while some research exists 
on attentional capture by pareidolic faces, less is known about the social 
relevance of robot faces. 
H.1b: Second, it’s not clear to me that the design the authors have selected 
is the best one to examine their main question. In describing previous work 
by Conty and then Chevallier, the authors state that “the lack of difference 
in arousal would lead to “centrally presented direct gaze delay[ing] 
attentional disengagement and recruit[ing] cognitive processing resources, 
and hence, processing times of the peripheral targets and the Stroop 
interference are increased”. They then go on to state that testing this claim 
was the goal of the current investigation. But as far as I can tell, their design 
does not examine arousal, nor is it confirmed that the stimuli themselves 
differ in the extent to which they arouse the participants. I don’t have an 
issue with their stimulus choices per se (they’re rather clever), but they 
don’t seem to fall out of the literature reviewed, and it seems like not 
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manipulating gaze direction was a missed opportunity. Thus, although I have 
no issues with the analysis or the data, it’s not clear to me that the 
conclusions reflect the underlying question, at least as it’s framed in the 
introduction. 
Response: This comment is very much in line with the comments of the other 
reviewers and editor, so we decided to reframe the introduction to clarify the 
rationale for our task, reduced the discussion of the follow-up experiment by 
Hietanen and colleagues (2016), removed the direct quote, which was criticised 
by another reviewer as well (see comment D.1b), and moved the entire section 
to the discussion. 
In this paragraph, we were trying to establish that another conceptual extension 
of the eye-contact effect by Hietanen and colleagues failed to show the 
predicted effect: these researchers reported an effect in the opposite direction 
(reaction times speeding up) and credit levels of arousal in their experiment 
with an embodied confederate as an explanation. They describe studies with 
pictorial stimuli (as our studies, or the studies by Conty, Chevallier and 
colleagues) as low-arousal situations, in which the original effect should hold. 
However, we were of course unable to provide convincing evidence for a social 
salience effect in this version of the Stroop task. While we did not measure 
arousal directly, we wanted to pick up this point by Hietanen and colleagues, to 
continue the conversation on why a null effect could be observed in conceptual 
extensions of this paradigms.  
P.20, l. 499-506: Hietanen and colleagues (2016) found a main effect of direct 
gaze speeding up the RTs of the participants, as compared to averted gaze. The 
authors reconcile their contradictory findings by relating them to the higher 
arousal produced by their stimuli: eye contact with a real person should be more 
engaging than pictorial representations thereof. In so-called low arousal 
contexts, they argue, salient social cues should recruit attentional resources and 
interfere with participants’ performance on cognitive tasks. In our experiments, 
even in a context that Hietanen and colleagues (2016) describe as “low arousal”, 
it is most probable that any social salience effect is practically equivalent to 
zero.  
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Like Chevallier and colleagues (2013), we chose not to manipulate gaze direction 
in this task, but rather include the neutral flower distractors (just as Chevallier 
and colleagues did) and vary the levels of socialness of the distractor agents. 
Based on the findings of Chevallier and colleagues, we expected a human 
distractor-dependent enhancement of the Stroop effect in the incongruent 
condition, compared to the flower distractor. Despite the experiments not 
explicitly investigating eye gaze, the gaze direction of all “social” stimuli 
(humans, robots, objects) was direct, towards the observer. Thus, despite taking 
up a smaller region in the distractor image, the direct eye gaze was controlled 
across social distractors, and any one of these categories should then draw more 
attention than the flower images. We added this point to our discussion: 
P.20, l.507-519: How can our results then be explained? Of course, the stimuli 
we presented were more complex than those used in the original studies, so it is 
possible that the eye-contact effect only holds in (more) simplified contexts. 
The eye region in our stimulus set appeared smaller than in the original 
experiments, due to it taking up a smaller percentage of pixels in our distractor 
images. While the eye region itself was smaller, all of our social stimuli (the 
human, robot and object faces) depicted direct gaze and a frontally oriented 
face. They only varied in their potential as a social interaction partner. So, if 
the eye-contact effect were to hold, we should have seen a consistent 
difference between our most salient social stimuli with direct eye gaze (the 
human faces) and the neutral control condition (flowers). The fact that our data 
did not support this pattern is especially surprising given that past studies 
examining direct gaze have also used full-face stimuli in similar, cognitively 
demanding tasks (Burton, Bindemann, Langton, Schweinberger, & Jenkins, 2009; 
Conty, Russo, et al., 2010a). 
H.1c: Third, critical information about the task is missing. Yes, the Stroop 
Task is well known and quite simple, but it isn’t adequately described in the 
Methods, nor is any background provided about the history of the task or its 
mechanisms. This wouldn’t be too difficult to rectify, but as it stands, it’s a 
curious omission. 
Response: We have added detailed information and figures on the number of 
discarded trials in the main text and supplementary materials (see also Reviewer 
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comment I.4) and have added more information on the design of the Stroop task 
(see also Reviewer comment I.8).  
Further to Reviewer H’s request, we have added a section discussing the history 
of the task and its mechanisms in the introduction.  
P.7, l. 208-222: Despite the above reviewed variety of paradigms which probe 
(social) attentional capture, the Stroop task has proven to be a particularly 
popular vehicle. Named after the psychologist who discovered the effect, 
hundreds of studies have shown that naming the ink colour of an incongruent 
colour word (i.e., the word “RED” presented in green) produces slower reaction 
times than determining the colour of a control word (the letters “XXX” 
presented in green). This interference effect, which highlights the fact that 
task-irrelevant information is processed concomitantly and automatically, has 
inspired a multitude of extensions, including pictorial, spatial, and social 
versions (MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000). For example, in the facial-emotional 
Stroop, participants name the ink colour of emotional, compared to neutral 
faces, which are overlaid with a coloured filter. Past research has shown that 
sad participants and participants with higher trait anger are slower to name the 
colour of angry versus neutral faces (Isaac et al., 2012; van Honk, Tuiten, de 
Haan, vann de Hout, & Stam, 2001; Van Honk et al., 2000). Thus, the Stroop task 
has been validated as a suitable paradigm to assess the distracting power of 
task-irrelevant information, such as facial cues.   
H.1d: Finally, I found it hard to process the takeaway message of the 
manuscript. The authors found evidence against the null hypothesis in 
Experiment 1, but there were issues with a stimulus confound, and then in 
Experiment 2, there appears to be no effect of category, but the authors 
were at the same time not able to support a case in favor of the null--of faces 
not drawing more attention in the Stroop task. In other words, it’s just really 
difficult to get a clear sense of what the study demonstrates, and thus what 
it’s impact will be. 
Response: Following comments from Reviewer I, we have revised the section on 
the Bayesian re-analysis of the data (including Figure 6). We hope that our 
interpretation of the results is now clearer: while the ROPE analysis does not 
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offer compelling evidence in support of the null hypothesis, we can quantify our 
uncertainty. The 95% credible interval of the posterior distribution contains zero 
and overlaps to ~ 50% with our region of practical equivalence. Thus, if human 
faces draw more attention in the incongruent condition than the flower 
distractors, this effect is much smaller than expected and the evidence for it is 
not very strong. By providing our posteriors, other Bayesians may include them 
as priors and collect enough evidence to support one decision over the other. 
Science is cumulative, and Bayesian statistics give us an important advantage of 
quantifying our uncertainty, which would have not been possible if we stopped 
at the point of describing the null effect of the Frequentist analysis. 
P.19, l.462-468: In summary, in defining our Bayesian regression model, we have 
increased the uncertainty of our estimates by including more random variance in 
the form of subject-level random effects. This increased uncertainty is 
expressed in Figure 5. Based on the ROPE analysis, we cannot definitively 
support the null hypothesis. However, considering that zero is contained in the 
95% interval of credible values of the parameter’s posterior distribution, the 
evidence for an effect is not very strong, and if real, goes in the opposite 
direction: -10ms [-10, 40].   
H.2: (Figures, Tables, data availability) The tables and figures are nice. Well 
done. 
H.3: (Ethical approval) This seemed adequate. 
H.4: (Language) In general, yes. The quality of English was good. 
Reviewer I: In this preregistered study, the question was investigated whether 
human faces automatically attract attention more than other types of 
distractors (human-like faces or non-faces) while participants solve a Stroop 
task. Two studies are presented, where in study 1 (N=39) a small effect seemed 
to favour the prediction with slightly increased Stroop effects in the presence 
of human faces, but a second study (N=51) that increased the number of unique 
distractor images failed to find differences between response times to the 
different distractor types.  
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I enjoyed reading this well-written manuscript, the theoretical background is 
nicely developed, the methods are sound and the statistical analyses are 
sophisticated. I have a few observations nevertheless that I would like the 
authors to consider. 
I.1: The task involved the concurrent presentation of a Stroop colour-word 
interference test and distractors. While this setup seems to follow methods 
by Conty et al. (2010), the main measure involves a form of “dual 
distraction” - distraction from the colour-incongruent words and distraction 
from the faces. It would have been nice to have baseline trials in which no 
distractors were shown, in order to evaluate people’s Stroop effect per se, 
without imposing a second task. 
Response: Indeed, our experiments were designed as a conceptual extension of 
Conty and colleagues (2010a), and we followed the original procedure as closely 
as possible. Seeing as the Stroop effect is considered robust in the literature, we 
did not include another control condition without any distractor images to 
establish this as a ground truth. Given that we find a main effect of target in the 
pre-registered analysis of both experiments, we can assume that the task itself 
worked and, overall, induced the desired Stroop interference effect (with some 
variance between participants, of course).  
We reemphasized this point (in addition to raising it in the abstract), by 
including it in the Results sections of Experiments 1 & 2: 
P.12, l. 355-356:  This finding confirms that our modified task was still effective 
at inducing a Stroop interference effect.    
P.15, l. 421-422: Again, this showed that the task worked as expected. 
I.2: The visual layout of these stimuli on the screen was not entirely clear to 
me as it is not shown in the figures, although described in the text. Was the 
distance between the words and the distractors different or the same as in 
the original study? In other words, was it perhaps easier to ignore the 
distractors here than in Conty et al., especially given that ignoring the 
distractors was indeed what participants were asked to do.  
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Response: We agree with the Reviewer that a visual representation of the 
experimental paradigm would be helpful, which we have added to the Methods 
section and is also visualised below: 
[See Figure 8] 
The distance between the distractors in our experiments and the original studies 
was matched as closely as possible given the difference in shape.  
In trying to emulate the stimulus size, we faced the following problem: to 
compute size based on reported visual angle, information on the distance at 
which the stimulus is viewed is also necessary. This information was missing from 
the 2010 paper. As a workaround, we referred to the later paper by the same 
group, which used a similar paradigm (exchanging the averted gaze control 
condition for flower distractors): Chevallier et al. (2013). This allowed us to 
calculate the size of the distractor images using the following code in R: 
desiredSize <- function(visAngle, distance){ 
Rad = visAngle/(180/pi)  
size = 2*distance*tan(Rad/2) 
return(size) 
} 
dist=50 
ang=6 
desiredSize(visAngle = ang, distance = dist)  
5.24 
(Code taken from: http://stephenrho.github.io/visual-angle.html)  
Thus, we can be confident that the target words and distractor images had a 
comparable size and were at the same distance from each other as in the 
original studies.  
214 
I.3: The skewed RTs (as nicely shown in Figure 4, for study 2) were analysed 
in raw format without further transformation (log) – have the authors tried to 
analyse log-transformed RTs? 
Response: As the Reviewer correctly observed, here we only report the 
untransformed reaction times, as we did not pre-register any data 
transformations. However, upon initially inspecting the skew, we did try the log-
transform, thus achieving an approximately normal distribution: 
 
The log-transformation did not change the results of either of the two studies, 
and as a recent preprint questions the usefulness of this convention (Schramm & 
Rouder, 2019), we decided to focus our exploratory report on the Bayesian re-
analysis of Experiment 2. In the Bayesian analysis we fit an exgaussian 
distribution to the data, which represents the inherent right-skew better 
(Baayen & Milin, 2010).  
References 
• Baayen, R. H., & Milin, P. (2010). Analyzing reaction times. International 
Journal of Psychological Research, 3(2), 12-28. 
Log-transformed reaction time data of Experiment 1. 
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• Schramm, P., & Rouder, J. (2019). Are Reaction Time Transformations 
Really Beneficial? https://psyarxiv.com/9ksa6/. 
I.4: Perhaps most critically, it seems that trials in which response times 
larger than 2 SD above the sample mean were excluded. This is likely too 
stringent since individual response times are quite variable and in fact, the 
most interesting trials in this task would be those in which distraction was 
maximal (i.e., response times are long). In order to avoid “overcleaning”, I 
would strongly recommend either not to exclude long trials, or to use 
individual response time distributions - exclude trials that are 2 (or 3) SDs 
above each participant’s own mean RT instead of the sample mean.  Numbers 
of excluded trials and excluded trials per condition are also not reported and 
should be added. As a result, the remaining trials could be biased towards 
those that were not distracting (no matter which condition). 
Response: We agree with the Reviewer that the criterion for pre-processing the 
reaction time data was perhaps too inflexible and did not accommodate 
between-participant variability. As outlined in our previous responses, we 
followed the procedure of the original studies and thus specified in our pre-
registration: “Outlier data are defined as reaction times below 200 ms and as 
more than 2 standard deviations above the mean.”  
To investigate the concerns of the Reviewer, we used the {trimr} package, which 
allows the implementation of various response time trimming criteria. We used a 
standard deviation criterion sensitive to the participants’ own means (8.9% of all 
trials were removed), as well as the standard deviation criterion we pre-
registered (8.09% of all trials were removed). We included two tables side by 
side that show the means for both methods. Using the suggested standard 
deviation per participant criterion resulted in overall slower reaction times 
(Table 2), compared to the original analysis (Table 1).  
[To avoid duplication, a cross-reference to above figures and tables is given 
below] 
Appendix C 
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However, the pattern of results nonetheless looks similar to what we originally 
reported, and in the interest of adhering to our pre-registration, we decided to 
keep the current results section of Experiment 1 as it is, but add a table on the 
number of discarded trials in the supplementary materials, as well as add the 
percentage of the total amount of discarded trials in the main text:  
P.12, l. 338-340: As a result, 606 trials (8.09%) were discarded (a detailed 
breakdown of the trial number per condition can be found in the Supplementary 
Materials).    
Repeating the same procedure for Experiment 2, we find that with our pre-
registered standard deviation criterion we discard 1061 trials (10.84%) in total 
(with the participant sensitive criterion we discard 11.35% of all trials). We 
added the information on discarded trials in the main text:  
P,15, l. 410-412: With this reaction time trimming criterion, we discarded 1061 
trials (10.84%). A detailed breakdown of the number of trials remaining per 
condition can be found in the Supplementary Materials.   
For comparison, we list Table 5 and 6 with the mean reaction times for 
Experiment 2 using our reported method and the method recommended by the 
Reviewer: 
[To avoid duplication, a cross-reference to above figures and tables is given 
below] 
Appendix C 
Again, we see that the overall patterns of results remain the same across these 
two pre-processing methods.  
References 
Grange, J. A. (2015). trimr: An implementation of common response time 
trimming methods. R package version 1.0. 1 
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I.5: The Bayesian analyses are sufficiently esoteric for me that I require more 
clarification here. 
Response: We agree with the Reviewer that the report of the exploratory 
Bayesian analysis in its original form was not as clear as it could (or should) have 
been. We hope we have addressed this concern sufficiently in the following 
responses. 
I.5a: Page 13 states “Given the results of Study 2, we explored the extent to 
which our data provided compelling evidence for the null hypothesis (no 
difference in reaction times in the incongruent and neutral conditions when 
human faces are presented)“. This implies to me that the null hypothesis 
would predict no Stroop effect when the human faces were presented. I 
believe this is not what the authors meant, but instead that the size of the 
Stroop effect would not differ between distractor conditions. Is this the case? 
If so, this needs to be changed in the text. 
Response: We thank the reviewer for pointing out this mistake. We have 
amended the text accordingly: 
P.16, l. 428-433: Given the results of Experiment 2, we explored the extent to 
which our data provided compelling evidence for the null hypothesis (no 
enhanced Stroop effect when human faces are presented compared to the 
control flower condition) by using a Bayesian regression modelling approach 
({brms} package in R and Stan (Version 2.9.0), Bürkner, 2017), as the null cannot 
be confirmed with Frequentist statistics. 
I.5b: How are R-hat values of 1.00 for each of the tested parameters in Table 
3 to be understood? 
Response: The R-hat value provides information on how well the algorithm could 
estimate the posterior distribution of each parameter. Since we already 
provided information in the main text on the convergence of the model, this 
column has been removed to avoid redundancy.  
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I.5c: The ROPE outcomes do not support the presence of a Stroop effect at 
all, if I understood this correctly. The size of the general Stroop effect was 
sufficiently large, in both studies, based on the conventional outcomes (study 
1:  F(1, 38)= 39.24, p<.001, ηG2= .03; study 2: F(1, 50)=70.31, p<.001, 
ηG2=.06). Can the authors comment more directly on this discrepancy? And 
if the outcomes of the Bayesian analysis are taken seriously, what are the 
consequences for the rest of the paper? For example, page 15 in the 
discussion states “While we again observed the predicted Stroop effect” – did 
you? The different outcomes need to be reconciled better, in my opinion. 
Response: We thank the Reviewer for raising this issue. Determining the limits of 
the ROPE is a somewhat controversial issue in the literature (Kruschke, 2018; 
Kelter, 2020). Instead of relying on the automated procedure we opted for 
initially via the {BayesfactoR} package’s rope_range() function, in the revised 
manuscripts, we choose the limits based on half of what is considered a small 
effect. The rope_range() function returned a range that is considered a large 
effect and because of this, the robust Stroop effect was classified as 
“undecided”. Based on Experiment 1 (∆ 47ms) and the findings of Conty et al. (∆ 
34ms) and Chevallier et al. (∆ 41ms), we set the ROPE limits to [-.017, .017] and 
observe a plot that is easier to reconcile with the Frequentist analysis.  
P.18, l. 451-457: In determining the ROPE range, we set the limits following the 
procedure based on half of what we consider a small effect (Kruschke, 2018). A 
small effect in our first experiment was an average difference of 47ms between 
the incongruent social and incongruent control distractor, compared to a 
difference in 34ms in Conty and colleagues’ task and 41ms in Chevallier and 
colleagues’ version (2010, 2013). Choosing the most conservative small effect, 
we set the ROPE limits to [-.017, .017]. 
I5.d: Figure 5 is unclear to me. What is zero on the x-axis – this can’t be 
“reaction time (s)” ? Also, going back to point 4 a) is this testing the 
presence/absence of any Stroop effect or the slow-down of RTs (i.e., bigger 
Stroop effect) for human faces compared to the other conditions? 
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Response: We included an updated version of Figure 5, now with a corrected x-
axis label. Thank you for pointing out this issue. The graph depicts all 
parameters estimated in the Bayesian regression model. So, for instance, the 
estimated effect of the incongruent target on the reaction time (the Stroop 
interference effect), for which H0 is rejected. We also see the parameter 
estimates for the different distractor types, as well as the interactions. The 
effect of interest (as outlined in the figure description in the manuscript) is the 
incongruent target with the human distractor type. This effect is now shaded in 
yellow, and we do not have a clear decision on H0 based on the ROPE analysis. 
However, as we have written in our updated Bayesian analysis section, the 
estimated effect is small and likely not very strong (if present at all). Moreover, 
it is smaller than the smallest effect we consider interesting (based on our 
previous experiment and the literature), and in the 95% CI zero is contained as a 
likely value.  
P.19, l. 462-468: In summary, in defining our Bayesian regression model, we 
have increased the uncertainty of our estimates by including more random 
variance in the form of subject-level random effects. This increased uncertainty 
is expressed in Figure 5. Based on the ROPE analysis, we cannot definitively 
support the null hypothesis. However, considering that zero is contained in the 
95% interval of credible values of the parameter’s posterior distribution, and 
more than 50% of its values are practically equivalent with zero, the evidence 
for an effect is not very strong and even goes in the opposite direction: 10ms [-
.01, .04].   
[See Figure 12] 
I.6: Using mirror-images also in study 2 arguably may not have created 
unique distractors. A mirror image could act as a particularly strong 
distractor, as it would appear familiar but not identical. This could be 
considered in the limitations section.  
Response: We agree that this point should be raised in the limitations section 
and have added it: 
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P.23, l. 593-604: A further stimulus-based limitation was that in Experiment 1, 
distractors were not controlled by their mirror and presented twice. Thus, the 
repeat presentation could have led to a particularly memorable stimulus set. In 
Experiment 2, the unique distractors in the incongruent condition were 
controlled by their mirror images. Of course, on the other hand, the repeat 
presentation of distractor images is common practice in the social attentional 
capture literature (for example, a set of four unique human and pareidolic face 
images used for an experiment consisting of 450 trials, Ariga & Arihara, 2017). 
Takahashi and colleagues (2013) used stimuli with three unique identities over 
many trials, and only four unique stimuli in another study (Takahashi & 
Watanabe, 2015). Theeuwes et al. (2006) presented 12 unique distractor images 
across 96 trials. To put it differently, based on the conventions of the social 
attentional biasing literature, it is unlikely that we did not observe the expected 
effect due to the number of unique distractor images we presented. 
I.7: The decision to move the stimulus rating into a supplement abbreviated 
the rating outcomes presented in the paper, but I would still have liked to 
see some details. In fact, the supplement also does not state what exactly 
was being judged regarding these stimuli. The paper states on page 11, 
“mind perception of different kinds of agents” – what does this mean and 
what was the actual outcome of the ratings? Is it relevant or irrelevant for 
this paper? 
Response: We have tried to clarify our rationale for the ratings of our distractor 
images in Experiment 2. As we have written, we wanted to establish that the 4 
different categories were perceived differently with regard to “having a mind”, 
which we implicitly equated with the agent’s potential for socialness. The two 
items (and their descriptions), which we called “agency” (ability to plan and 
act) and “experience” (the ability to sense and feel), were derived from Gray, 
Gray & Wegner (2007). 
P.14, l. 402-407: We used mind perception as a socialness proxy to distinguish 
between the control condition (flowers), inanimate (robot and pareidolic faces) 
and agents with a mind (humans). The analysis of the ratings confirmed that the 
stimulus categories were perceived differently: the human images received the 
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highest agency and experience ratings. A detailed report of the stimulus ratings 
can be found in the Supplementary Materials. 
I.8: Some missing details on the Stroop task itself included the number/ratio 
of congruent and incongruent trials, and any restrictions regarding the switch 
between the two (e.g., no more than 2 incongruent trials after each other 
etc.) 
Response: We have added this information in the methods section: 
P.11, l. 327-329: There were equal numbers of incongruent and neutral Stroop 
trials, and no restrictions regarding the switch between incongruent and neutral 
trials were put in place (as they were presented randomly). The target word and 
distractor image pairs were fixed. 
I.9: Since several participants were excluded, I wonder whether these 
criteria were too stringent. At least the method of excluding participants 
should be detailed. For example, excluding participants with ASD diagnoses – 
how was this done? 
Response: We have added this information.  
The rationale for specifying these exclusion criteria was that Chevallier and 
colleagues (2013) found diverging results for the ASD participant group in their 
sample, and we wanted to ensure that all participants were equally naïve 
towards robots (as the initial goal was to establish this as a robust measure for 
social motivation, and then in future experiment integrate this task following 
prolonged human-robot interaction. We were curious about seeing any potential 
differences between a robot-naïve group of participants and a group that has 
encountered humanoid robots on this task).  
P.9, l. 284-289: We recruited 50 participants, however, based on our pre-
registered exclusion criteria (diagnosis of ASD and having had a previous 
interaction with a robot) we excluded 9 participants. Two additional participants 
had insufficient English language skills, and thus the total number of exclusions 
was 11. The pre-registered exclusions were made based on participant answers 
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on the experiment questionnaires’ self-report items (for example: “Do you have 
a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder?” and “Have you interacted with a robot 
before?”). The other exclusions had to be made in addition, based on difficulties 
participants had with the task. We report a final sample size of N=39. 
I.10: (Figures, tables, data availability) Very nice use and high quality of 
Figures. 
I.11: (Ethical approval) Ethical approval was obtained from the University of 
Glasgow ethics review board (300170224). 
I.12: (Language) English is appropriate. 
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